

103
**NEW CHALLENGES FACING THE DEA: HEROIN,
METHAMPHETAMINE, AND CAT**

Y 4.G 74/7:D 84/37

New Challenges Facing the DEA: Heri...

HEARING
BEFORE THE
INFORMATION, JUSTICE, TRANSPORTATION,
AND AGRICULTURE SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

AUGUST 2, 1994

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations



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NEW CHALLENGES FACING THE DEA: HEROIN, METHAMPHETAMINE, AND CAT

TUESDAY, AUGUST 2, 1994

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
INFORMATION, JUSTICE, TRANSPORTATION,
AND AGRICULTURE SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gary A. Condit (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Gary A. Condit, Karen L. Thurman, Bart Stupak, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, and Stephen Horn.

Also present: John Edgell, professional staff member; Aurora Ogg, clerk; and Diane M. Major, minority professional staff, Committee on Government Operations.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CONDIT

Mr. CONDIT. Good morning. The subcommittee will come to order.

In May 1994, the subcommittee held a comprehensive antidrug oversight hearing which allowed the subcommittee members an opportunity to hear testimony from national experts and Federal agencies. We heard about the progress made and the challenges remaining in the war on drugs.

Most witnesses felt that there are clear signs of progress. Overall, cocaine and marijuana use is down significantly from the historical highs of the 1980's. But there remain some troubling new trends. These new problems are in the form of heroin, methamphetamine and a new synthetic narcotic called methcathinone, or CAT.

Heroin trade appears to be flourishing on both coasts. Importation is at near record levels. Supplies are up. Prices have plummeted. Purity levels have peaked. And this is a deadly, deadly combination.

Methamphetamine, also known in street terms as speed, is rampant in my home State of California. The California State Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement raided 360 meth labs in 1993. In the other 49 States, 160 meth labs were raided.

New regulations on the precursor chemicals used in meth production appears to have some effect, but the problem seems now to be driven by illegal importation of the chemicals across the board from Mexico.

CAT, also known by the street names "goob" and "morning star," appears to be more of a regional problem in rural Michigan and Wisconsin. As represented on the table before us this morning, CAT labs resemble nothing more than a high-school chemistry set. In fact, most of the chemicals necessary to produce CAT can be found at your local hardware store.

CAT and meth labs represent a significant challenge for State and local law enforcement officials. More and more illegal labs crop up all over our country. Raids of these labs have become troublesome, burdensome for local police and sheriffs' departments. It is a burden that goes beyond arrests and convictions. Police now have to deal with the environmental problems associated with the disposal of dangerous and poisonous chemicals.

With every raid comes a long-term problem of how to dispose of the chemical waste. My subcommittee colleague, Mr. Stupak, and I have been working on legislation to amend the Superfund law to allow coverage of these types of labs under Federal law. In today's hearing we have an opportunity to discuss these and other issues.

We are pleased to have as our first witness the new Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Mr. Thomas Constantine. This is the first time before our subcommittee for Mr. Constantine.

As we begin here, I want to acknowledge a certain amount of reflection, sadness, and even personal anguish on behalf of the DEA staff. Last month a DEA agent, Mr. Richard Fass, was killed in Phoenix, AZ in a raid of an illegal meth lab. Agent Fass represented the very best law enforcement had to offer, and his loss is a terrible tragedy. Our hearts go out to Agent Fass's family and friends and to his DEA colleagues.

I now turn to Mr. Horn, who is here for Mr. Thomas, for any opening remarks.

Mr. HORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to put Mr. Thomas's opening statement in the record at this point.

I was pleased to help Mr. Stupak on a bipartisan basis when we marked up Superfund to make sure the Federal money would cover raided drug labs and the toxics that they spread around the area.

My own interest in this hearing will be strictly with the sufficiency of funds and positions in terms of interdiction, and the role of your agency in coordinating other Federal efforts and what has happened there on funding, and are you able to help rescue, perhaps, some of the cuts that have occurred in other agencies, which we will get to in the question period.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT
"NEW CHALLENGES FACING THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION"

August 2, 1994
Room 2203 Rayburn House Office Building

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling today's hearing. It is the second in a series of hearings the Subcommittee has held to review the the Clinton Administration's efforts to deal with the proliferation of illegal drugs in our society.

I am sad to report that after finally making significant gains to end casual drug use, the drug war has taken a new direction. Between 1985 and 1992, casual drug use declined. However, the numbers are going back up, particularly among adolescents. Hard-core narcotic addicts have also followed suit as our hospital emergency rooms are reporting a nine-percent increase in heroin and cocaine related cases.

What is most troubling about the hard-core narcotic population, is that they are rarely treatable. Last August, Dr. Lee Brown, the Clinton

Administration's Drug Policy Director, released the Treatment Outcome Prospectives Study. Its sobering results found that "for every ten clients who used cocaine regularly during the year prior to treatment, six clients had returned to heavy use one year after treatment, and eight clients had relapsed into heavy use within three to five years after treatment."

Treatment and prevention have their place in the battle against drugs and crime. However, I question the president's decision to cut \$95 million for interdiction efforts and spend \$355 million for hard-core drug users.

Interdiction and domestic law enforcement must play an equal role in the National Drug Control Strategy. It's for this reason that I'm disappointed in the administration's drug strategy that calls for cutting 625 positions among the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Coast Guard.

It is time the administration stop sending mix signals. If it is

serious about the drug war, then we should be encouraging law enforcement to coordinate their efforts -- not cut back their resources; we should get tough with countries that are the source of illegal drugs -- not concede our demands that production be reduced; and, we should allow state and local officials to use federal anti-drug funds for their highest priorities -- not categorize what is important to Washington, D.C.

Mr. Chairman, these are the real solutions needed to fight the drug war and to set the National Drug Control Strategy in the right direction. Thank you again for holding today's hearing. I look forward to the testimony.

Mr. CONDIT. Mrs. Thurman, do you have any remarks you would like to make?

Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to applaud yours and Mr. Stupak's efforts. I know that Mr. Stupak has worked hard and long on this issue. I think it was one of the first bills the freshmen passed around here. So I recognize his efforts on that issue. I also just want to lend my support and recognize the significance of these issues.

Hopefully, we can help make some changes in this country. We appreciate you being here.

Mr. CONDIT. Thank you very much.

Mr. Constantine joined the Clinton administration after a distinguished career in New York State law enforcement, recognized for his life commitment on behalf of local law enforcement and his antidrug efforts. We are pleased to have him with us here today. He joins us today not only with his able staff but comes around with a series of exhibits and even videotapes.

We commend you and your staff for your cooperation in this hearing. We look forward to your testimony. We appreciate very much you being here, and the floor is yours.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. CONDIT. Mr. Constantine, the floor is yours.

**STATEMENT OF THOMAS A. CONSTANTINE, ADMINISTRATOR,
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY
JOHN COONCE, STAFF COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF CHEMICAL CONTROL**

Mr. CONSTANTINE. Congressman, to you and members of your subcommittee, first of all I want to thank you for your work which was done previously before I got here. You have a reputation for being very helpful to people in the drug enforcement business, and your legislation has proved to be an excellent asset for us. I am glad that you are again willing to listen to us and provide us with opportunity to explain some of the problems facing us. I think that is very, very satisfying to people in DEA.

As you mentioned, I have been here only 4 months. I spent years in New York, the last 7 of which were as superintendent. I guess if any State can lay claim to seeing the tremendous devastation that occurs as a result of drug trafficking, it is in my home State of New York. All of the problems seem to be magnified there, and one of the things that I have seen and am hoping to work toward at DEA is to try and design programs that work at the nexus of drugs and violent crime. Hopefully, we can restore a sense of order and quality of life to many of our cities and towns throughout the country that are suffering greatly from this problem.

There is no doubt that drug abuse and trafficking have denigrated that quality of life. I could speak of examples of it forever. I think what you will see today is how two drugs, methamphetamine and methcathinone have brought major drug traffickers and violence to what were once peaceful rural areas of the country.

You mentioned Richard Fass. He was an outstanding young man from Tucson, AZ. He was dealing with individuals alleged to be part of an organized methamphetamine Mafia from Mexico. They

very coldly and in a preplanned fashion assassinated him in a car repair garage in Glendale, AZ.

As it turns out, I was with Director Freeh in Europe at that point in time on a trip of organized crime and drug trafficking, and I came back that night to meet with Richard's widow and his mom and dad and his brother. As I sat in this house in Tucson and talked with them, that was the 12th time in my career I have dealt with survivors and so often it is a result of something involving drug trafficking.

So I would also like to provide you with some data on what you mentioned on heroin and what is really a worldwide beginning of an epidemic that is spreading again throughout the United States—almost like a repeat of a movie.

But before I highlight the illicit drugs I am discussing today, methamphetamine, CAT, and heroin, I would like to make some points that take into account the efforts to control drug trafficking of all these drugs.

First, one thing it is important to recognize is that both domestic and international strategies must be developed. All of these substances have some relationship to international drug traffic.

Second, the trafficking and use of the drug contributes significantly to the level of violence in this country. In fact, at least 50 percent of all homicides in the United States are drug related and probably 75 percent of all of the homicides that law enforcement is unable to solve presently are drug related.

Third, most of the drug cartels and distributors, even in the drugs we mentioned, are very tightly controlled operations and very similar to the Mafia of the 1950's or 1960's. The methamphetamine, which is, as you mentioned, a very difficult problem in the State of California but really everywhere, is a stimulant drug manufactured in clandestine labs with easily available ingredients.

Historically, the origin of these drugs was with violent outlaw motorcycle gangs. The FBI and DEA and a lot of State and local police departments in an operation in the late 1980's were very, very successful in destroying that linkage with the motorcycle gangs. In recent years, however, the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamines within the United States has been taken over by an equally violent group of traffickers from Mexico.

These violators operate out of laboratories that are located primarily in California, which, as you know, Mr. Chairman, has been the most prolific State for clandestine laboratories in general and specifically methamphetamine labs. Last year alone, California accounted for at least 56 percent of all clandestine laboratories seized nationwide. It also accounted for about 80 percent of all clandestine methamphetamine labs seized nationwide last year.

The price of methamphetamine I think is indicative of the location of manufacture. In California, 1 pound of methamphetamine is about \$4,000 to \$6,000. On the East Coast it is \$10,000 to \$15,000, which is roughly double the price of cocaine.

At this point, I would like to just show you a little bit about what these methamphetamine labs look like, some of the dangers that are associated with it, the dangers to the users because of the crudeness and the lack of any type of quality standard on the product, the danger to the community and law enforcement because of

the nature of mixing flammable chemicals and the inexperience of the operators.

Although this methamphetamine case goes back a few years, it clearly represents the situation today. To set the scene, the lab was found through a task force operation with DEA and State and local officers near Riverside, CA. The lab operator owned a junkyard and although he wasn't open for business, the junkyard was a great cover for his clandestine business. It was capable of producing 100 pounds of methamphetamines at any one point in time.

In the rear of the junkyard, the operator had buried a school bus, your typical 45-passenger yellow school bus buried 12 feet underground. The entrance was hidden by a tire-changing machine that was hydraulically operated and could be lifted to reveal the drawer.

As can you see, the atmosphere was so volatile the agents are wearing safety gear and respirator apparatus. At this point in time Joyce McDonald will put on 2 minutes of this tape and you will be able to look at some of the situations they were facing.

[Videotape shown.]

Mr. CONSTANTINE. It is hard to believe that primitive laboratory was capable of producing \$1 million worth of methamphetamines to be sold. There are approximately 15 such laboratories seized in the Central California Valley just since January 1, 1994.

The problem of methamphetamine is not a new one. It has been a threat since the early 1960's. Prior to the passage of the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988, which provides the Federal Government with the means to regulate chemicals that are being diverted continuously for illegal production of controlled substances, no attempt had ever been made to attack the source of the problem, which is to control the precursor and essential chemicals used to produce illegal drugs. The primary precursor is ephedrine powder.

Since Congress passed and DEA implemented the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act, we have seen some successes, most notably reflected by the clandestine laboratory seizures which decreased dramatically from 807 in 1989 to 115 in the first 6 months of this year. We realize, however, that traffickers are resourceful in adapting to new conditions.

First, in their attempts to look for new ways to circumvent the law, laboratory operators started purchasing ephedrine tablets by the millions to escape the scrutiny being applied to large sales of ephedrine powder under the law. Ephedrine tablets until recently were exempt from the regulatory controls of the act since they are an approved drug product readily available in over-the-counter medications. Its purpose is, for people who have asthma or breathing situations, it helps to deflate the lungs.

Fortunately, we have been able to address this concern and attack the use of ephedrine tablets in the manufacture of methamphetamines through a new law, the Domestic Chemical Diversion Control Act of 1993, a major piece of chemical control legislation that was sponsored by Congressman Stupak and passed by Congress in November of last year. This legislation removes the tablets from regulatory exemptions and grants DEA the authority to remove the exemption from any other drug products which are diverted for use in the illicit production of controlled drugs.

I just have to tell you, Mr. Chairman, as I said in the beginning, when you are involved in this type of a profession, when you see people from the legislature rally to your support and come up with essential legislation, it makes things seem worthwhile. To all of you, I thank you very much.

Our second concern is that because of tighter United States controls, clandestine laboratory operators have sought other sources of chemicals, principally from Mexico and Canada. In 1990, shortly after passage of the CTDA, smuggling of precursor chemicals along the Mexico-United States border increased significantly. Since 1991, there has been a proliferation of Mexican trafficking organizations involved in the clandestine manufacture of methamphetamine. This is an ominous development for us.

Mexican traffickers are involved in this production in two ways. They smuggle the chemicals in the United States to labs that are located in remote areas throughout southern or northern California, or they produce the methamphetamine in labs in Mexico, smuggling the finished product across the border.

The Department of Justice is working with multinational organizations such as the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission to assist Mexico and other Latin American governments to draft legislation that is urgently needed.

I am optimistic about our potential for success in reducing this international problem which has serious ramifications on the methamphetamine problem in this country.

I might add that with Attorney General Reno and what is I understand an annual meeting with counterparts in Mexico, this issue of the need to address the problem with ephedrine was put out very directly in the joint meetings, and in my limited trips to Europe before I returned because of the death of Agent Fass, we discussed this with people in Eastern Europe, because that is becoming more and more the source of large tonnage shipments of ephedrine, by a number of routes into Mexico.

Another drug, which will be familiar to some of you, is methcathinone. Periodically there are unexpected drug problems that arise that just add to the grief that we have. They are usually in designer drugs or some type of an analog. This is the case with methcathinone, which is a methamphetamine analog that is also called CAT and a variety of other street names. It is a central nervous stimulant. It produces a variety of serious health effects including agitation, anxiety, paranoia, and convulsions. It is generally snorted or taken through intravenous drug injections.

In 1991, the first seizures and identification of this drug were encountered by the Michigan State Police in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan.

Let me briefly trace its history. The drug was first developed and used in Russia in the 1930's as an antidepressant but they found out that the withdrawal symptom produced more depression than they were curing. It was used during the war by Germany as some type of a drug to keep people awake.

Then it was brought to the United States in the mid-1950's. There was a good deal of research, perhaps as an appetite suppressant, but it was found too addictive. In 1991, two people started

making the drug and distributing it in Ann Arbor, MI. There was not a market at that point in time. So they took the drug to the Marquette in the Upper Peninsula and found there was an interest and it started to develop from there.

DEA, along with the Michigan State Police, seized the first methcathinone laboratories in Ann Arbor, MI, in June 1991. A total of five labs were seized in 1991. In 1992, six more were seized, one of those in Wisconsin.

The size of these laboratories is generally smaller than those normally encountered with other drugs such as methamphetamine, leading us to believe that CAT laboratories are intended for self use or small-scale production.

I might add about a week ago on Friday I went out to speak with a number of Explorer Scouts at Indiana University, and on a Friday night I was driven from Indianapolis to Bloomington. In talking with the DEA agents, they tell me that in the State of Indiana very frequently they are finding methcathinone laboratories as well as methamphetamine.

John Coonce from the DEA staff, who is certainly far more knowledgeable than I am in the technical aspects of this and these laboratories, has brought a number of the types of chemicals that are utilized in the manufacture of methcathinone. And what I will do is ask John if he will please come up to the table to explain the technical aspect to the group. Since 1979, John has been involved in the seizure of over 100 labs in the country and has testified numerous times in Federal and State courts.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. CONDIT. Thank you, sir.

Mr. COONCE. Mr. Chairman, honored committee members, I would like to preface my comments with respect to the manufacturing process of methcathinone by telling you that I would love to go into specific detail and give you the proportions, but unfortunately this forum is not the place. However, I am available to this committee after these proceedings today to go into any kind of detail that you would like.

I would also like you to understand that I am not a chemist. I have never had an hour of chemistry in high school or college. But I am a cook. By a cook I mean an individual that knows how to manufacture a controlled substance. And normally these people learn how to manufacture these controlled substances simply by watching other people make it. I learned mine by training, undercover work in the seizure of laboratories.

With that, I will get on with my explanation and tell you that this drug, methcathinone, is the easiest drug to manufacture. The labs are entirely mobile. It can be contained in one box like this, the CAT in the box that was seized up in northern Wisconsin.

I call this process a shake and bake, because that is all it is. All I need is two mason jars and a source of heat and I can manufacture this drug, or I can take two glasses that you commonly drink water out of and manufacture this drug.

I would like to tell you how this process starts. Right here we have a magnetic hot plate, our source of heat. This is rather sophisticated for this type of laboratory because in our seizures we found

they will just put a mason jar on top of an electric stove and that is their heat source.

The only other thing you have to do is stir it. This happens to be a magnetic stirrer. I may be aging myself but they have been known to use mix masters as their stirring device.

The first process is to take the precursor, ephedrine, and grind it up in one of these grinders. They will put that in the mason jar, add sulfuric acid and distilled water and shake it up.

They will put this in the container, the mason jar here. And then the next step is they will take battery acid, and sodium dichromate, which is an industrial oxidizer, and they will mix that together. After they do that, they will take red devil lye and they will add it to this solution to bring up the alkalinity level.

Basically, at this point in time, you have liquid methcathinone, and you have other chemicals in the mason jar. What you do then is take a solvent, which is toluolene in many instances, but it can be any solvent, and you use it to separate the liquid from the methcathinone. You pour this out and you still have the methcathinone in the jar. You take Epsom salts and spread it on a pie plate and you heat it in the oven for about an hour or so at a certain temperature. You add this to that methcathinone and it removes the water.

After you have the water removed, you have the liquid methcathinone in the mason jar. What you do is you boil muriatic acid in a wine bottle. It goes through these two tubes into these two bottles which are in an ice bath. That causes the condensation to come down into this pie plate and it goes right into the liquid methcathinone and it converts from a liquid into a powdered form of the drug.

After that is done, they take the powder out of the mason jar, put it on a coffee filter, and they pour acetone over this solution, and that cleans it up. Lay it out and dry it up, and you have got methcathinone.

I can take 4,000 ephedrine tablets and I can manufacture 2 ounces of methcathinone. My cost for that is \$60 and I can sell it for well over \$2,000.

I will be more than happy to answer any generic questions.

Mr. CONDIT. Thank you very much. That was very informative. You are welcome to sit up here if you like.

Mr. CONSTANTINE. Once DEA had realized the potential seriousness of CAT, there was a quick move to address the threat. In 1992 it was temporarily placed into schedule I of Federal Control Substance Act. This is an emergency scheduling provision for some type of drug that is being abused and considered a risk to health. It was permanently scheduled on November 1, 1993.

Also, for past year, working with local law enforcement in northern Michigan and northern Wisconsin, the DEA has been responsible for the arrest of a group of individuals, 52 of them; 44 have pled guilty, 32 have been sentenced for manufacturing and distribution.

We are also working to try to educate the public about this drug. It is something new on the horizon. We thought at one point it would just be limited to northern Michigan. It is very obvious, however that is not the case.

We have disseminated a great deal of information about it and included it in educational presentations. However, in spite of our best efforts, CAT has been seen in Colorado, Indiana, and Illinois already, and during the first 6 months of this year we have seized labs in Ohio and Virginia.

In fact, there is a poster with individuals who have been arrested and been convicted as repeat violators. Unfortunately, when they finish their time after being released from prison, they could be equally as dangerous in spreading their information to other people in prison.

A case that illustrates that point is the fentanyl investigation that was worked originally out of DEA's Boston field division task force in 1992. This is a deadly designer drug with characteristics similar to heroin but much, much more potent.

Based on intelligence from wire intercepts in Virginia, Kansas, and as John reminded me, and it felt kind of good that there were State investigators from New York who helped in this case, in Wichita, over \$700,000 in chemicals and sophisticated laboratory equipment were seized.

The fentanyl manufactured in these labs was responsible for over 130 overdose deaths in the Northeast United States. Three individuals were arrested and charged with a conspiracy to manufacture. All of them had served time in Lewisburg prison, and while in prison had formulated a plan to produce and distribute this drug, and obviously to make great sums of money.

Fortunately for society, the chemists and the master planner are going back to jail for a long time, 25 and 30 years respectively, both with no possibility of parole.

I would like to briefly mention another issue that I think you brought up associated with labs in general and CAT and methamphetamine. It is of grave concern to the DEA, just as I am sure it is to you, Mr. Chairman.

These labs leave behind dangerous chemical waste which is routinely dumped into the ground. As a result, when laboratory sites are encountered either by the DEA or local law enforcement such as the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, the sites must be cleaned up at great expense to the taxpayers.

I have some experience in this. In 1986, in one of the most rural parts of New York State, we found the Cali cartel had moved in and established the largest cocaine laboratory in the United States. We arrested 18 subjects, all of them illegal aliens from Colombia, as a result of a fire that started on the top of the hill.

Unfortunately, they had 55 or 50-gallon drums of ether and an equal amount of acetone. A lot of it had been dumped in the ground and started the fire. We thought we were heroes in law enforcement for breaking up the lab. We spent a week trying to figure out what to do with the waste that was left behind, because after the cameras had left, nobody wanted to pay for it. I thought I was going to have to take it home for a while but eventually we were able to get some Superfund money out of the State to clean it up.

We have put some things up here and I think it is worth noting. This is almost in my police career like a revisit of a terrible situation, because heroin was the primary drug of choice in the 1960's and early 1970's when I was working narcotics on the street. We

seem somehow to have gotten away from it. Cocaine became the drug of choice.

We have done a good job in the education system, at least up until lately. There has been a reduction in the number of casual users. So heroin really kind of became a low priority. What we have seen now is it has become a worldwide epidemic, and there is a great deal of usage of it in certain areas of the United States. It has become a trendy drug again for people on the East Coast and the West Coast, most specifically in the wealthy types of entertainment centers, the East Side of Manhattan and Hollywood. People are espousing this again as something that can be used casually.

The purity rate is increasing, as you can see from some of those bags, which are actually street buys of glassine envelopes from various places. In New York City, there are glassine envelopes of heroin being sold as high as 75 to 80 percent. For a historical comparison, in the 1970's when we were working in the street, the average percentage of purity was 5 percent. It has gone up at least tenfold. The price, even accounting for inflation, has gone down about 50 percent.

In some areas, talking to Congressman Rangel and others, in his district, there is at least anecdotal information that there are people giving heroin away for free in certain sections in New York City, which is obviously a tremendous investment if somebody gets addicted.

It—heroin distribution—is controlled by a very diverse multiethnic group. Most of our heroin presently from the Far East can be traced back to Burma and then shipped through Thailand.

More often now the transporters have become Nigerians. If you look in the prisons in Eastern Europe, if you look at the prisons in Thailand, you will find them populated with heavy groups of Nigerian drug traffickers.

The traditional routes that came through the Balkans have been disrupted by the war. We are now, at least in areas such as Hungary and Slovakia and the Czech Republic, extremely concerned about the drug trafficking of heroin through these areas. I am told by knowledgeable people in the DEA who served in Pakistan in the late 1970's, when there were only a handful of heroin addicts, they now number in the millions of people addicted to heroin in some of those countries.

As you can see, it is interesting, if you get close enough, to look at the names on the bags, which tells you something about the psyche of the heroin user or the drug user in general. All of the bags are written to in some way emphasize the tremendous impact that the drug would cause on a human being. And that is why I think for a while fentanyl was so attractive, because people saw it as having a big hit.

The heroin problem is now becoming more and more complicated as traditional Colombian cocaine traffickers are entering the heroin trade. There are now 20,000 hectares of opium poppy under cultivation in Colombia. That would make it the fourth largest producer of the opium poppy in the world.

Now, when you link that to that very tightly controlled, organized Colombian-controlled cocaine production out of Cali where we

have seized their work records, and their job applications are as detailed as anything in government, when they now enter also into the heroin market, I think you get a sense of some of our fear.

We cohosted with Interpol an international heroin conference 2 months ago. Every law enforcement official throughout Europe, the Mideast, the Far East, and Africa have talked about the problem of heroin, not supplanting the present drug problems that we have but supplementing the present drug problems. And because the purity is so strong, people think that they can snort this drug and thereby avoid the dangers of AIDS and some of what they think is overdose problems with intravenous injections.

Yet, despite that, the heroin overdose to our hospitals, in 6 months in 1993 were up 44 percent. All of our historical knowledge of people using drugs is that they start off snorting the drug. If they can use it intravenously, it provides a bigger, long-lasting rush. They would then move to that.

If they did, with that type of purity, I am sure that we would see a tremendous increase in our hospital overdose.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for being patient with me, when I went through this kind of fairly prolonged explanation. Again, to you and the subcommittee I want to thank you very much for what you have done for us in the past and hopefully we can work together again in the future to try to address some of these problems.

[NOTE.—To reduce publication costs, the subcommittee has omitted from the record a drug intelligence report entitled, "Methamphetamine: 1992–1993 Threat Assessment" by the U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration. This report can be found in subcommittee files.]

[The prepared statement of Mr. Constantine follows:]

Statement
of

Thomas A. Constantine
Administrator

*The Drug Enforcement Administration
United States Department of Justice*

for

*Subcommittee on Information, Justice, Transportation
and Agriculture*

U.S. House of Representatives

Concerning

*New Challenges Facing DEA: Heroin, Methamphetamine
and Methcathinone (CAT)*

August 2, 1994

Chairman Condit and Members of the Subcommittee on Information, Justice, Transportation: It is a privilege for me to appear before the Subcommittee today to provide you with my views on trends in drug production and trafficking, and to share with you what the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is doing to address them. I would like to deliver an abbreviated opening statement and submit a longer statement for the record.

I have been the Administrator of DEA for four months now and these few months have confirmed for me how complex our drug problem is, both nationally and internationally. Prior to assuming the DEA responsibilities, I was Superintendent of Police in New York State. I spent 32 years in that organization and saw first-hand how devastating crime and drugs are to our communities. One of my goals as DEA Administrator is to design and implement programs which attack the nexus between drug trafficking and violent crime, and restore a sense of order and pride to our cities and towns.

There is no doubt that drug abuse and trafficking have denigrated the quality of life in not only our major cities but in small towns and rural areas. You will see today how two drugs -- methamphetamine (speed) and methcathinone (CAT) --- have brought major drug traffickers and violence to once peaceful rural areas. The violence associated with methamphetamine was well-illustrated in the killing of DEA Special Agent Richard Fass in Phoenix, Arizona on June 30. He was slain during an undercover buy by traffickers who planned to steal money. I will also provide you with data on how heroin is making a comeback, threatening to spread into all major urban areas and new user populations.

I am not being alarmist when I say that we need to acknowledge that our drug problem will not be solved overnight. We must also recognize that the violence which goes hand in hand with drug trafficking and abuse will continue given current demographic trends. A brief look at some statistics illustrates just how serious our problem is. The most violence prone segment of our population --- 18 to 24 year olds--- decreased during the 1980's. It was expected that with this decrease would come a corresponding decrease in crime and violence. That did not happen, mainly because of crack cocaine. By the year 2005, the number of young people between 15 and 19 will rise by almost 25 percent. The consequences for the criminal justice system are profound; men between 18 and 24 are two to three times more likely to commit violent crimes than men over 25. Many criminologists predict that we will experience another crime wave in the early part of the next century when those in the "echo of the baby boom" hit late adolescence.

These demographic statistics, coupled with recent drug abuse data, give us even more reason for concern. The 1993 Household Survey which was released last week indicated that although there has been a steady decrease in drug use among Americans since 1979, no such decrease was documented between 1992 and 1993. The number of people using cocaine weekly remained at about half a million. Another recent survey measuring drug use among 8th, 10th, and 12th graders also contained troubling data. Marijuana use increased among all these grades in 1993 and significantly fewer students acknowledged that there are risks associated with drug use.

While these numbers do give us cause for concern, I am optimistic that with the proper emphasis and with persistence, we can and will reduce drug production and trafficking in our nation.

Before I go into detail on the three illicit drugs we are discussing today --- heroin, methamphetamine and CAT --- I'd like to briefly make some points which should be taken into account any effort to control the production and trafficking of these drugs.

First, we need to recognize that both domestic and international strategies must be developed to address these problems. All of these substances have components which frequently have international sources and are trafficked into the United States for use by American drug users.

Second, the trafficking and use of these drugs contributes significantly to the violence we are experiencing in this nation today, and

Third, drug supplies and demand are closely linked and fuel each other.

Heroin: We have good reason to believe that we are facing a resurgence of heroin abuse and trafficking in the United States. As you well know, Mr. Chairman, the heroin problem is not new. In the past 30 years, we have seen the rise and fall of heroin supply, heightened public awareness, and coordinated law enforcement efforts aimed at both the demand and supply of

heroin. Although we have seen these problems associated with heroin before, today's problems in the United States are different for a number of reasons. The increased quantities and purity levels of heroin, a changing method of heroin abuse, a growing acceptance of drug use among a new generation of users, and new traffickers and producers of heroin all combine to make our challenge more difficult.

With increasing frequency, we are seeing dramatic increases in quantities and purity of heroin being seized. As worldwide production of opium rose substantially between 1988 and 1993, particularly in Burma and Afghanistan, we have seen a number of multi-hundred kilogram seizures of heroin in various parts of the world. Colombia has also entered the scene as an emerging source of heroin destined for the U.S. In addition, analysis of data from DEA's Domestic Monitor Program shows street-level purity continuing to rise. Purity levels of heroin being sold on U.S. streets now average 37 percent, compared to 5 percent a decade ago. High levels of purity mean that supplies are plentiful and more potent. There has also been a continued rise in the number of heroin-related emergency room drug abuse episodes. In the first six months of 1993, hospital admissions for heroin-related emergencies increased 44 percent.

In addition to more heroin being available at much higher purity levels, changing patterns of administering heroin may make this resurgence much more dangerous. While injection continues to be the primary method of administering heroin, an increasing number of heroin users are now snorting, or inhaling the drug because of its higher purity and because of the fear of AIDS. This disturbing trend is a particular cause for concern for two reasons:

- New heroin users are being lulled into a false sense of security in believing that because they inhale the drug, they are less likely to become addicted, and
- Since inhalation is not an efficient way of administering heroin, drug experts believe it is only a matter of time before many inhalers switch to the more efficient method of injection, thus creating a whole new population of intravenous heroin users.

A troubling phenomenon that we are witnessing with the resurgence of heroin is the fading of the social stigma that was once attached to that drug. Heroin has once again become fashionable and chic in certain social circles, including among rock stars and the club scene. Today, the attitude of heroin users is reminiscent of the cocaine user in the Seventies and early Eighties, when cocaine use was rationalized as non-addictive and recreational. Cocaine use began among the well-to-do; crack was the tragic legacy left to poorer Americans.

Heroin trafficking in the United States is controlled by a diverse, multi-ethnic group of traffickers who supply heroin from a variety of sources to heroin users in this country. This situation is further complicated by the different languages and dialects used by these groups. Aggressive heroin traffickers, like West Africans, have joined the traditional Asian, Turkish, Middle Eastern and Mexican heroin traffickers in the heroin trade. Heroin smuggled into the United States originates from one of four distinct source areas: Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, Mexico or South America.

Several routes are used to transport heroin to the United States. A major route originates in Bangkok, transits Taiwan, enters the U.S. at one of several West Coast cities, and terminates in New York City, the largest importation and distribution center in the United States for Southeast Asian heroin. Some shipments are direct to New York, while other cities on the East Coast, such as Boston, are used as entry points. Recent seizures have shown that these organizations are capable of utilizing ant deep water port, such as New Orleans, where 327 kilograms of Southeast Asian heroin were seized last year.

Within U.S. borders, there are overall regional heroin distribution patterns that are fairly distinct. For example, at the wholesale level, Southeast Asian heroin is dominant in the northeastern United States and along the east coast; Mexican heroin is prevalent in the western states and some large mid-west cities. Southwest Asian heroin is available in both west coast and east coast cities, as well as in several southern cities. Colombian heroin is available primarily in the northeastern United States, with most of it entering the U.S. in Miami.

The heroin trafficking situation is further complicated by the fact that while heroin may originate in Southeast Asia, several different groups will be involved in smuggling it -- each with its own techniques and specialties. Chinese and Thai traffickers, for example, are able to move multi-hundred kilogram shipments of heroin to the United States in commercial cargo. Nigerians and other West African traffickers smuggle Southeast Asian heroin in primarily one to five

kilogram loads aboard commercial airliners. The sheer number of Nigerian and West African smugglers make them responsible for moving substantial amounts of heroin to the U.S. market, despite the small size of individual loads.

Some Mexican trafficking organizations control the entire process from opium production and heroin processing in Mexico to the management of transportation and distribution networks in the United States. Other trafficking organizations operate independently on a smaller scale. Traffickers from Mexico also exploit the extended land border that Mexico shares with the United States. They take advantage of their proximity to the United States by stockpiling the larger quantities of heroin in Mexico, then smuggling smaller amounts as transactions are arranged in the United States, thus minimizing exposure to U.S. law enforcement efforts.

Colombian traffickers, whose drug focus has primarily been cocaine, are also emerging as another distinct threat, producing and trafficking high purity heroin. These traffickers use their connections with the existing Colombian cocaine cartels to smuggle heroin through well-established trafficking routes. Seizures of Colombian heroin are rising in the United States, and the purity is often 90 percent or higher. Cultivation of opium poppy in Colombia has increased dramatically from 1,200 hectares in 1991 to 20,000 hectares today -- making Colombia potentially a major heroin source.

The problems associated with heroin are not limited to just the United States. The heroin problem is a global one -- and it requires a global response. Cooperative programs on a regional and worldwide basis are the only way to effectively address the problem. We also must wage a concentrated attack on every link in the chain of heroin production, beginning with opium poppy cultivation, going through manufacturing, finances and transportation, and concluding with the distribution networks in every country.

To that end, DEA has a multi-faceted approach to the heroin problem. DEA is currently participating in the Presidentially-mandated interagency review and an internal Department of Justice coordination of our heroin policy. We are also working closely with the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, Dr. Lee Brown, who has recently returned from Southeast Asia, where he met with government officials and saw first-hand the challenges posed by opium and heroin production.

DEA's heroin strategy is structured to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy the major heroin trafficking organizations that are responsible for the production, transportation, and distribution of heroin destined for the United States and other world markets. This strategy is DEA's framework for planning, directing, and supporting major investigations and operations that target the highest level of the heroin traffic. The intent is to focus and coordinate U.S. Government efforts to combat heroin trafficking in and through the various geographical regions. The

strategy identifies and prioritized the most important heroin traffickers in the United States and foreign countries for intelligence collection and exploitation and ultimately arrest and incarceration.

DEA has developed a two-pronged enforcement program that addresses not only an international effort to identify and disrupt foreign sources of supply, but also a simultaneous attack against domestic-based heroin importation and distribution organizations. Domestically, DEA is targeting Mexican, Colombian, and Nigerian/West African heroin trafficking groups.

The United States' most direct heroin threat is posed by the Mexican sources of supply. Historically, family-oriented Mexican drug trafficking organizations are poly-drug, offering transportation services to bulk quantity South American cocaine cartels, while at the same time being a source of supply for heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine. To respond to this threat, DEA has initiated a Southwest Border initiative, which allows for the development of a full-range of drug investigations targeting U.S. and Mexican-based trafficking organizations. Through this effort, our goal is to disrupt these poly-drug enterprises, and in doing so, directly impact on the heroin sources of supply in Mexico.

To address the emerging threat posed by Nigerian and West African heroin trafficking organizations, we have initiated an in-depth review of this problem to identify the nature and extent of these groups, determine how they build support and infrastructure, and uncover where they are vulnerable to aggressive law enforcement programs. This information will supply a

wealth of intelligence to support ongoing and future initiatives against these heroin trafficking groups. In addition, this year during the annual certification process, Nigeria was decertified. Later this month, Dr. Brown will be leading a Presidential mission to Nigeria and other West African nations.

In other efforts, DEA continues to utilize Operation Pipeline, Convoy and Jetway to target the interstate transportation of heroin in much the same way as cocaine shipments are intercepted. This operation has proven to be efficient and successful. Through the operation, DEA works directly with state police organizations to target all modes of land transportation for interstate heroin transportation.

To attack the vulnerabilities of violent drug organizations, cooperative efforts with state and local officials will be expanded and enhanced through DEA's Violent Trafficker Program, an initiative that focuses on local issues and the relationship between violence and drugs. Through this program, we have strengthened efforts with our state and local partners by targeting drug-related violence, particularly in inner cities. Once these violent traffickers have been identified, we work through our state and local task forces to put these organizations out of business.

In the coming months, DEA will be developing heroin strategies to address the myriad heroin threats from all of these trafficking groups now producing and trafficking heroin.

Dangerous Drugs: Methamphetamine is a stimulant drug manufactured clandestinely from easily available ingredients. Methamphetamine, also known as "Speed" and "Crank," is the most significant dangerous drug problem in terms of domestic clandestine manufacture and widespread distribution. Traditionally, violent Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMG's) were the predominant operators of methamphetamine laboratories. In recent years, however, the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine has been taken over by equally violent traffickers from Mexico. These violators operate out of laboratories that are located primarily in California which, as you know Mr. Chairman, has been the most prolific state for clandestine laboratories in general and specifically methamphetamine labs. Last year alone, California accounted for at least 56 percent of all clandestine laboratories seized nationwide. It also accounted for about 80 percent of all clandestine methamphetamine laboratories seized nationwide last year.

The problem of methamphetamine is not a new one -- it has been a threat since the early 1960s. Prior to the passage of the *Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988 (CDTA)*, no attempt had ever been made to attack the source of the problem--that is to control the precursor and essential chemicals used to produce illicit dangerous drugs including methamphetamine. The primary precursor used to produce methamphetamine is ephedrine powder. Since Congress passed and DEA implemented the *Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act*, we have seen some successes, most notably reflected by the reduction of clandestine laboratory seizures, which have decreased dramatically from 807 in 1989 to 115 through the first six months of this year.

The CDTA was passed to provide the Federal government with a means to regulate chemicals that are being diverted continuously for illegal production of controlled substances. This legislation originally placed under federal control the distribution of 12 precursor and 8 essential chemicals used in the production of illicit drugs, as well as the distribution of tableting and encapsulating machines. In 1990, additional chemicals and their salts were added to the CDTA as part of the Crime Control Act, which brought the total number of listed precursor chemicals to 24 and the number of essential chemicals to 9. We realize, however, that traffickers are resourceful in adapting to new conditions, including restrictions imposed upon them by law. While the *Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act* has been an important law enforcement tool in preventing clandestine laboratory operators from obtaining the chemicals they need to manufacture illegal drugs, it has also had two effects that are of concern to us.

First, in their attempts to look for ways to circumvent the law, clandestine laboratory operators started purchasing ephedrine tablets by the millions to escape the scrutiny that was being applied to sales of ephedrine powder under the CDTA. Large purchases of ephedrine are controlled under the law, but ephedrine tablets were exempt from the regulatory controls of the CDTA since they are an approved drug product, readily available in over-the-counter medications. Ephedrine is the key ingredient used to manufacture methamphetamine in clandestine laboratories using the ephedrine reduction method. This is the most commonly used method to manufacture methamphetamine, and it is easy, more efficient, and produces a much more potent product than other forms of production. The ephedrine tablets started showing up in methamphetamine labs almost immediately after the CDTA was implemented. Clandestine

laboratory operators purchased them from legitimate pharmaceutical companies and distributors, which, in some instances we found, knew that these pills were being diverted into the illicit market. An example of one such company was Nationwide Purveyors, Incorporated. This Pittsburgh-based company operated as a mail order supplier of ephedrine tablets, and was a major source of supply of ephedrine to numerous methamphetamine labs in California. A DEA investigation into the illicit activities of Nationwide led to the arrest and conviction of nine individuals, including the owner and vice president of the company, who were involved in diverting approximately 9,000 pounds of ephedrine, money laundering, and evading the reporting requirements of the CDTA. The owner of Nationwide was sentenced to eight years in prison and three years probation, and the vice president received five years probation, 1,000 hours of community service, and a \$10,000 fine. Nationwide Corporation was also fined \$26,800.

Fortunately, we have been able to address this concern and attack the use of ephedrine tablets in the manufacture of methamphetamine through a new law, the *Domestic Chemical Diversion Control Act of 1993*, a major piece of chemical control legislation that was sponsored by Congressman Bart Stupak and passed by the Congress in November of last year. This legislation removes tablets from regulatory exemption and grants DEA the authority to remove the exemption from any other drug products which are diverted for use in the illicit production of controlled drugs. The *Domestic Chemical Diversion Control Act* was sorely needed to address this "legal drug exemption" of the CDTA, as well as to build added safeguards into the system to curtail the flow of chemicals to clandestine laboratories.

Mr. Chairman, DEA appreciates the efforts of Congressman Stupak, the Members of this Subcommittee, and the other Members of Congress for passage of this important legislation. Briefly, this law requires persons who sell single entity ephedrine tablets to become registered with DEA, and meet certain recordkeeping and reporting requirements. It also authorizes DEA to revoke, suspend or deny any chemical registration that has been found to be inconsistent with the public interest.

Our second concern is that because of tighter U.S. controls, clandestine laboratory operators have sought other sources of chemicals, principally from Mexico and Canada. There has also been a proliferation of Mexican trafficking organizations involved in the clandestine manufacture of methamphetamine.

In 1990, shortly after passage of the CDTA, smuggling of precursor chemicals along the U.S./Mexican border increased significantly. United States Customs Service border interdiction seizures of ephedrine for U.S./Mexican border Ports of Entry, indicate a substantial increase in ephedrine seizures between 1990 and 1993. In 1990, 225 pounds of ephedrine were seized. Ephedrine seizures peaked in 1992 to 2,648 pounds and dropped off to 1,546 pounds in 1993. Figures for the first quarter of 1994 indicate that 1,014 pounds of ephedrine have been seized. The dramatic increase in ephedrine seizures along the border from 1990 to 1993 can be attributed to the fact that traffickers from Mexico initially preferred to smuggle ephedrine into the United States rather than manufacture the illicit methamphetamine in Mexico. By doing so, they avoided the more significant penalties associated with smuggling the final product across

the border. However, the sharp drop in ephedrine seizures between 1992 and 1993 may indicate that this trend is changing. We have reason to believe that more traffickers from Mexico are actually producing methamphetamine in Mexico and smuggling it across the border.

The involvement of traffickers from Mexico in methamphetamine production -- a problem that has always been considered a domestic one -- is an ominous development. This phenomenon surfaced in mid-1991 in southern California, where, as I mentioned earlier, motorcycle gangs were the predominant operators of methamphetamine laboratories. Unlike the motorcycle gangs, who primarily use the product themselves, the traffickers from Mexico are almost exclusively involved in methamphetamine production for profit. They seem to be closely controlled by organizations based in Guadalajara, and these organizations are difficult to penetrate due to long-established or close family ties and relationships. These traffickers are also prone to violence.

Aside from the profit motive, we believe that the Mexicans, who identified an opportunity, became involved with methamphetamine for a number of reasons, including the proximity of the porous U.S./Mexican border; an abundance of isolated areas in San Bernardino and Riverside counties in which to set up and operate clandestine laboratories; the ready availability in Mexico of precursor chemicals needed to produce methamphetamine; their established smuggling contacts, expertise, and routes which are also used to traffic in marijuana, heroin, and cocaine; and the ready availability of a cheap illegal alien workforce.

The traffickers from Mexico are involved in methamphetamine production in two ways: they smuggle the chemicals into the United States to labs that are located in remote areas throughout southern and northern California, or they produce the methamphetamine in labs in Mexico and smuggle the finished product across the border.

Initially, Mexican traffickers smuggled chemicals into this country, where the methamphetamine was actually produced. The typical pattern is for traffickers from Mexico to order from firms in Europe bulk quantities of ephedrine, which is most often imported into Mexico through Veracruz or some other major port. It is then transported in bulk to Tijuana, Mexico where it is stored in "stash houses," which are also used to store heroin, marijuana, and cocaine. From Tijuana, the ephedrine is smuggled in small quantities across the border into southern California. Clandestine laboratories are then set up in remote areas as far north as Sacramento. This system is very efficient because it makes effective use of already established smuggling routes and patterns. Mexican trafficking groups are primarily business and profit driven; they have a tendency to produce large quantities of methamphetamine in large batches or, in an effort to minimize potential losses, set up a large number of small laboratories. They also move the laboratories on a regular basis in order to avoid detection.

We are now seeing Mexican traffickers becoming increasingly involved in the second method of operation -- making the methamphetamine in Mexico and smuggling it into the U.S. Last year, 226 pounds of methamphetamine seized in Hatch, New Mexico, was traced directly to a laboratory in Guadalajara, Mexico. This methamphetamine was destined for Los Angeles.

In addition, methamphetamine seizures at interdiction points have dramatically increased from 13 pounds in 1992 (Calendar year) to 613 pounds in 1993. This trend seems to confirm the theory that Mexican organizations are increasingly producing methamphetamine in Mexico instead of the United States. DEA will continue to monitor this situation closely. In a recent case, DEA's Los Angeles Division reported that on June 8, 1994, over \$1 million in cash had been seized from a Mexican national involved in a DEA/state/local methamphetamine investigation. With the success of the regulatory control of ephedrine in the U.S., and increased enforcement efforts, Mexican traffickers are likely being forced to establish more and more methamphetamine laboratories in Mexico.

The availability of methamphetamine in this country has increased substantially, and we directly attribute this to traffickers from Mexico. The large supply of methamphetamine has driven the price down in California to less than half of what it would sell for on the East Coast; about \$4,000 to \$6,000 per pound in California, vs \$10,000 to \$15,000 per pound on the East Coast. Most of the illicit proceeds from these operations are returned to Mexico.

The Mexican methamphetamine situation illustrates an important example of how vital international chemical controls are. Mexican traffickers have found a steady supply of ephedrine in Eastern Europe, which is easily smuggled into Mexico where there are no laws regulating precursor and essential chemical. DEA investigations reveal that Mexican nationals have purchased between 40 and 50 metric tons of ephedrine from former East Bloc Republics.

Clearly, the methamphetamine problem in the United States cannot be solved through domestic enforcement actions alone. In order to be successful, exporting and importing nations must institute adequate laws and commit dedicated resources to deal with the growing global chemical diversion problem. The Department of Justice is working with multi-national organizations, such as the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), to assist Mexico and other Latin American governments to draft legislation that is urgently needed. I am optimistic about our prospects for success in reducing this international problem which has serious ramifications for the methamphetamine problem in this country.

I would also briefly like to mention another issue of significant concern associated with the Mexican methamphetamine production operations -- the damage to the environment. This is of grave concern to DEA, just as I am sure, Mr. Chairman, it is to you. As you well know, these laboratories leave behind dangerous chemical waste which is routinely dumped into the ground. As a result, when laboratory sites are encountered, either by DEA or by local enforcement organizations such as the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, the sites must be cleaned up at great expense to the taxpayers. In 1991, DEA spent nearly \$8 million for hazardous waste cleanup, over \$6 million in 1992, and nearly \$3 million last year. These costs have decreased over the years as lab seizures have gone down, which, again, illustrates the effectiveness of the CDTA in helping us address the methamphetamine problem. I understand that state and local enforcement organizations are facing grave clean-up problems associated with dangerous drugs.

"CAT"

Methcathinone: Periodically unexpected drug problems surface, especially in the area of "designer drugs," or controlled substance analogs. Such is the case with methcathinone, which is a methamphetamine analog that is also called "CAT," "GOOB" and a variety of other street names. As a central nervous system stimulant, it produces a variety of serious health effects including feelings of agitation, anxiety, sleeplessness, paranoia, visual and auditory hallucinations, and convulsions. Methcathinone is generally snorted or taken through intravenous injection.

Beginning in early 1991, the first seizures of methcathinone were encountered by the Michigan State Police in Michigan's Upper Peninsula. DEA, along with the Michigan State Police, seized the first methcathinone laboratories in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in June 1991. A total of five "CAT" labs were seized in 1991 in Michigan, and in 1992, six more "CAT" labs were seized, one of which was seized in Wisconsin. The size of these laboratories is generally smaller than those normally encountered with other drugs such as methamphetamine, leading us to believe that CAT laboratories are intended for self-use, or small-scale production. We believe that the growth of the methcathinone problem in the past three years is due, in part, to one or more of the following reasons:

- The synthesis process is relatively easy and can be completed without an extensive background in chemistry.

- The immediate precursor, ephedrine, is readily available in tablet form, which until recently was exempt from the recordkeeping and reporting requirements of the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act (CDTA). The other chemicals used in the synthesis are readily available and have a wide variety of legitimate applications.
- The Michigan Upper Peninsula is a remote area, which complicates law enforcement efforts.

Once DEA realized the potential seriousness of "CAT," we moved quickly to address this new threat. In May 1992, methcathinone was temporarily placed into Schedule I of the Federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) on an emergency basis. The emergency scheduling provision of the CSA allows the Administrator of DEA to schedule temporarily a substance that is not currently controlled, but is being abused and considered a risk to the public health. Methcathinone was permanently scheduled on November 1, 1993. It has also been placed into Schedule I of the state Controlled Substances Acts of both Michigan and Wisconsin. Also, for the past year, DEA has provided manpower from both DEA's Detroit and Milwaukee offices to work on temporary assignments on ad hoc task forces in northern Michigan and northern Wisconsin with state and local law enforcement agencies and federal, state and local prosecutors on the methcathinone problem. As of July 7, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Michigan reported that since the task force was established, 52 people have been arrested, 44 have pleaded guilty and 32 people have been sentenced on "CAT" manufacturing and distribution charges. We are also working to educate the public about the dangers of

"CAT." We have disseminated informational material on "CAT," and included it in all of our prevention and education presentations across the nation.

In spite of our best efforts, unfortunately, the methcathinone problem has spread to other states. By 1993, "CAT" labs had spread to Illinois, Indiana, and Colorado. During the first six months of this year, "CAT" labs have also been seized in Ohio and Virginia.

Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, many of the people like the ones that you see on that "CAT" poster and others involved in manufacturing and distributing methamphetamine, are repeat violators who resume their trade soon after being released from prison. While in prison, they meet other violators like themselves, and they use these connections with other individuals or organized crime families to expand their operations once they are released.

A case that illustrates this point is a fentanyl investigation that was worked by DEA's Boston Field Division Task Force in November of 1992. Fentanyl is a deadly synthetic designer drug with characteristics similar to heroin, but much more potent. Based on intelligence and Title III wire intercepts in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Norfolk, Virginia, and Wichita, Kansas, a chemist and two fentanyl labs were located in Wichita, and over \$700,000 in chemicals and sophisticated laboratory equipment were seized. The fentanyl manufactured by these particular labs was responsible for about 130 overdose deaths in the northeast U.S. Three individuals, including the chemist were arrested and charged with conspiracy to manufacture fentanyl.

All three of these individuals--the master planner, the chemist, and the distributor for the fentanyl in this case--met in the federal penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. While in prison, they formulated the plan to produce and distribute this deadly drug. Once they left prison, they put their plan into action, and were making great sums of money until DEA uncovered their operation.

Fortunately, the chemist and the master planner are going back to jail for a very long time--25 years, and 30 years, respectively--both with no possibility of parole. The distributor of the fentanyl has been convicted and is presently awaiting sentencing.

As is the case with the methamphetamine labs, the environmental effects of the "CAT" labs are also a serious concern. Between October 1991 and the end of May 1994, hazardous waste cleanup for "CAT" labs cost DEA over \$150,000.

Situation Report on Other Drugs: At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to talk about some of the trends that we are seeing with other drugs of abuse in the U.S.

Cocaine continues to be our primary drug law enforcement challenge. It remains readily available throughout the United States at relatively low prices and high purities at all levels of the traffic. Crack cocaine also remains readily available in all major cities and rural areas, and the trade in crack has resulted in an escalation of violence in our nation as street gangs vie for control of markets. It is estimated that over 800 metric tons of cocaine were produced in 1993.

U.S. Federal law enforcement seized 111 metric tons of cocaine and our foreign counterparts seized approximately 160 metric tons during that year. Yet despite significant seizures, massive quantities of cocaine still reach our streets.

Marijuana remains the most readily available and widely used illegal drug in the United States. It is produced both abroad and domestically. Mexico is a principal foreign source of marijuana, but supplies from Jamaica and Colombia have increased. Domestic marijuana cultivators have increased marijuana potency by employing advanced technology. As a result, the average THC content of marijuana has risen considerably in the last 10 years.


LSD availability has increased in the last two to three years, and it is available in retail quantities in virtually every state in the United States. The sources of supply for most LSD is the northern California area. As is the case with methamphetamine and "CAT," the precursor chemicals used to make LSD are made or imported by legitimate companies in the United States and Mexico. LSD dosage strengths remain relatively low; however, LSD is readily available to school-age children.

Fentanyl, a powerful synthetic narcotic drug, has been trafficked on the street as heroin, synthetic heroin and "china white." These analogs were associated with more than 127 overdose deaths between 1991 and 1992. Fentanyl is over 80 times more potent than heroin, and because of its high potency, a relatively small amount can yield large illicit profits.

We are working to address the devastating effects of these drugs, and I would be glad to meet with you at some point Mr. Chairman to discuss what we are doing to address these challenges.

Conclusion: Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the Subcommittee for taking the time to conduct this hearing and explore the challenges ahead that federal law enforcement faces. As you can see, new drugs appear on the scene quickly, and sometimes with tragic results. Law enforcement needs the flexibility and resources to meet these challenges head on and quickly before they become more serious. This concludes my remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions that you may have.


Methamphetamine Clandestine Laboratories
Calendar Year 1993



Atlanta.....	3	Detroit.....	1	New Orleans.....	12	San Francisco.....	41
Boston.....	0	Houston.....	5	New York.....	1	Seattle.....	9
Chicago.....	2	Los Angeles.....	39	Philadelphia.....	5	St. Louis.....	12
Dallas.....	12	Miami.....	4	Phoenix.....	12	Washington DC.....	1
Denver.....	16	Newark.....	2	San Diego.....	41	Total.....	218

METHAMPHETAMINE LABORATORY SEIZURES

(Ephedrine versus P2P Method)




Source: DEA/ODC 4/15/94




Methamphetamine Clandestine Laboratory Seizures Methods of Production - Calendar Year 1993

Total Lab Seizures - CY93
270



Clandestine Laboratory Seizures Calendar Years 1981 - 1993



■ Meth □ Total


Source: NDC, 6/20/94



Southwestern U.S. & Mexico Methamphetamine Seizures



1990 - March 1994






Methcathinone (CAT)

Clandestine Laboratory Seizures

June 1991 thru June 30, 1994



State DEA Total	
1991	1 5 = 6
1992	13 6 = 19
1993	4 23 = 27
1994	* 10 = 10
18 44 = 62	

Note: Samples of CAT have been seized in Montana and Missouri

* Data not collected

Source: DEA/ODC
Revised: 6/7/94




Southwestern U.S. & Mexico Ephedrine Seizures



1990 - June 1994

U.S. Seizures....5753 KGS



Mexican Seizures.....9454.46 KGS

Source: DEA/ODC

Mr. CONDIT. It is our pleasure to have you here this morning and we appreciate very much the fine testimony that you have presented to us.

We have got a few questions for you. It is my opinion that the Superfund law appears to provide funds for cleanup, but there are some gaps in the law, and I would appreciate some cooperation with the DEA as we try to fix these problems.

I have been told by the police officers in California that cleanup costs are actually providing a disincentive to busting these labs. Have you heard this problem?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. If you get a situation where you are running a police agency and knowing what it goes through, I went through 7 years of very difficult fiscal situations in New York State. You have a limited amount of resources to attack infinite problems. And if you are in a situation where you are going to be involved in laboratories, you very much have no money for the cleanup.

And I have not heard this personally, but I can see a police officer saying, I am going to go in there, I am going to be involved in the laboratory around the residue and nobody will give me money to clean it up. Maybe you want to address the problem in a different fashion with arrest of the principals for conspiracy and maybe not focus on the lab as much.

Mr. CONDIT. We now see the Federal data on drug use published every 6 months or a year. At our hearing in May the Federal data we received from the National Institute on Drug Abuse represented data that was more than 1 year old. Years ago we received reports on drug use patterns every 3 months. This allowed us to refocus our attention in a more timely manner.

This delay on public data on drug abuse and use would seem to hinder effective drug policy. Is this the case?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. I am not familiar with the report and the timing between 3 months and 6 months. Obviously the only reports I have seen while I have been here dealt with the last, most recent report, which was of concern to me in that it showed upticks in what I think are particular age groups.

It may be well to start tracking that on a more frequent basis. But to tell you the truth, that comes out of, I believe, other agencies in government.

I would have to have somebody consult with them to find out when they changed it, why they changed it, and what would be the problem of changing it back. It is an area of expertise that is really not in the purview of my experience in life. But if I can help, I will.

Mr. CONDIT. We may come back to you on that question a little bit later. You are new here. But we are concerned about the delay in information and how quick the agencies get to respond.

We read reports of heroin trade being driven by organization gangs, well-organized trafficking gangs connected to New York, to Chicago, to San Francisco, and it all begins in Hong Kong. Intelligence sources identify well-funded Chinese organized crime as being the backbone of the international heroin trade.

I have heard that of the entire DEA agent work force of several thousand agents, that only one DEA agent speaks Chinese. Is this true? If not, how many DEA agents are fluent in Chinese, and what type of foreign language training is required of DEA agents?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. The number of people within the agency who are fluent or are able to at least read and understand and to interpret Chinese, I would have to check on the number. I would suspect it is like every other law enforcement agency, very limited.

I know we did a lot of work with the New York City Police Department, which is 31,000 people and has a very large Asian population, especially on the Lower East Side and over in Queens.

We have a very difficult time in recruiting people into law enforcement. You mentioned the fact of Hong Kong. It is a little more diffused than the cocaine traffic. There are brokers at every level of the heroin traffic.

What is of concern to us is about 1 week or 2 weeks ago we saw 77 kilos of heroin, and we are able to determine that it came through mainland China. That is the first time that we have seen that experience. That vast country with the vast population creates difficulties for us in looking at it.

The other issue that will become a problem, no doubt about it, for everybody in law enforcement is that a lot of the Asian groups, and specifically Chinese groups, are very much involved in the major conspiracies involving heroin. The best way to address that is through court-ordered wiretaps.

That means you have to have people who are able to interpret that language. And you are going to wind up with tremendous costs to agencies like the DEA to pay for contract translators for that information.

DEA agents that volunteer and are selected for overseas assignments are sent to good language schools and are required to meet a certain level of ability to be able to work in that country. We have people in Hong Kong presently. We have money in the fiscal year 1996 budget to open an office in Beijing because we think that mainland China is going to be a major source for the distribution of heroin in the world.

Mr. CONDIT. Under the Stupak legislation, it reports that truck stops are registering at an alarming rate. Is this true?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. A lot of the sales of the ephedrine tablets certainly is not to deal with bronchial conditions.

The concern that we have is that they are advertising that there is going to be an effective date very soon, that they will not be able to sell those drugs once they are regulated. And people are trying to sell large numbers of them in anticipation of the upcoming zero tolerance on the regulation.

My experience in previous occupations is a lot of long-haul truck drivers who have to move perishable items from one part of the country to the other have always been a source of methamphetamines. In addition to the drug traffic, there is a tremendous danger to people on the road, people under the influence of drugs who kind of space out. Many times you will see accidents where passenger cars are stopped for some problem on the road and the tractor trailer will literally drive right over the top of the cars and sometimes crush the occupants.

It is an area of concern for us. I think, once regulated, it is going to put those people pretty much out of business for the amount of the cost for regulation, we hope.

Mr. CONDIT. Your testimony touched on the Colombian heroin trade. Some speculate the Colombians intend to create a new market for heroin in the United States similar to the creation of the cocaine market in the late 1970's and early 1980's.

Can you say more about the heroin consumption patterns? Will we see more heroin use if heroin is made available in smoked or inhaled form?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. I think it is to a degree more attractive to casual users in that the idea of injection in today's world carries with it the fear of AIDS and a lot of other communicable diseases through the intravenous injection.

I think they are fooling themselves by saying that just by snorting the drug that, one, they won't become addicted, and second, they won't move to an injection stage of the addiction later on.

There is no doubt in my mind that the group of people that control the cocaine traffic out of the Cali cartel are very bright, they are very, very wealthy and resourceful, and if they can see a market for an additional drug that is more expensive—and by being more expensive that means you take less risk in moving the drug—it has an advantage for them.

And I say, yes, that they are going to be a key player on the market. They already have the transportation systems in place. They have the key distribution systems in every major city in the country. It is very, very easy for them to do it, as opposed to another group which would have to set up a new distribution system.

Mr. CONDIT. So then you do think that the Colombians are creating a new market in the United States?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. Yes.

Mr. CONDIT. On the Southwestern border, with two-thirds of the drugs coming into the United States from northern Mexico, how do you coordinate with the INS and Customs? How does this coordination avoid duplications of effort?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. There are a number of joint task forces that work all along that Southwestern border. There is an operation alliance or a Southwestern border task force. Relationships between the agencies have been very, very good in the INS, especially the Border Patrol, which has done an excellent job in identifying drugs along with illegal aliens as they are going through.

I am working with Commissioner Weise of Customs to continue the cross-designation authority. As you know, the authority to work narcotics enforcement that is allotted to about 1,100 Customs people comes from the DEA.

When I came here, I was told that was a point that was contentious, that there were issues that had gone back and forth. Thanks to the cooperation of Commissioner Weise, and I think an approach that we were trying to take, we immediately tried to eliminate any points of contention.

I withdrew any doomsday deadline dates for the solution. And over the last 2 or 3 weeks, I think we have been very, very successful. Probably with another week or two, Customs and DEA I think will be able to put to rest the 20- to 25-year-old issue, and I think it will help us.

But usually if you have working enforcement officers in a general area where they face a common, very difficult problem, I find that

that is not where the issue occurs. It is usually the bureaucrats who have problems that are fighting and discussing things with each other.

Mr. CONDIT. Who is the lead agency?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. The lead agency on drug enforcement would be the DEA, but Customs, by border inspections and smuggling routes, how a lot of the coke and methamphetamines are coming over the border right now, Customs plays a huge role in that effort. The INS, and Border Patrol in particular, are stopping and checking a number of people in cars. They also have been productive in identifying.

Mr. CONDIT. To what extent—could you provide any statistics on arrests and convictions?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. I don't have the statistics at hand. I can tell you that my previous agency had 350 people working narcotics in New York State. We had focused directly on the Cali cartel in huge seizures. Every time we took down a cell, which was the people who provided the cars, the people who provided the safe houses, the people who distributed the drugs on at least a mid-level scale, every single one of those people were illegal aliens from Colombia.

When we deal with the methamphetamine and people coming from Mexico, I don't have the exact figures, but I would say it is probably very, very close in proportion to the situation with Colombia.

Mr. CONDIT. But DEA does have those numbers? Are they somewhere?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. I am sure they are available and I can get those for you.

[The information can be found in the appendix.]

Mr. CONDIT. We heard in our May hearing about problems associated with klonopin and Valium, and I understand these legal prescription drugs are often used by cocaine and heroin addicts to help them deal with their addiction. Federal overdose data shows that overdoses from legal prescription drugs like Valium and codeine ranks right behind cocaine and heroin overdoses.

Can you describe in greater detail problems associated with the illegal diversions of legal prescription drugs?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. I would like to postpone that and respond to that question in writing. I am not familiar with the details of that. I have people in diversion control who can educate me on that. I have been trying to focus on the cocaine and methamphetamine problem.

Mr. CONDIT. We would appreciate if you would respond in writing.

[The information can be found in the appendix.]

Mr. CONDIT. Can you identify the largest cities with a drug-related problem?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. New York is still the largest consumer location. Miami, Houston, Los Angeles, and probably Chicago, they are population centers but they also are the locus of major parts of the international drug cartels operating in those locations.

Mr. CONDIT. How many DEA agents do you have working in these five cities? Could you provide the subcommittee with the de-

tails of the distribution of DEA resources and staff within the United States and in foreign countries?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. Yes, I could. I would say that the proportional strength—I know that New York City is the largest office in numbers, because when you include in there about 80 New York City detectives and about 70 New York State Troopers and the task force, it is probably somewhere around 350 or 400 people.

I know that the strength of the DEA commitment in that region, in that office, in particular since 1984, 1985, has virtually tripled in numbers. But let me get those numbers for you and get you historic as well as current.

Mr. CONDIT. Thank you very much. I will ask you to do that. [The information can be found in the appendix.]

Mr. CONDIT. I am going to defer now to my colleague, Mr. Horn, for a round of questioning.

Mr. HORN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

As you will recall, as of May 1, 1994, the Department of Defense decided unilaterally to stop sharing real-time intelligence regarding aerial traffic in drugs with Colombia and Peru.

Now, as I understand it, that decision, which hasn't been completely resolved, has thrown diplomatic relations with the host countries into chaos.

I am curious from your standpoint and your agency's perspective, how has the decision affected your Peruvian operation, in particular the mobile basing concept, and what about operations in Colombia and Bolivia? Has that been a major setback?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. To my understanding, and I am not a lawyer, since a number of I guess treaties in dealing with the shooting down of the Korean airliner off the coast of Japan, there is—the interpretation of the Department of Defense, and I believe from the Justice Department, there is a liability that attaches to people who provide information to other people who shoot down civilian aircraft.

I was at the hearing before the House Foreign Relations Committee and I listened to the interpretations from the Department of Defense and also the Department of State. It was a decision that for the most part did not have a great deal of impact on DEA.

We were not involved in large numbers of intelligence-driven reports that would have resulted in a shutdown of the operation. Most of our cases are built on on-the-ground arrests, either at the laboratory site or the delivery site. So that in addition to the actual seizure of the drug, that you get the principals who are involved in the delivery, because they are going to continue to do it. So for us it was not a major issue.

In my meetings with at least the new Minister of Defense from Colombia last week, he came to my office, and also the Ambassador from Colombia, who has been in twice, they did not raise that issue with DEA. I think it dealt a great deal more with the military and the Department of Defense and the State Department.

My concern, as I relayed it to the House Foreign Relations Committee, is the bigger concern of the Cali cartel, which has to my knowledge, since 1985, operated this whole enterprise of cocaine distribution in the United States, and has yet not been brought to justice, either in the host country or through an extradition pro-

ceeding. This was a bigger issue for me as a law enforcement officer than the technical discussion on the shutdown.

Mr. HORN. Was it effective in terms of at least cutting in somewhat to the supply available so that in that sense, if it wasn't coming into the distribution system, and you just noted we have had very little success with the Cali cartel, was it not a help to you in reducing the things you have to look at among the many you have to?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. If you look at it as part of a comprehensive package, any asset that you have got is going to be helpful. One of the problems I see with cocaine, in looking through all of the records and all of the seizures that we made, the purity and quality of the product seized again and again and again by tonnage, almost 300 tons in various law enforcement or military operations last year, has stayed the same. And the price has not gone up, which would lead me to believe that they have ample supply to continue.

The interdiction of the supply and seizure of the supply is going to be much more effective when those people involved in either the manufacture or distribution are indicted, arrested and convicted, rather than just a seizure. I am not saying that—every pound of dope you take off the street is hopefully a pound less that is going to be on the street of Chicago or New York.

I have always kind of looked at that as one part of the strategy. But if you don't have the other part to go with it, I think you could do that endlessly and not improve the situation greatly.

Mr. HORN. I am going to ask a question which I know is very hard to answer, but give me your best shot at it.

As I look at the interesting charts you have attached to your testimony, it is pretty clear that we still pick up a lot of these methamphetamine seizures at the check points. Does that mean that it is simply a matter of surveillance of people that fit a profile? Is this simply inside information?

I can't imagine how dumb people are if they are going through those check points with the drugs when we are as successful as we are, at least compared to other seizures.

So what are we doing? Is that 10 percent of what is possibly coming into the country?

That is the tough question. And would more intensive Customs-Border Patrol efforts, more staffing, if you will, which we tried to get in the crime bill, at least on the Border Patrol, be of help to you in this? Or would we still be sort of getting the same amount?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. Let me see if I can answer all of those questions. First of all, on drug interdiction and check points, it has virtually become a trainable art for people in law enforcement. There are certain indicia that a trained police officer or I am sure a Border Patrol person or people in Customs look for.

If you have a rental car and you don't know who rented the car and where it is going to, that is certainly an indication that there is a lack of knowledge. When you separate the passenger from the driver and the passenger says he is going one place for one purpose and the driver says he is going another place for another purpose, you often have further indications.

There has been good work on the part of—there are a lot of people on the ground on the part of DEA in Mexico that pretty much

know a great deal about who the traffickers are and when drugs are going to be moving, where they can provide that information in a specific target to Customs or to INS. That is how the interdiction is most successful.

In a Customs search, of course, obviously you have great advantages in that you don't need probable cause, consent or a search warrant. People have made themselves available to be searched. And I think if you do that on a random basis every fifth car, you are going to have some success. If you do it intelligence driven, you are probably going to be successful 95 percent of the time. If you do it on a trained person with the right types of questions and interviews, they are going to be fairly successful.

So that appears from everything we can see right now to be the major mode of transportation from South America right now through Central America to Mexico, and being brought through in any number of conveyances, a lot of them in small allotments with a large number of people, because we have been fairly effective with highway patrol in Arizona and as far east in Missouri it has been very effective where we see 1,000 kilos or 2,000 kilos.

They are very resourceful. Their adjustment will be more conveyances in less amounts. That, however, affords us an opportunity, because the more people that you are using in these operations, the weaker you become; the more difficult confidentiality becomes, and the more likely you are going to get people to testify.

So it is almost like an arms race between us and the drug traffickers, trying to come up with strategies.

Mr. HORN. I notice on your chart on ephedrine—

Mr. CONSTANTINE. I have trouble myself. They keep correcting me on that.

Mr. HORN. Despite taking chemistry, that has escaped me. But I notice Nogales on both sides of the border you are doing fairly well on seizures.

You will recall that ABC-TV went through that tunnel with much fanfare. I was one of the millions of Americans who watched that who thought that ABC-TV could walk through with the teenage gangs, where is Customs, the Border Patrol, and DEA?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. I didn't see that show.

Mr. HORN. I am sure you have heard about it.

Mr. CONSTANTINE. You are placed in a very difficult position because as you show up in uniforms or you show up in things—they spot you very quickly as cops—people have a tendency to take off. We have reached kind of a strange situation in society where people will do things in front of the camera for the news media, but if they think there are police around with no cameras that can sanction them, they are going to disappear. They know pretty well that by virtue of the news media situation, they are not going to go to prison for it.

See, it would be tough to say. Look, I have friends of mine in Customs and in the Border Patrol. I know how hard they work. I know how much they believe in this. I know the sacrifices they make. It is certainly not purposeful, and I think it is well intended, trying to do the best they can, but you have an absolute army sometimes of drug traffickers in some of these locations and you have a platoon of law enforcement officers, and it is very difficult.

Mr. HORN. I note the number of seizures in Mexico, and I suspect the average citizen thinks they probably just push those illegals north and some of them have drugs increasingly. Is it your assessment that we are getting pretty full cooperation from Mexico in terms of drug seizures? I know they have lost a number of agents in their own force.

Mr. CONSTANTINE. I think it is good for people in the United States to remember that many of these countries, with limited economic situations, have paid tremendous prices in loss of personnel, thousands of police officers either assassinated or in some way tortured or killed, and DEA has suffered that themselves.

The other issue you have is that in many of them that I have visited, the law enforcement officers are really poorly paid. It is not a sought-after profession or you can be very, very selective. This whole idea of narcotics and the amount of money that is available to narcotics traffickers carries with it the possibility of corruption everywhere.

I can remember in this country, in the 1960's, working organized crime cases, when organized crime gamblers had corrupted large members of police departments and entire gambling units to the point in time when I conducted an organized crime gambling investigation, I was followed around the city by a local police department to make sure that everybody knew that I was in town conducting an investigation.

So they don't have a lock in those countries on corruption. I think their problems are much more significant because of economics and because I think as we start to become aware, and we should, the power that these cartels have. Our best estimate is that yearly the Colombian cocaine cartels have a \$2 billion profit. Now, that is an awful lot of money to be able to move through the system. It is triple at least the budget for DEA, which gives them the possibility for technical equipment surveillance and counter-surveillance.

So it is a formidable enemy. I am not saying it is one we can't make great improvements with, but it is always well to recognize who the enemy is and to respect their resources, as you are conducting investigations.

Mr. HORN. Speaking of the budget for the DEA, the FBI/DEA were rumored to be targets of the Vice President's NPR for consolidation. I am told the Office of Investigative Agency Policies was sort of the result of that failed marriage.

What impact has that Office of Investigative Agency Policies had so far on policies of the DEA?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. Most of the major decisions have been made before I got here, and I have to tell you, we have a person on that committee. Director Freeh has been very, very fair in the decisions. In fact, the preliminary decisions involving staffing, sharing the intelligence information, sharing of personnel, have been I would suspect more to the benefit of DEA than to the FBI structure.

I think it has been done well. I met with all of the heads of the various FBI offices last Wednesday morning for an hour. Director Freeh met with all the heads of the DEA. We have both concluded that some of the people think both of us are giving away the store to the other agencies, which is probably the mark of success.

My sense in coming here is that all of these problems I talked to you about, crime and drugs, are driving the American public to distraction, and they are paying a lot of taxes, and the last thing they want to hear about is a bunch of bureaucrats and agencies in Washington fighting one another over egos or turf.

I like what I have seen so far. Commissioner Weise extended his hand to me from Customs early, and I received that, and have tried to do the best I can to come back and cooperate with Customs. The same with the FBI.

I think the level of cooperation that I have seen, I have been president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, I have been vice president, I have seen all the players throughout the country and watched the Federal law enforcement close up since 1986. I think the level of relationships and cooperation right now, at this time, is probably better than I have ever seen it in my career.

Mr. HORN. So we have good cooperation. How about actual resources in terms of money to hire individual agents? In fiscal year 1996, will those be cut?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. We have in my presentation on the budget of this year, for the 1995 budget, which already I guess has gone through and there has been some markups, there was a target of 476 total positions for downsizing in DEA. That is a cumulative roll-up of 3 budget years, not just this year.

It is also my understanding that there was a hiring of 50 agents above target back in 1991 or 1992, that there was never any budget appropriation for it as it got to the legislative process. And there was a reduction from the legislature, both Houses, I believe, of another 116 agents, what they call an AUO issue, which I think may hopefully be addressed. That left them large numbers of agents over the target figure, which—in other words, those salaries were being absorbed in DEA for almost 3 years.

It is also my understanding that both in the House and in the Senate, there are markups of the budget that would improve the situation, specifically the Senate markup, as was provided to me. I am also not an expert as to how this process works here. I am learning it as I go through.

I guess it is a conference. If either of them would prevail, and especially if the Senate figure would prevail, we would be back to 1991 or 1992 full strength, and would be hiring again probably in the early spring of 1995.

Mr. HORN. One last question. What is the relationship if any between DEA and the interdiction policy of the Coast Guard? Do you have a coordinated effort there? Do you help them establish targeting areas based on intelligence and so forth?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. It is very elaborate. I have spent time meeting with Admiral Kramek, the Commandant of the Coast Guard. We have a DEA liaison person on staff with them here in Washington, but more importantly, at many of the critical sites throughout the world where this would be happening, these groups work together.

How it traditionally would happen would be if DEA information indicated there was a ship or a plane or a movement of a large amount of narcotics at a certain point in time, in a certain place, we then provide that information through a whole communications

network. If it is in the water, sometimes in the air, Coast Guard will track that ship for DEA. If a decision is to make the arrest in some waters that can be made at that point in time, if the decision is made that there is greater benefit of allowing the ship to go to a certain location to make sure that the conspirators on the other end are brought into the criminal case so that you take down the structure of it, that then can happen. But they coordinate those things very well, especially the mid to lower level.

Mr. HORN. The reason I ask that is they are talking about a regional consolidation. I am just curious if this will affect drug interdiction.

Mr. CONSTANTINE. You would really have to ask the Coast Guard that to see how their assets would be involved. But they have been very cooperative. I have been impressed with all the agencies in the Federal Government. Everybody is seriously trying to do something about it.

Mr. HORN. Thank you.

Mr. CONDIT. Mrs. Thurman.

Mrs. THURMAN. Good morning.

When you prepare the agency's budget and consider requests from your field offices, what criteria are we using to allocate your resources?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. I have brought together all of the SACs from around the country to Quantico in the first week in June. One of the first things I became involved in when I came here was recognizing the limits of the knowledge in the agency and the problem. I asked all of the key probably 30 or 40, top people, especially the field managers of the DEA, to identify for me what they thought the three or four major problem areas are.

Once they did that, we came up with five or six primary areas. We then brought them to Quantico in groups and allowed them to come up with the solutions, one of those being in the area of the budget.

One of the messages I got loud and clear was that they were concerned that not enough was being done on the home front domestically, especially with the numbers of violent drug groups that are operating within the United States. As a result of that, in the budget for 1996, we will try to address that.

I additionally will try to do that by looking at where I can streamline headquarters positions out of staff and into line positions.

I think I am pretty close to 80 numbers of agents. Then looking at a number of our international programs where we are involved in drug suppression, in the Andean countries, we have reached the stage where we have trained local law enforcement and military to a level where they no longer need DEA to actually do that with them on a day-by-day and night-by-night basis, and we can come up with groups of task forces to enhance what we already have existing in the country.

If you read the Washington Post on Sunday of this week, there was a group here in the District that was a dope-dealing group, was also intimidating witnesses. From the beginning of the investigation to the final conviction they killed numbers of people involved and tried to intimidate them, but the DEA, along with the

Washington Police Department homicide squad, was able to convict the principals and send them away.

That is how to look for the input, say what are the priorities that you think are available. I think it should be set on a regional basis, rather than trying to impose from Washington a totally autonomous, ironclad set of instructions, because it just doesn't work that way. There are too many dynamics.

We mentioned Michigan. Nobody even heard of CAT before in 1991 or 1992. There has to be a need for them to be able to respond to that and to be able to respond to it quickly.

The only way to do that would be for somebody some way to come up with that information locally for the budget and say, for our office in San Francisco, we think we are developing a major LSD problem, can we do something, can we get extra resources, are we stuck with having to work 35 percent heroin when heroin isn't our problem. So that is how I look for their thoughts.

Mrs. THURMAN. So are you then looking when you do staffing levels and the investigations. You have mentioned Michigan where there was no problem before. I mean, arrests, convictions, prosecutions, are you using any of that criteria?

I guess one of the things we always concern ourselves with up here is, are we using our resources to the best of our ability and not necessarily basing our decisions on politics.

Mr. CONSTANTINE. I guess you would have to know me more awhile to know how I came into this business, I am apolitical very much. I have been appointed by a Governor of New York State and a President, neither of whom have even asked me what my politics was when I got involved in it.

Mine is kind of a sense that we are in I think a very serious situation in this country. I believe that with the demographics and age groups in our society, this situation is going to get worse by the year 2000 unless we address it very dramatically, very quickly.

What we try to do with our resources is, we have 3,500 or 3,600 law enforcement DEA agents covering the entire United States and 50 countries. Once you start looking at that, you realize that it is difficult to move them all around.

One of the things I think we have to do is recognize that what traditionally was known as a major urban problem—drug traffic in the 1960's dealt with just the major urban areas—has changed dramatically.

We have cities, Savannah, GA, that Senator Hollings mentioned, Orangeburg, SC, Georgia, Tulsa, OK—vicious, violent drug gangs controlling those areas. And so we have to move whatever assets we can to be able to help some of those smaller communities that heretofore maybe were serviced out of a major city.

Maybe there is a need for a smaller office or maybe we have a need for some mobile groups which I am looking at to be able to take people from all over the country and maybe to deliver them to a certain locality for a short period of time to help out the local police, to see what we can do, and then where the problem flares up someplace else, rather than to be wedded into all of the major cities and to leave so many of the areas of the country unserved by DEA.

Mrs. THURMAN. I am pleased to hear that. I have several areas of rural Florida that have some——

Mr. CONSTANTINE. Then you probably know the experience. At least it has been reported to me again and again.

Mrs. THURMAN. In your testimony you talked about a particular case that happened in Hatch, NM, and it was directly traced back to Guadalajara. Can you tell me what kind of cooperation we actually are having the Government of Mexico?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. There is no extradition process that currently works. I know the Attorney General was very firm. I was watching her meet with the then Attorney General from Mexico talking about a case then topical, which was the sexual assault or attack on a young girl in which the defendant had gone back to Mexico.

So they were——committees were going to work on it, but the idea of an extradition is very, very difficult at this point in time.

The best you can do is where you have the conspiracy information and you have the evidence, you turn that over to the host country, recognizing, as I do now, that each one of these countries we deal with have totally different criminal justice systems. Some move very rapidly with very severe sanctions. Some move very slowly, at least from my experience.

That particular case I would have to get back with you the names of the defendants and what the results were. I do not have that information right now.

Mrs. THURMAN. Do you believe we are trying to develop some kind of a strategy? I think——

Mr. CONSTANTINE. Strategy in the United States or outside——

Mrs. THURMAN. With our Latin American friends and a hemispheric strategy, I know we are in other areas, but this seems so significant to so many of us.

Mr. CONSTANTINE. As I said, I am not a lawyer and I don't work in the State Department.

Mrs. THURMAN. Neither am I.

Mr. CONSTANTINE. I know when I traveled for the first time to South America to a committee hosted by DEA for all the law enforcement narcotics people through the hemisphere, it was my first meeting, and I talked to more experienced hands, and one of the things that was kind of interesting to me was each one of the countries from Mexico to Central America to South America all stated that the genesis of their problems were the Cali cartel in Colombia, very specifically, by location, by name and by country.

I am told that heretofore, as recently as 3 or 4 years ago, the sensitivity was so great they would not even refer to other countries as the problem. I think, as they start to see that our problem is their problem, you are going to see greater cooperation.

One of the concerns that I have always had, being a citizen of the United States and a police officer for so long, is somewhere around the mid-1980's we decided this wasn't our problem, that we would blame other countries and thereby absolve ourselves of the problem, and that we would be able to put the military and surround the entire country and not allow any drugs in.

This is to a large degree our problem. We are the largest consumer nation. The violent drug gangs in Washington, Tulsa,

and Savannah are American citizens shooting and killing other American citizens.

The people in the countries I have mentioned, in Colombia, obviously there have been numerous issues going back and forth with some of the issues, but I always try to remember there were over 2,300 police officers that have been killed in the drug war, an entire Supreme Court blown up in a building. That is a tremendous price. They seem to react if you try to tell them too much what to do, kind of a Big Brother approach. So I have tried to do it through just cooperation and explaining what the needs and concerns are.

I think many of those countries are now aware that the traffickers like in Colombia have so much money and are so powerful they have the potential to be a threat to the entire democratic government as well as anything else.

Mrs. THURMAN. Thank you.

Mr. CONDIT. Thank you, Mrs. Thurman.

Under the current law, you can purchase enough ephedrine to make 48,000 CAT tablets. Should this be allowed?

Mr. COONCE. No, sir, it shouldn't. I think the legislation that has been enacted will take care of that problem once the tolerance level is established, and that is zero.

Mr. CONDIT. Your demonstration this morning was quite sobering. It makes the DEA's job appear to be virtually impossible. It appears anyone can get these items and make the drug—CAT. Would you agree that our task is impossible given the ease of access to this stuff?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. No, I don't think it is impossible. Like all of us I am hopeful that through education systems we can make a difference, that more and more we take what the media—one of the wealthiest nations in the world with all of the great freedoms and why we are abusing drugs so strongly, that has to come through education.

I think things done by this committee and the leadership to try to restrict precursors for drugs, and if we get a zero tolerance for ephedrine, that makes it much more difficult for people to have this type of a laboratory.

If I thought any of these things were impossible, I certainly would have taken my retirement and stayed back home. I just believe that you can improve the situation. And as long as everybody is aware of how serious it is and what types of tools by law or resources are needed, I think you can improve the situation.

That is why in my preliminary statements, I thank you for the opportunity to be here today.

Mr. CONDIT. And I appreciate your attitude and your being constructive and positive. We are delighted you didn't retire, because this is a tough job and we need good people to do it.

Are there any countries left off the State Department list of uncooperative countries that you think should be on the list?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. That is a State Department certification. We provide them with the information that we have. I think there are a number on the watch list presently and I think one or two were not certified, Syria and one other one, I can't recall at this point in time. We provide information in our investigations. We work with them closely.

They eventually forward the names up. I have tried to avoid getting myself into diplomatic issues and just try and deal with the law enforcement and provide people with information. There are people a lot brighter than I am who seem to do this sort of thing.

Mr. CONDIT. We heard this morning about CAT. Is there another 1994 designer drug that DEA is aware of?

Mr. COONCE. Not that I am aware of, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CONSTANTINE. As we sit here somebody could be designing one.

Mr. CONDIT. Describe DEA's relationship with the CIA.

Mr. CONSTANTINE. As I talked about back in the mid-1980's when there was a discussion that this is an international problem outside of our shores, DEA and CIA—CIA specifically, it is my understanding, was given a role to use whatever resources they could to possibly cooperate. And so in numbers of countries, where they would be involved in any analysis or information, they would be working with DEA.

There is a pretty clear definition—I have met with Director Woolsey twice right now—police officers do not deal in the intelligence business. Any information we are able to put together, we always have to eventually be in a situation, much like I am here today, where you raise your right hand and are willing to testify in court.

I think intelligence groups in any facility have never been in a criminal-justice type of arena. Their information is for policymaking and later decisions maybe to help the host country.

Generally, I think it has been congenial. I know of no specific problems.

Mr. CONDIT. I would like to close this with a question to you. There are obviously a disproportionate number of meth labs in California, where Mr. Horn and I live. Have DEA resources been reallocated in any way in response to this development?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. No, not to my knowledge. There hasn't been any specific addition of personnel out there for methamphetamines, but you have to remember the last 2 or 3 years we have been in a situation of trying to live within the existing resources without any hiring.

So with all of the cocaine and all of the traffic, I have in situations added some people to the San Francisco office for specific investigations that I can't discuss at this point in time, brought people from other places in the country. I think one of the things that holds out some interest to us was—that I mentioned to the Congresswoman—was some mobility for maybe substantial numbers of people, where a specific problem flares up that we can bring them to a locale for 3 or 6 months, try to help local law enforcement out, get it done quickly and be fluid enough to go someplace else.

Mr. CONDIT. You kind of instigated another thought that Mrs. Thurman referred to as well, and that is your relationship with local entities in California and across the country. Are agencies coming together and working in undercover units?

What is the relationship? Do you stay in contact with these task forces across the country?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. I think obviously coming from my background, I have a peculiar interest in being involved in a lot of associations.

By focusing internationally on international problems in suppression in other countries, in my meetings police chiefs, there is kind of a sense that DEA over the last 3 or 4 years has not been as present on the scene as they had been historically.

I think that is important for DEA. I think that is the bread and butter of the services that we provide. I have met with the major city chiefs of police, and have assured them whatever resources that I get, that I will do everything possible to improve that. If there is any reprogramming of money, which there is sometimes in a budget year, I have found in some previous years it has been reprogrammed out of State and local assistance to maintain some of the international programs.

I want to make sure we get a better balance in that. I have been active in all these associations. I am the chairman of the Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Committee. I was out in California, in your State, as a guest of Commissioner Hannigan to speak at the California Police Officers Association in June, and told 400 or 500 people in that room the same thing. So I am very committed to that, and committed to that for DEA.

Mr. CONDIT. Mr. Horn, do you have any additional followup questions?

Mr. HORN. I would just like to follow up on the last discussion, because all of us are concerned about your ability to generate the resources internally. Do you have sufficient reprogramming authority, if you want to send mobile units from one part of the country to another, to live there and pay those transaction and room expense, how much leeway you have to there?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. If it is a reprogramming situation that is going to be very expensive, and I can't tell you what the threshold number is, obviously we have to come back to the Senate and Congress and just advise people that we are reprogramming.

Mr. HORN. It is just a sign off of the authorization and the appropriations?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. I think there is fluidity to it. I think it is a question of what your priorities are. We presently expend a large amount of money in per diem and different types of salary enhancements and what we call TDY, temporary duty assignments for South and Central America for drug suppression. It has been going on 4 or 5 years.

They tell me many of the people, especially in Bolivia, to a lesser degree in Peru, have become very sophisticated from the training. We can save money from those assignments and bring that money in essence home and still maintain the drug suppression effectiveness, but do more with some of the local law enforcement agencies who are crying for help in some of these areas.

So that is what we are looking at right now. I am optimistic we can do some of those things. It has to be done discretely. But I think we can do it.

Mr. HORN. If you had the ability to wave a wand and get three things to help solve the problems for which you are responsible, what three things would you pick?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. If it was just law enforcement, it would be resources and legislation. Those are the two big items. Legislation—like the types of things that you have done here with leadership

on this committee—legislation that would enhance things like digital telephony as technology goes on, those types of tools are effective.

And always, resources. You have to be a realist.

Mr. HORN. Excuse me. On legislation, have you asked the Department of Justice to make that part of their legislative program?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. We have with digital telephony. I have not submitted a legislative package yet in my new job, but Director Freeh at his leadership, and I have supported him, and have our people contacting legislators across the country telling them about the concerns of technology and how technology will eventually relate to the effectiveness of law enforcement.

Mr. HORN. Could you file with the committee what particular need is there? I think it is important that we educate our colleagues on this.

Mr. CONSTANTINE. I have no problem doing that. I will try to keep the list down to a reasonable number.

Mr. HORN. Just two or three things that would really make a difference in the effectiveness of the agency and achieving your mission. Resources we know is a problem. Now we know legislation is needed. That is our job. We need to help.

I take it the Byrne grant program is back on the track again.

Mr. CONSTANTINE. That was obviously of more concern to me when I was the superintendent of New York State police in that a lot of our people were funded in the task forces under the Byrne grant. I had to recuse myself as a vice president of the IACP when I took this job. We had done a great deal of discussion, and hopefully providing information to Members of Congress of the impact.

And the symbolism in New York State is so great because Eddie Byrne was the beginning of the crack crisis, and almost a lawless stage for a period of time. People don't remember, he was a young patrolman, sent to a house in Queens, parked outside, just to guard a witness against intimidation. The dope peddlers were so upset that they just walked up behind him in the police car and blew his brains out as he sat there. That became an extremely emotional issue for us in law enforcement.

Mr. HORN. So it is back in the crime bill?

Mr. CONSTANTINE. I would have to say yes, I understand it is, but for the most part that has been an issue for State and local government rather than DEA.

Mr. HORN. The Attorney General assured me she had "got the message." So given what some of the staff were doing in the Justice Department in trying to divert those funds, I think she has given it support.

Mr. CONDIT. Thank you, Mr. Horn.

Thank you, sir. We appreciate you and your associate being here. You have done an excellent job this morning. If there is anything this committee can do to assist you in your job, please call on us.

We will submit some additional questions to you and hope you respond in writing to us. Thank you very much.

[The information can be found in the appendix.]

Mr. CONDIT. Our next witness is Mr. Ben Nelson.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. CONDIT. Thank you very much. We are now joined by Mr. Ben Nelson, Associate Director, International Affairs Issues, General Accounting Office. Mr. Nelson's testimony is based on a GAO report, "Drug Control: Interdiction Efforts in Central America Have Had Little Impact on the Flow of Drugs."

The GAO report was requested by this subcommittee last year on behalf of the subcommittee members. We are very grateful for all the work on this important project.

I want to especially commend the work of Mr. Allen Fleener, who led the GAO's efforts in this area.

Mr. Nelson, thank you for being with us today. The floor is yours. Do you want me to swear in the other two witnesses?

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. CONDIT. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. Nelson.

STATEMENT OF BEN NELSON, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY ALLEN C. FLEENER AND ANDRES C. RAMIEREZ

Mr. NELSON. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I would like to thank you for introducing Mr. Fleener and Mr. Ramirez. These two gentlemen have worked extremely hard to produce our report on this very important topic.

With your permission, I would like to summarize my statement and submit the full statement for the record.

Mr. CONDIT. Absolutely. Without objection.

Mr. NELSON. As you stated, our work was conducted at the request of this subcommittee and focused on, one, U.S. efforts to control the flow of cocaine to the United States, and the obstacles to those efforts, and two, the capabilities of the Central American governments to interdict cocaine shipments and the extent of their reliance on U.S. assistance.

Strategically located between the United States and the cocaine-producing countries of South America, Central America and its coastline are used by drug traffickers to facilitate cocaine shipments to Mexico and onward to the United States. The U.S. Customs Service estimates that two-thirds of all cocaine entering the United States crosses the United States-Mexico border, where concealment in cargo is the preferred method of operation.

Although the amount of cocaine that transits Central America is not known, the Department of State estimates that as much as 70 tons of cocaine annually transits Guatemala, the country which is the focus of United States interdiction efforts.

In fiscal year 1993, the U.S. Government spent about \$56 million on various efforts to control the flow of cocaine from Central America. Of the total, about \$48 million was used for the U.S. directed interdiction efforts.

Despite various U.S. Government interdiction efforts, Central America continues to be a major transshipment point for cocaine shipments to the United States. That is because drug traffickers have adjusted their mode of operations to evade U.S. air interdiction efforts and are increasingly using sea and land transportation

to move drugs through Central America and on to the United States.

Available evidence suggests that the supply of drugs entering the United States from Central America remains virtually uninterrupted despite U.S. interdiction efforts. U.S. efforts to control the flow of narcotics have centered on intercepting drug trafficking aircraft transiting the region and seizing drugs destined for the United States.

The primary effort has been operation cadence, a program combining the efforts of various U.S. Government agencies with interdiction operations conducted by the Drug Enforcement Administration and Central American police personnel. Initiated in 1991, operation cadence involves the deployment of specialty trained United States law enforcement agents to Guatemala, who, working on information and intelligence developed by DEA, DOD, and the U.S. Customs service, attempt to seize trafficking aircraft and their cargoes.

Although annual cadence seizures have steadily declined, according to DEA, operation cadence has been responsible for seizing almost 29 metric tons of cocaine since its inception. As a result of operation cadence's ability to successfully seize a growing percentage of those aircraft choosing to land in Guatemala and six consecutive successful interdiction operations during the summer of 1993, traffickers have avoided Guatemala and no additional trafficking flights have been detected entering the country as of March of this year.

Operation cadence achievements, however, have had little impact on the flow of drugs to the United States. As I stated before, this is because traffickers have changed their mode of operation to those that are much more difficult to identify and stop. For example, traffickers are increasingly using overland and over-sea air-drops to deliver cocaine to Central America.

Traffickers are also said to be changing their routes to avoid U.S. radar assets on the northern coast of South America.

One DEA official with whom we spoke said that traffickers are flying small aircraft into the jungle area that separates Colombia and Panama, trucking drugs across Panama, and reloading the drugs on small aircraft that mixes with legitimate air traffic in the region, making it most difficult to detect.

In addition, DEA reports indicate that maritime vessels and air cargo containers are now responsible for the bulk of cocaine being moved into Central America and much of the cocaine being smuggled into the United States. The use of ships and boats allow cocaine to be imported in greater bulk and more easily concealed, increasing the difficulty of detection when commingled with legitimate cargo.

The large volume of vehicular traffic coming into Mexico from Central America also provides traffickers with ample smuggling opportunities. Once into Mexico, whether by air, boat, or land, the drugs are usually destined for the United States. More than 6,000 tractor-trailer trucks and over 200,000 passenger vehicles cross the United States-Mexican border each day, making drug shipments more difficult to detect.

The Central American nations through which these drugs travel have neither the resources nor the institutional capability to address the new drug trafficking modes and are heavily dependent on U.S. assistance. Various U.S. Government agencies are working with Central American countries on a number of small-scale projects to address the new trafficking modes.

However, the outcome of these efforts is uncertain due to limited host-country capabilities and the change in U.S. strategy which now focuses on drug interception in the source country and less on interdicting drugs in the transit zone.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my summary. I will be happy to answer any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nelson follows:]

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Information, Justice,
Transportation, and Agriculture, Committee on Government
Operations, House of Representatives

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DRUG CONTROL

U.S. Counterdrug Activities in
Central America

Statement of Benjamin F. Nelson, Associate Director,
International Affairs Issues, National Security and International
Affairs Division



Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the results of our review on drug trafficking in Central America.¹ Our work, which was conducted at the request of this Subcommittee, focused primarily on (1) U.S. efforts to curb the flow of cocaine to the United States and the obstacles to those efforts, and (2) the capabilities of Central American countries to interdict cocaine shipments and their dependence on U.S. assistance.

Strategically located between the United States and the cocaine producing countries of South America, Central America and its coastline are used by drug traffickers to facilitate cocaine transshipment to Mexico and onward to the United States. The U.S. Customs Service estimates that two-thirds of all cocaine entering the United States crosses the U.S.-Mexican land border where concealment in cargo is the preferred method of operation. Although the amount of cocaine that transits Central America is not known, the Department of State estimates that as much as 70 tons of cocaine annually transits Guatemala, the country which is the focus of U.S. interdiction efforts

¹Drug Control: Interdiction Efforts in Central America Have Had Little Impact on the Flow of Drugs (GAO/NSIAD-94-233, Aug. 2, 1994).

in the region. The United States, in 1993, programmed about \$56.5 million to curb the flow of drugs in the Central American region. Of this total, over \$48 million was for U.S. directed interdiction efforts.

RESULTS IN BRIEF

Despite various U.S. government interdiction efforts, Central America continues to be a major transshipment point for cocaine shipments to the United States. Available evidence suggests that the supply of drugs entering the United States via Central America remains virtually uninterrupted.² Drug traffickers have adjusted their modes of operations to evade U.S. air interdiction efforts and are increasingly using sea and land transportation to move drugs through Central America and on to the United States.

U.S. efforts to control the flow of narcotics have centered on intercepting drug trafficking aircraft transiting the region and seizing drugs destined for the United States. The primary effort has been Operation Cadence, a

²Drug Control: Impact of DOD's Detection and Monitoring on Cocaine Flow (GAO/NSIAD-91-297, Sept. 19, 1991); Drug Control: Heavy Investment in Military Surveillance Is Not Paying Off (GAO/NSIAD-93-220, Sept. 1, 1993); and Drug Control: Expanded Military Surveillance Not Justified by Measured Goals or Results (GAO/T-NSIAD-91-14, Oct. 5, 1993).

program combining the efforts of various U.S. government agencies with interdiction operations conducted by Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Central American police personnel. Initiated in 1991, Operation Cadence involves the deployment of specially trained U.S. law enforcement agents to Guatemala who, working on information and intelligence developed by DEA, Department of Defense (DOD), and the U.S. Customs Service, attempt to seize trafficking aircraft and their cargos.

According to DEA, Operation Cadence has been responsible for seizing almost 29 metric tons of cocaine since its inception. However, annual Cadence cocaine seizures have declined. The number of detected flights to the seven countries of Central America fell from 84 in 1992 to 25 in 1993. Suspected trafficking flights into Guatemala fell from 57 in 1992 to 13 in 1993. As a result of Operation Cadence's ability to successfully seize a growing percent of those aircraft choosing to land in Guatemala and six consecutive successful interdiction operations during the June to September 1993 period, traffickers have avoided Guatemala and no suspected trafficking flights have been detected entering the country between October 1993 and March of this year.

Operation Cadence achievements, however, have had little impact on the flow of drugs to the United States. This is because traffickers have changed to different modes of transportation that are much more difficult to identify and stop. For example, traffickers are increasingly using over-land and over-sea air drops to deliver cocaine to Central America. Traffickers are also said to be changing their routes to avoid radar assets on the northern coast of South America. A DEA official involved in Operation Cadence told us that traffickers are believed to be flying small aircraft into the jungle area that separates Colombia and Panama, trucking drug cargoes across Panama, and reloading the drugs on small aircraft that mix with legitimate air traffic in the region. In addition, DEA reports indicate that maritime vessels and air cargo containers are now responsible for the bulk of the cocaine being moved into Central America and much of the cocaine being smuggled into the United States. The use of ships and boats allows cocaine to be transported in greater bulk and more easily concealed--increasing the difficulty of detection when commingled with legitimate cargo.

The large volume of vehicular traffic crossing into Mexico from Central America also provides traffickers with ample smuggling opportunities. Once into Mexico, whether by air, boat, or land, the drugs are usually destined for

the United States. Almost 6,600 tractor trailer trucks and 211,000 passenger vehicles cross the U.S.-Mexican border each day making drug shipments difficult to detect.

The Central American nations through which these drugs travel have neither the resources nor the institutional capability to address the new drug trafficking modes and are heavily dependent on U.S. assistance. Various U.S. government agencies are working with Central American countries on a number of small-scale projects to address new trafficking modes. However, the outcome of these efforts is uncertain due to the limited host country capabilities and changes in U.S. program emphasis from drug interdiction in the transit countries of Central America to intercepting drugs in the source countries of South America.

U.S. AGENCIES' EFFORTS TO CONTROL DRUG TRAFFIC FACE OBSTACLES

For fiscal year 1993, State, DEA, DOD, and the U.S. Customs Service programmed over \$48 million to support Operation Cadence and other interdiction activities in Central America. This expenditure primarily

represents the cost of U.S. personnel and services and the operation of U.S.-owned radar and aircraft. Using various land-, sea-, and air-based radar, DOD programmed \$24.7 million on detecting and monitoring drug-trafficking aircraft as they left South America and approached the Central American isthmus. The U.S. Customs Service spent at least \$9 million to monitor suspect trafficking aircraft and track them in Central American airspace. The Department of State budgeted \$6.1 million to operate and maintain aircraft used to transport Cadence personnel to aircraft landing sites and \$1 million to train and support Guatemalan police personnel involved in interdiction operations. DEA spent \$828,000 to support the deployment of Operation Cadence teams to the region and \$6.5 million to operate its offices in six Central American countries.

In addition to supporting Operation Cadence, the Department of State programmed almost \$8 million to improve the drug interdiction capabilities of six Central American nations; support drug eradication efforts; and inform Central American citizens about the adverse impacts of drug production, trafficking, and abuse.

Obstacles to Successful Interdiction Operations

In addition to problems inherent in identifying and interdicting drug traffickers, U.S. efforts in Central America face a number of other obstacles, some of which involve national sovereignty and jurisdictional issues. For example, Operation Cadence activities in Belize were suspended for about a year because the government of Belize prohibited the entrance of Cadence personnel armed with M-16 rifles. Belize continues to prohibit Department of State helicopters armed with M-60 machine guns from flying over Belize. Similarly, the government of Honduras does not allow Guatemalan aircraft or personnel to fly over its territory.³ According to one State Department official, regional suspicions have also inhibited joint training and adversely affected joint drug interdiction operations.

At a 1993 conference, Central American presidents discussed greater anti-drug cooperation and pledged their commitment to develop specific regional

³Department of State helicopters used in Operation Cadence are operated and maintained by a U.S. government contractor, which employs Guatemalan civilian pilots. Also, Cadence interdiction teams include a number of host nation law enforcement personnel who are restricted to operations within their country.

counterdrug programs within 6 months. To date, however, none of the actions approved at the presidents' conference have been initiated.

INTERDICTION CAPABILITIES OF CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES
ARE SEVERELY LIMITED AND HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON U.S.
ASSISTANCE

Although all of the Central American countries--Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama--have drug control efforts underway, no country possesses the technical, financial, or human resources necessary to run an efficient drug interdiction program. In addition, none of the countries has an organization in place to effectively counter the overland or maritime drug movement. The limited interdiction efforts that they do undertake face obstacles and are highly dependent on U.S. assistance.

Limited Capabilities and Obstacles

None of the Central American countries have the resources necessary to purchase sophisticated equipment and develop well-trained personnel to combat the well-financed, creative, and highly adaptable drug traffickers. No Central American nation has a navy or coast guard capable of adequately patrolling all of its territorial waters. For example, four Honduran Navy ships are responsible for patrolling that country's 400 mile Caribbean coast. At the time of our field visit, three of these ships were in dry dock, and Honduras, for a long period of time, could not afford fuel for the fourth ship.

Programs specifically dedicated to counternarcotics activities suffer from inadequate funding. In Honduras, for example, anti-drug police officers earn as little as \$60 a month.

Corruption also limits the effectiveness of Central American governments' narcotics control efforts. In its 1993 and 1994 reports to Congress on the international narcotics control strategy, State reported concerns of narcotics-related corruption in all seven countries of Central America.

Funding for U.S. Narcotics Control Activities Is Declining

As a result of budgetary constraints and concern over the effectiveness of State's narcotics control program, Congress reduced the funds available for this worldwide program from \$147.8 million to \$100 million in fiscal year 1994. During fiscal year 1993, the United States provided a combined total of \$5 million in narcotics control assistance to six of the seven Central American countries. Current plans are to provide these countries with \$3 million during fiscal year 1994.

To accommodate reduced funding level in Central America, State Department terminated the deployment of an interdiction/eradication helicopter to Belize, reduced the number of helicopters it had deployed to Guatemala, and greatly reduced the number of flying hours available to support Operation Cadence interdiction activities. This reduced level of aviation support has adversely affected interdiction efforts, since DEA has had to reduce the number of Operation Cadence teams in Guatemala.

In February 1994, the White House released the new national drug control strategy, which changed the focus from interdicting drug shipments in the

transit zone toward stopping the flow of drugs at their source. Along with the shift in emphasis, the strategy clearly envisions a reduced role for DOD and its detecting and monitoring assets in the transit zones. The impact of this strategy shift is not yet clear.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you or members of the Subcommittee have.

Mr. CONDIT. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Nelson, the DEA Administrator spoke about the emergence of Colombian heroin trade. Did GAO see any evidence that heroin travels in much the same manner as cocaine?

Mr. NELSON. In this particular effort, we did not address the heroin problem. Our last work on drug trafficking in Colombia, which was completed in 1993, did indicate a significant increase in the level of opium cultivation in Colombia and recognized that Colombian heroin was a growing threat.

However, we did not focus on heroin or Colombia in this particular body of work.

Mr. CONDIT. Your testimony states that the available evidence suggests that supply of drugs entering the United States via Central America remains virtually uninterrupted. That, in my view, is a pretty sobering statement.

Do you believe we are getting a good return on our funds spent for interdiction? Is it too little, too much or about the right amount?

Mr. NELSON. That is a very good question, and a very difficult one to answer. It is true, as I stated, that some of our interdiction efforts have been extremely successful. Definitely, traffickers have shifted their mode of operation and the number of seizures is impressive. However, the supply remains plentiful. The purity is greater. And the prices are lower.

These measures would indicate that our efforts are not having a great impact on cocaine availability in this country, which is one of our primary drug control objectives.

Whether the funding is adequate is difficult to determine. The interdiction efforts have proven to be very costly, and the administration's efforts now are aimed at the source countries the full impact of the budget cuts and the policy shifts on the transit zone remains to be seen.

Mr. CONDIT. Your testimony also referred to the current administration, as you made reference to change in focus, that is, a new kingpin strategy. Somebody said the virtual destruction of the Medellin cartel, all we have now is as many as 10 new cartels all fighting for the same turf.

Do you have any information on this for the subcommittee? Is there any evidence that cocaine production has decreased in Colombia, or has it simply shifted in its neighboring area of Brazil?

Mr. NELSON. Central America was the focus of this particular effort and we do not have information on the cartels or the nature of their narcotics business in Colombia. We did not encounter any information which would lead us to believe that the production of cocaine was less than it has been in past years.

I would like to turn to Mr. Fleener to see if he has any additional information.

Mr. CONDIT. We are delighted to have you here. Do you have any additional information?

Mr. FLEENER. Our review didn't look at drug production. However, I know that a lot of the people have been scared that cocaine production could move into Brazil. Brazil has all of the precursor chemicals necessary to convert coca into cocaine and would not have to import any required chemicals. This would avoid the chem-

ical control efforts currently underway. Plus, Brazil has access to Europe.

Brazil is so large that it has very few narcotics control policemen in the Amazon part of the country, where it abuts Bolivia and Peru. Therefore, getting the drugs into and out of Brazil would not be very difficult. This has always been a concern of the drug control officials I've spoken to in South America.

Mr. CONDIT. You have said you hoped—

Mr. FLEENER. We hoped they don't move into Brazil.

Mr. CONDIT. So I take it you have concluded it hasn't shifted into Brazil?

Mr. FLEENER. I haven't read that much about a shift, if there has been one.

Mr. CONDIT. Mr. Nelson, your testimony and report on Central America drug trafficking patterns are highly critical of our Central America neighbors. Should we tie foreign aid in some way to their antidrug activities?

Mr. NELSON. I believe that the GAO would support the notion of tying foreign aid to the conduct of countries and supporting our counternarcotics effort. However, I think that such a connection should be made in the context of a larger U.S. relationship with the country. This relationship should also address local difficulties that might arise because of narcotics control actions the government may undertake.

However, I believe the tying or conditioning of foreign aid to a recipients' commitment to counter drugs would be an appropriate measure.

Mr. CONDIT. Your testimony suggests that there is a constant adjustment by traffickers to whatever pressure the U.S. Government brings upon them. The latest assault in the form of sea and land transportation of drugs suggests we should be changing our strategy.

Do you see any evidence that we are doing that? Are we changing our strategy periodically because they catch on real quick?

Mr. NELSON. Well, I will address it and then turn to Mr. Fleener. Basically, the traffickers are very adaptable. I believe during the conduct of the work, a State official in Guatemala told us that it had spent 6 months setting up an operational base and it took the traffickers, I believe he said, 6 days to adjust their mode to avoid that region.

And that reflects the difficulty in the counternarcotics war. Traffickers have tremendous resources, they do not have to comply with laws, they do not have to worry about sovereignty issues or jurisdictional issues, and they can move their operations almost at will in response to U.S.-directed counternarcotics efforts.

Mr. Fleener might have something he would like to add.

Mr. FLEENER. We found that while the Central American countries have antidrug units in place, they just don't have the capabilities, resources or the equipment to address the drug trafficking problem. This is particularly true with regard to the maritime movement of drugs. While it is easy to locate suspected airplanes carrying drugs, it is much more difficult to identify which container on a ship contains drug cargoes. Also it is very difficult to locate the drugs within the containers.

What has happened is that we have made the traffickers move from the more detectable means of drug transport to the less detectable. It is now more expensive for traffickers to move drugs. We were told that traffickers don't like to move drugs by land and sea because they lose physical control and the drugs are in transit for longer periods of time. However, it is awfully difficult for interdiction personnel to locate the ships, or if they use the air-drops, to know exactly when they are going to drop the drugs from the plane.

We were also told that global positioning systems, which can be bought at Radio Shack, allow air traffickers to coordinate with waiting speedboats so that drugs can be dropped within a few yards of awaiting confederates. It is extremely difficult to try to stop traffickers from doing this.

Mr. CONDIT. I also read with interest your findings that the Honduras Navy left its lone serviceable vessel tied to the pier because they could not afford fuel. As a result, there was no patrol of that nation's extensive coastline.

Given that \$835,000 was spent for narcotics control activities in Honduras in 1993, is it too much for us to ask that somebody buy the fuel?

Mr. FLEENER. I think that most of what we spent in Honduras was for the operation of the DEA offices. DEA has an office in the Capital with two or three agents. The State Department program in Honduras involves establishing a computer intelligence system.

The lack of fuel is a problem the Hondurans also have with the airplanes they fly. When we went to the base used by some of the antidrug airplanes we were told that when the United States wants one of the Honduran planes to go up, the Hondurans usually ask for the United States to provide the gas. They just don't seem to have the money.

Mr. CONDIT. So the money went for——

Mr. FLEENER. What we provided was in the form of U.S. services for stationing and supporting DEA people at the embassy.

Mr. CONDIT. Compared to what the \$835,000 was spent for, and fuel for vessels and aircraft for observation, what is the priority? Is that a top priority? Is there a ranking of priorities in this?

Mr. FLEENER. The priority as far as DEA is concerned is the islands along the northern coast of Honduras. This is where the Honduran ships were located. DEA didn't have the resources to send people up there, to obtain aviation support, or to get people to conduct surveillance of the islands.

I don't think it was in anyone's budget to procure fuel. While we may give them computers, a lot of times the Hondurans didn't have money to pay for food for the detector drug dogs. A DEA official had to pay for dog food out of his own pocket because the Hondurans weren't feeding the dogs.

Mr. CONDIT. Mr. Nelson, in your report, you reported that the State Department said it took 6 months to establish a forward-operating base in Guatemala and it took the traffickers only 6 days to get around it. Since that time, three more bases have been established.

Has there been a measurable increase in seizures as a result? Do the operating bases make sense?

Mr. FLEENER. The first operating base was established when the program began in 1991. Right after they made a few seizures, the traffickers started to go to the eastern part of Guatemala. It took roughly a year to establish the bases in the eastern and northern regions of Guatemala. Once in operation, the Guatemalans began to seize drugs. The next step by the traffickers was to fly and land at night, knowing that the interdiction planes would not be able to chase them.

It took about a year for the State Department to get authorization to procure and train the pilots in night-vision flying. Once operational the State Department helicopters were able to seize the planes as they landed at night.

Since that time, trafficking aircraft have avoided landing in Guatemala.

Mr. CONNIT. Mr. Nelson, your work in the area shows there are numerous U.S. agencies involved in the effort of interdiction for drugs. How would you rate the cooperation among these agencies? Do they get along? Are they bickering? Are there territorial disputes?

Mr. NELSON. With respect to the major operations and the issues and programs that we examined in our review, there didn't seem to be a problem with coordination at the program level, or at the high levels in Washington. We did, however, get indications of operational problems on the ground, that is, out in the field. I guess one could characterize those as being a points of contention between DEA, the State Department, and Customs over various operating procedures.

For example, the Customs Service has a rule which allows its planes to fly no lower than 5,000 feet. The DEA feels that that is not low enough to meet its needs. And so there is a point of contention there. DEA feels that the traffickers can escape or at least move the cargo if they are not monitored.

One other problem involves the State Department's rules regarding aircraft or helicopters and how close they can be to the scene of an arrest. The State Department is concerned about safety of the aircraft. The DEA agents are concerned about making sure that the traffickers do not escape.

So it is those types of operational problems that we found, not necessarily major coordination problems at the program or at the policy level.

Mr. CONNIT. Is one of those agencies designated the lead agency?

Mr. FLEENER. The problem is that you have multiple agencies involved in interdiction operations. One agency is the lead agency. That is the State Department, which provides the helicopters in Guatemala. The other agency, DEA, is the lead for interdiction. However, DEA can't interdict without the helicopters.

The State Department has assigned a DOD person who is trained in different types of assault techniques to monitor operations. While a raid is taking place, this individual will be circling the raid site in a fixed-wing airplane. He won't allow the helicopters to land if he views the conditions as unsafe. This happened a couple of years ago at the shooting in Veracruz where Mexican police were ambushed.

The DOD observer will direct the pilots to not land within so many yards of the raid site. DEA, however, wants to land right in the middle of the landing site.

This situation results in a conflict over who is in charge: the agent running the operation or the guy with the keys to the helicopter.

Mr. CONDIT. It seems to me that like in a military operation, whoever is in charge, that is what you do. You discuss that out in advance and then during—that is the guy who finally makes the decision. You don't find that to be the case?

Mr. FLEENER. The agencies involved put off solving these problems for a long time. They believe they have them solved. However, neither side likes the situation. But there haven't been any chances to interdict drugs since October.

Mr. CONDIT. Mr. Horn.

Mr. HORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Following up on this last exchange, what is the role of the Ambassador in coordinating these various Federal agencies? As I recall, Lyndon Johnson issued a directive that applied to CIA as well as everybody else that the Ambassador was to be the principal American representative in that country and responsible for coordinating divergent agencies. Do Ambassadors seem to do anything or their deputy chiefs of mission?

Mr. FLEENER. In most of the countries, the deputy chief of mission has been delegated authority for narcotics matters. Most embassies have narcotics coordinating committee for all of the participating agencies, if it is a major producing or trafficking country. They meet about once a week. This would be the forum to resolve most of these problems. A lot of times they don't want to bring it up at these meetings and tell us when we arrive.

Mr. HORN. Do all agencies have this reluctance to bring the matter up the hierarchy? Are they afraid they are going to lose or what?

Mr. FLEENER. In some instances they are reluctant to bring it out if they think they can settle it without having the Ambassador or the DCM becoming involved.

Mr. HORN. Do they feel the Ambassador or the DCM will simply side with the Department of State position that simply says they worry a lot about it and nothing happens, or what?

Mr. FLEENER. That was never relayed to us. I know, in some instances, DEA is concerned about the Ambassador, and the narcotics coordinator. Both are State Department personnel, DEA may feel that their views aren't being adequately considered or they are being ganged up on.

Mr. HORN. Did you see one embassy where things seemed to be well coordinated, and if so, which one was it?

Mr. FLEENER. It was Guatemala. They had an overall narcotics group that would meet once a week. They had a special interdiction group that would meet once a week. And then they had a special intelligence group that would meet once a week and discuss their activities. And they also had a DOD tactical analysis team that would provide a lot of secure communications for them.

Also, the government of Guatemala appears to be providing enough people for interdiction operations and investigations.

Mr. HORN. Why weren't other embassies doing the same thing?

Mr. FLEENER. I think it reflects the extent of the drug trafficking problem. Air landing of trafficking planes was a big problem in Guatemala. It is not so much a problem in Honduras because they shoot down aircraft. As a result, the Hondurans don't have a problem and airplanes keep away.

I think it relates to the size of the problem and the priorities of the mission.

Mr. RAMIREZ. Related to that question, in South America, in the source countries, they have what is called an operational planning group or a variation thereof. Since you have the multiple agencies involved and you ask who is really in charge? The Ambassador or the DCM really don't have the staff per se to really be involved in it all time.

These operational planning groups have memberships from various agencies involved. In some cases, they are under DEA lead. In other cases, it is State Department. And in some cases it may even be autonomous. But—

Mr. HORN. Who decides who is in charge of these? Is this a Washington decision or a field decision or just a natural evolution of who is the dominant figure in the room?

Mr. RAMIREZ. The Ambassador in country is the one in charge and he will decide the makeup and arrange for all the procedures.

Mr. HORN. So the Ambassador is in charge?

Mr. RAMIREZ. Yes, he is.

Mr. HORN. Do you track that by a paper trail? When you went in looking at how these operations work, did you look at the file on who delegated what to whom?

Mr. RAMIREZ. We have another ongoing job for another subcommittee, but we looked at Peru, and that one is just barely getting off the ground, so there was really no paper trail to look at. But I have been told by various government officials that the operational planning group in Bolivia operates very well and so does the one in Colombia.

Mr. HORN. Do you want to add anything to that?

Mr. FLEENER. In Guatemala we did look at the minutes of the three coordinating groups. In Honduras narcotics are discussed weekly as part of their country team. I also believe the embassy has a subunit that meets, on call, for drug-related matters.

Mr. HORN. If the three of you had to go down to run DEA tomorrow, what would you recommend based on what you found out that they ought to do immediately to turn the situation around?

Mr. RAMIREZ. I believe that you have a very difficult situation, because you have DEA that has its role, and it is very limited because it does not have the resources or the budget or the legislative authority to go out and provide the support that they need and they depend on other agencies. So you have that very complex situation where you have competing type goals and resources that are limited that are used for multiple agencies.

Mr. HORN. So it is very clear. Do you plan to make specific recommendations or have you in this area that they simply don't have the resources, or that they are missing something in legislative authority because that is important to us? You are the agent of the Congress, tell us what it is, what is missing?

Mr. NELSON. At this time we haven't undertaken a body of work which would allow us to make those types recommendations. I believe we would probably want to start with an examination of the authority of the Ambassador to set the tone and direct the counternarcotics program in a country, whether that role is taken very serious, and, in countries where we have a major effort, whether the agencies are working together.

Mr. HORN. Those are nice generalities, and I have been a management consultant, and every time you go into an agency you sort of say that. I grant you that is important, but sometimes you have people who probably don't think this is an important area for their career or something. Obviously, we shouldn't assign those people to that particular area as an Ambassador. It is a decision that the President, the Secretary of State and the people that make these choices really have to face up to.

If drugs are our principal problem in a country in Latin America, we need to focus on getting the type of person down there that cares about that issue and reward that person in the State Department career hierarchy or get a political appointee in there who will get the job done, one or the other.

And I just wonder, Mr. Ramirez, you have been into this area. What do you see that you would say you could do the first week to help turn things around? What kind of policy shift are we talking about?

And you are speaking as an individual, I understand it. We don't have to worry about the GAO hierarchy clearance. Common sense is what I would like to hear.

Mr. RAMIREZ. You have to go back to ONDCP and look at the structure overall. They have set up an interagency working group that is headed by State Department officials with memberships from other agencies. They are the ones that cooperate and put together the type of program and cooperation and relationships to carry out the different programs. They are the ones that really need to wrestle with the problem and determine how they are going to do it. And the ONDCP director is the one that is going to have to lead that effort.

No one independent agency can make a difference whether it is DEA, State, Justice or anyone else—no independent agency by themselves are really going to be able to solve anything. It is bigger than that.

Mr. HORN. Any other suggestions on this? What do you do on the first day you guys go down there to turn this agency around?

Mr. NELSON. I don't have an answer for you as to what I would do the first day. I can tell you that within the GAO we have had extensive discussions about what work we need to do to bring to the attention of the Congress the problems inherent in the current way that the drug war is being carried out. We have agencies that have responsibility but not the resources.

They have to depend on other agencies for resources. And agencies that have resources and their own programs that they want to carry out in a country. I can tell you that this issue has been the subject of much discussion within the team that you see here at the table today.

It is a difficult problem. Each agency has its own authorizing legislation. Each has certain limitations on what it can and cannot do. And when you couple that with sovereignty issues in the producing countries and in the transit countries, you have a very complicated situation.

And as I am sure you are aware, some of the producing countries do not see things the same way that we do with respect to drug investigations and so forth. So it is a very complicated problem but one to which we have devoted a lot of time discussing. And I believe there are plans on the books to do some work which would highlight the problems and offer some recommendations.

Mr. HORN. Mr. Fleener, any suggestions, just based on what you know now?

Mr. FLEENER. No, I would like to comment on the point you raised about having quality people at the State Department. The current Ambassador to Guatemala was a deputy chief of mission in Bolivia. She was there when the subcommittee visited in 1989. It was her job to focus on the drug effort in Bolivia. She brought a lot of the people to Guatemala who were in Bolivia. I think the country attache for DEA is a former agent from Bolivia. Also the military officer who runs the tactical analysis team came from Bolivia.

Mr. HORN. So you feel there is at least some direction and leadership being given to get the right combination of experiences there?

Mr. FLEENER. I would hope so. It happened in this case.

Mr. HORN. Well, that is encouraging, because the real question is, when you really get into this, if you decide to give us some recommendations, does the comptroller general have the guts to say there is a leadership problem here, and any evidence to back it up?

Mr. NELSON. I believe that in cases where we have done a sufficient body of work, of sufficient scope and depth, we will make appropriate recommendations.

Mr. HORN. When might we get those?

Mr. NELSON. As I said, we have been discussing this issue, but we do not currently have work under way to address it. But the concerns that you raised have been discussed in planning what work we should do in the future.

One of the things that we have to consider at this time is that the administration has produced a new strategy. We are waiting to see how it is going to be implemented, and it will be some time before we can really start to see the results of the new strategy, which, as I stated earlier, changes the focus from the transit zone interdiction to the source country. We are not sure of the implications of this change yet.

So, we have to wait to see if there are some practical, on the ground, changes resulting from the changes in the strategy.

Mr. HORN. That is a worthy project without question. The problem comes, every administration comes in, talks well, whether it be Republican or Democrat, in a campaign. They say they have got a new strategy. How long do we wait? Because we are constantly having the shell game here of people saying, this is the right approach, and someone else saying, that is the right approach.

How do we evaluate objectively? And that is certainly one of GAO's missions. What ought to be done, what is being done, have they got the resources, and do they have the legislative authority, to achieve what they say they want to achieve?

And if we are the problem, GAO ought to have the guts to say, Congress, you are the problem, either give them the authority or don't expect them to get the job done. Same with resources. Trace it right up to the director of various agencies, such as the Attorney General, Secretary of the Treasury, Director of OMB, or even the President.

Where did it fall off the edge of the cliff? Given all the other things those authorities have to worry about. But we ought to know. And we ought to be able to get focused on this. And you are our agent for getting the focus.

I mean, do you really see a way we can get an answer at some point in time, with everybody changing the strategy?

Mr. NELSON. I think we can get an answer to the question on authorities and responsibilities, and the coordination issues and how well programs are being implemented. The issue of whether the counterdrug programs result in an appreciable decrease in the supply of narcotics entering the country is a slightly different issue.

GAO has done extensive analyses of various programs. To date, we have not been able to make a connection between the programs and a reduction in the supply. This is because there are issues far beyond the control of government program managers that affect the availability and the purity and the price of drugs in this country.

In many cases, you are dealing with political issues, economic issues, cultural issues, and law enforcement and judicial type issues that are far beyond the control of a government program manager—whether it is a State Department officer heading a program or a DEA officer. However, that issue is somewhat different from how well the programs are being implemented in the country and who has the lead responsibility.

Mr. HORN. Just one last comment on my part. It seems to me one way you experiment is, let's take the ports that are in my area, the port of Los Angeles, the port of Long Beach, thousands of containers come in every week from all over the world. They are already in transit there now.

If we had a demonstration project where we systematically looked at every single container coming in and we put several hundred people out there to get that job done, would we find any drugs or wouldn't we?

I don't have the slightest idea. But I suspect most people would say we have still got the drug flow coming, it is simply happenstance, either advance intelligence or a random sample if they even do that, to find anything, and maybe we ought to put full force on for 1 or 2 weeks to see what happens. That is one way to know how much we are missing.

Mr. CONDIT. Thank you, Mr. Horn.

I will follow up with Mr. Horn's question. In your report, you were correct in your assessment that the U.S. Customs Service faces enormous challenges in the expecting sea containers and passenger vehicles and tractor trailers entering our Nation. I guess that follows the line Mr. Horn is taking.

Would you support giving them a bigger percentage of narcotics control funds earmarked for regions to respond to this challenge? And if so, where would you get the money, where would you take the fund from?

Mr. NELSON. Our work would not allow us to draw any conclusions about the relative priorities of the different elements of the drug programs. All of the programs in the Department of State as well as these of other agencies involved have been reduced. A major reason for that reduction is difficulty in demonstrating impact and the strategy that the current administration is going to pursue.

We would not be in a position to issue a recommendation as to the spending priorities within the program. The program is composed of several elements and the interdiction efforts in Central America, which were the subject of our review, is a very limited part of the overall narcotics trafficking problem, and a limited part of the U.S. Government's strategy for dealing with drug trafficking.

Mr. CONDIT. I think the fact is we inspect 1 out of 300 containers. It seems to me that what Mr. Horn suggested, that is target area, is justified.

I understand that is not your decision to make. But since I have served on this subcommittee, the GAO's message on Central America interdiction activities has remained the same. I was in 1989 with Mr. Fleener in Central America. The message is the same as it was then, that our efforts have little impact on the flow of drugs.

Would you support suspending these efforts and using the funds for domestic enforcement and prevention programs?

Mr. NELSON. We have not taken a position on that issue. We have not done work which would support a position on that issue. However, I do not think that we would recommend that those efforts be totally suspended. I believe we have to maintain a credible interdiction program. At what level, I believe the people in the Clinton administration are in a better position to answer that specific question. But we probably would not recommend the total elimination.

Mr. CONDIT. Is my assessment correct?

I came on this committee in 1989, and GAO has been totally consistent—that our Central American policy does not work. We are not stopping the flow of drugs into this country.

That being the case, I mean, shouldn't we do something else?

Mr. NELSON. Our efforts have made it more difficult. And we have made it more expensive for the traffickers. But we have not stopped them because of the profits that are available from the narcotics.

Our efforts have resulted in some pretty sizable seizures. However, once you set up an interdiction effort in one place, the traffickers shift to another. To say the least, our efforts have made it somewhat more difficult.

Mr. CONDIT. The street prices haven't changed for the drugs.

Mr. NELSON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. CONDIT. On a scale from 1 to 10, 10 being the best and 1 being the worst, rate our efforts in reducing the flow of drugs into this country.

Mr. NELSON. Well, the evidence suggests that we have not been very successful in that regard.

Mr. CONDIT. OK, 5 or 2 or 10 or 9?

Mr. NELSON. I would have to give a pretty low grade. I can't say exactly what.

Mr. CONDIT. Around a two?

Mr. NELSON. Somewhere around there.

Mr. CONDIT. I think my assessment is right. We are not doing very well. If we are not doing very well, we ought to have some concrete suggestions on how we change this. I guess that is all I am saying. Or get out of it in some way.

Mr. NELSON. Interdiction is just one aspect of trying to fight the drug war. There are other issues that have to do with economics and judicial matters in the producing countries and transit countries. There are a range of issues involved in fighting the drug war and interdiction is only one of them.

Given the amount of cocaine that is produced, less what is seized still leaves a large amount available for sale and consumption in this country.

Interdiction is just one aspect of the overall drug war. And we would probably support retaining a credible effort. We have to show commitment because we are asking other governments that do not have nearly the resources of the U.S. Government to develop credible programs to try to stem the flow of drugs through their countries.

Mr. CONDIT. That is a fair response. I understand that. You may have given us some indication of what to ask for next in the assessment of the effectiveness of these antidrug programs.

I want to ask one last question. In your research, how is the morale of the DEA agents that are housed in these countries?

Mr. NELSON. I will defer to Mr. Fleener on that because he has traveled to the countries, to both the producing and transit countries, and has had extensive conversations with DEA agents.

Mr. Fleener.

Mr. FLEENER. The morale is good. They are very optimistic about what they can do. They get frustrated when the planes don't land in Guatemala because they are sitting out there in the middle of nowhere waiting for the plane to come, and it doesn't show up. The individual agents are neither not frustrated nor angry at anyone.

They are down there for 90 days. There were no problems we were made aware of.

Mr. CONDIT. And they think that the program is working effectively, or did they make significant suggestions on what they might be doing?

Mr. FLEENER. They always want more money. In Honduras they wanted more money for the maritime program, which State couldn't fund due to a budget cut. The State budget went from \$150 million to around \$100 million in fiscal year 1994. They just didn't have the resources for the maritime program.

A lot of these countries want more sophisticated equipment.

Mr. CONDIT. I know you have talked to me about this before. How often do we rotate DEA personnel?

Mr. FLEENER. I think the country attaches are usually there for 2 to 4 years, the permanent staff at the embassies. The interdiction

teams which go down in snowcap in Peru or Bolivia or operation cadence, they go down for 60 or 90 days, and they are taken from a special group of people who volunteer.

When they first went down there, they had a lot of problems because it was just volunteers and they would go straight out of their offices down there. Now they are basically assigned for a year and they go back and forth between the States and South America. That way they are able to provide them extra training at Fort Benning and things like this, and it is not a hit-or-miss operation like it was when they began in South America.

The cadence people are pretty well trained. They have an extensive training course, language course for them. They used to have a language problem. When snowcap began, a lot of people went down there to South America who didn't speak Spanish and we expected them to develop leads and tips and information. I think the State I.G. reported on that. And they supposedly have solved that problem.

Mr. CONDIT. Is this solely a DEA operation? Do we place people from that country with DEA staff? Do we begin to educate them? And if so, what percentage do we do that?

Mr. FLEENER. These cadence teams usually consist of about 10 DEA agents, 10, 12, 13, 14. They will probably have a communication person who is a DEA person. They will have a medic who is probably a DEA employee who is a former special forces type person trained in field medicine.

They will go out and they will have a group of host country people in Guatemala. They will have Treasury police and they have special units in Peru and in Bolivia.

Since the DEA people can't make arrests in these countries, they take with them maybe 10 or so host country police unit people who will in fact make the arrest, the actual arrest.

Mr. CONDIT. Are these like uniformed officers or are these undercover people?

Mr. FLEENER. A lot of them are paramilitary type officers. They have been trained. Sometimes the United States military out of Panama will send teams down there to train them in different techniques on assault from helicopters and other skills that they can use.

They are more like a National Guard type of unit. But they are trained and they conduct the arrest. However, depending on the country, some countries like Mexico won't allow DEA agents to go on the raids. They conduct the raids with their own people and DEA comes in afterwards.

It all depends on how the country feels about having Americans at the scene of arrests.

Mr. CONDIT. Mr. Nelson, did you want to add anything to any of this? I was just refreshing my memory from when we were down there last.

Mr. NELSON. I believe, as we pointed out in the report, a part of the United States's effort in Central America has been to increase the capability and competence of local law enforcement people with the hope that they can assume a greater share of the responsibility for investigations.

Mr. CONDIT. That was my point. At some point are we training these people and getting them in the loop so eventually they can take a greater share of this? That is our objective; is that correct?

Mr. NELSON. That is correct. We saw some signs that agencies responsible for counternarcotics were showing more of a commitment to funding programs and improving the quality of their staffs.

Mr. CONDIT. Mr. Ramirez, do you have anything to add?

Thank you very much for being here. Thank you all for being here. We appreciate it. We may have some additional questions that we may want to submit in writing and hope that you would respond to those.

But we do appreciate your time. You have been very kind with your time. We appreciate your being here. Thank you.

This meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

RESPONSE BY THOMAS CONSTANTINE, ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION TO SUBCOMMITTEE QUESTIONS



U.S. Department of Justice

Drug Enforcement Administration

Office of the Administrator

Washington, D.C. 20537

SEP 14 1994

Honorable Gary A. Condit
Chairman, Government Operations
Subcommittee on Information, Justice,
Transportation and Agriculture
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to the questions you provided as a result of issues that were raised at the Subcommittee's August 2 hearing on emerging drug trends -- methamphetamine, "CAT," and heroin. The answers to those questions are as follows:

1. *How many regional, district, field or other adjunct offices does the DEA provide staffing for?*

DEA provides staffing for a total of 243 offices worldwide. DEA has 19 domestic Field Divisions throughout the United States, each managed by an executive-level Special Agent in Charge (SAC). Subordinate to these divisions are 119 Resident Offices, 9 District Offices, and 31 Posts of Duty, with at least one office located in every state. Overseas, DEA has 65 Foreign Offices which are managed by Country Attaches.

In addition to these offices, DEA also manages EPIC, a multi-agency intelligence center in El Paso, Texas, and has established a training center at Quantico, Virginia. DEA also maintains seven drug analytical laboratories throughout the country, and a special drug testing facility in McLean, Virginia.

2. *Could you please provide the Subcommittee with a list of the locations of such offices by city, including the number of DEA agents in each office. Please provide this information for DEA's Foreign Offices as well.*

(A) As you will see from the chart accompanying this response, DEA has Special Agents (SA) working drug investigations in nearly every state in the country. These efforts are augmented and enhanced by State and Local Task Force Officers (S&L TF) who help DEA to identify and dismantle the local drug organizations that operate in rural and urban areas throughout the country. As part of DEA's Diversion Control Program, we also have a number of Diversion Investigators (DI) working in the field conducting criminal investigations of pharmacies and practitioners who may be involved in diverting licit substances into the illicit market.

To show a breakdown of how DEA's offices are staffed, please refer to the attached chart, which is divided into DEA's 19 Field Divisions. Listed under each Field Division are the names of each office located in that district, followed by a designator (POD, Post of Duty; RO Resident Office; DO District Office) which identifies the type of office, and the city and state in which the office is located. The next column identifies the number of DEA SA's and DI's in that office, and the last column shows the number of State and Local Officers participating in a Task Force supported by that office.

1. Posts of Duty (POD) 31
 Resident Offices (RO) 119
 District Offices (DO) 9
 Field Divisions (FD) 19
 Foreign Offices (FO) 65

TOTAL 243

2a. DOMESTIC:

<u>DIVISION</u>	<u>OFFICE/CITY/STATE</u>	<u>DEA</u>		<u>S&L TF OFFICERS</u>
		<u>SA</u>	<u>DI</u>	
ATLANTA	Atlanta FD/Atlanta/GA	49	10	14
	Atlanta Airport TF/Hapeville/GA	4		10
	Columbus RO/Columbus/GA	2		8
	Macon RO/Macon/GA	4		6
	Savannah RO/Savannah/GA	7		8
	Charlotte RO/Charlotte/NC	4		8
	Greensboro RO/Greensboro/NC	6	5	
	Raleigh RO/Raleigh/NC	4		4
	Wilimington RO/Wilimington/NC	2		4
	Charleston RO/Charleston/SC	6		14
	Florence POD/Florence/SC	3		5
	Columbia RO/Columbia/SC	6	5	
	Greenville POD/Greenville/SC	2		8
	Knoxville RO/Knoxville/TN	5		7
	Johnson City POD/Johnson City/TN	2		
	Chattanooga POD/Chattanooga/TN	2		4
	Memphis RO/Memphis/TN	6		13
	Nashville RO/Nashville/TN	9	5	10
BOSTON	Boston FD/Boston/MA	56	13	21
	Cape Cod POD/Barnstable/MA	2		9
	Bridgeport RO/Bridgeport/CT	4		
	Hartford RO/Hartford/CT	11	5	
	New Haven POD/New Haven/CT	3		
	Springfield RO/Springfield/MA	6		11
	Portland RO/Portland/ME	5		
	Concord RO/Concord/NH	4		
	Providence RO/Providence/RI	8		13
CHICAGO	Burlington RO/Williston/VT	4		6
	Chicago FD/Chicago/IL	109	19	30
	Chi. Airport Group/Des Plaines/IL	4		11
	Springfield RO/Springfield/IL	5		2
	Hammond RO/Hammond/IL	7		9
	Indianapolis RO/Indianapolis/IN	8	6	
	Minneapolis RO/Minneapolis/MN	14	4	9
	Fargo RO/Fargo/ND	4		9
	Milwaukee RO/Milwaukee/WI	7	5	8
	Madison POD/Madison/WI	2		

DIVISION	OFFICE/CITY/STATE	DEA		S&L TF OFFICERS
		SA	DI	
DALLAS	Dallas FD/Dallas/TX	44	10	
	Oklahoma City RO/Oklahoma City/OK	8	6	6
	Tulsa RO/Tulsa/OK	3		
	McAlester POD/McAlester/ OK	2		
	Ft. Worth RO/Ft. Worth/TX	9		25
	Lubbock RO/Lubbock/TX	5		4
	Midland POD/Midland/TX	2		
	Amarillo POD/Amarillo/TX	2		
	Tyler RO/Tyler/TX	3		8
DENVER	Denver FD/Englewood/CO	44	9	13
	Glenwood Springs RO/Glenwd Sp./CO	3		3
	Colorado Springs RO/Colo. Spr./CO	3		
	Salt Lake City RO/Salt Lake Cty/UT	8	2	6
	Cheyenne RO/Cheyenne/WY	2		
	Casper POD/Casper/ WY	2		
	Albuquerque DO/Albuquerque/NM	20	2	8
	Las Cruces RO/Las Cruces/NM	7		8
DETROIT	Detroit FD/Detroit/MI	83	22	27
	Lexington RO/Lexington/ KY	5		6
	Louisville RO/Louisville/KY	7	4	5
	Grand Rapids RO/Grand Rapids/MI	6		6
	Saginaw RO/Saginaw/MI	3		3
	Cincinnati RO/Cincinnati/OH	6		15
	Cleveland RO/Cleveland/ OH	11	6	12
	Columbus RO/Columbus/ OH	3	6	11
	Toledo RO/Toledo/OH	4		
HOUSTON	Houston FD/Houston/TX	112	13	28
	Beaumont RO/Beaumont/TX	4		5
	Galveston RO/Galveston/TX	4		
	El Paso DO/El Paso/ TX	34		11
	Alpine RO/Alpine/TX	2		2
	McAllen DO/McAllen/TX	37		2
	Brownsville RO/Brownsville/TX	13		4
	Corpus Christi RO/Corpus Christi/TX	6		8
	San Antonio DO/San Antonio/TX	33	6	11
	Austin RO/Austin/TX	10		
	Waco POD/Waco/TX	2		7
	Eagle Pass RO/Eagle Pass/TX	5		17
	Laredo RO/Laredo/TX	11		15
LOS ANGELES	Los Angeles FD/Los Angeles/CA	177	14	85
	Riverside RO/Riverside/CA	13	7	10
	Santa Ana RO/Santa Ana/CA	11		7
	Santa Barbara RO/Goleta/CA	7		
	Honolulu RO/Honolulu/HI	16	2	4
	Hilo POD/Hilo/HI	1		
	Guam POD/Agana/Guam	2		
	Las Vegas RO/Las Vegas/NV	14		

DIVISION	OFFICE/CITY/STATE	DEA		S&L TF OFFICERS
		SA	DI	
	Reno RO/Reno/NV	10		
	N. Lake Tahoe POD/Incline Vil/NV	1		4
	S. Lake Tahoe POD/Zepher Cove/NV	1		4
MIAMI	Miami FD/Miami/FL	201	11	
	Gainesville RO/Gainesville/FL	6		
	Jacksonville RO/Jacksonville/FL	13		
	Key Largo RO/Key Largo/FL	7		
	Orlando RO/Altamonte Springs/FL	14		12
	Panama City/Panama City/FL	4		
	Pensacola POD/Pensacola/FL	3		
	Tallahassee RO/Tallahassee/FL	6		
	Ft. Lauderdale DO/Ft. Laud./FL	37	8	12
	W. Palm Beach RO/W. Palm Bch/FL	15		7
	Tampa DO/Tampa/FL	27	7	8
	Ft. Myers RO/Ft. Myers/FL	10		11
	San Juan DO/Santurce/Puerto Rico	32	12	24
	St. Thomas RO/St. Thomas/Virgin Is.	3		4
	St. Croix POD/Christiansted/VI	2		2
NEWARK	Newark FD/Newark/NJ	59	18	16
	Atlantic City RO/Northfield/NJ	7		
	Camden RO/Mount Laurel/NJ	4		
NEW ORLEANS	New Orleans FD/Metairie/LA	63	9	18
	Birmingham RO/Birmingham/AL	5		12
	Mobile RO/Mobile/AL	8	5	9
	Montgomery POD/Montgomery/AL	2		
	Little Rock RO/Little Rock/AR	8	2	13
	Fayetteville POD/Fayetteville/AR	2		
	Baton Rouge RO/Baton Rouge/LA	7		
	Shreveport RO/Shreveport/LA	4		
	Gulfport RO/Gulfport/LA	4		
	Jackson RO/Jackson/MS	5		11
	Oxford POD/Oxford/MS	2		1
NEW YORK	New York FD/New York/NY	310	18	240
	Westchester POD/Hawthorne/NY	6		14
	JFK Airport Station/Jamaica/NY	19		
	Albany RO/Albany/NY	10		11
	Buffalo RO/Buffalo/NY	10	5	10
	Long Island RO/Melville/NY	17	7	13
	Rochester RO/Rochester/NY	6		
	Syracuse RO/Syracuse/NY	4		15

DIVISION	OFFICE/CITY/STATE	DEA		S&L TF OFFICERS
		SA	DI	
PHILADELPHIA	Philadelphia FD/Phila/PA	61	17	34
	Wilimington RO/Wilimington/DE	5		9
	Allentown RO/Allentown/PA	4		4
	Harrisburg RO/Harrisburg/PA	6		
	Scranton POD/Scranton/PA	2		
	Pittsburgh RO/Pittsburgh/PA	11		
PHOENIX	Phoenix FD/Phoenix/AZ	47	8	18
	Yuma RO/Yuma/AZ	5		
	Tucson DO/Tucson/AZ	25		12
	Nogales RO/Nogales/AZ	7		
	Sierra Vista RO/Sierra Vista/AZ	6		
SAN DIEGO	San Diego FD/National City/CA	94	6	58
	Imperial County RO/Imperial/CA	14		
	Carlsbad RO/Carlsbad/CA	11		
	San Ysidro RO/San Ysidro/CA	17		4
SAN FRANCISCO	San Francisco FD/San Francisco/CA	68	11	23
	Fresno RO/Fresno/CA	11	2	
	Monterey RO/Monterey/CA	3		9
	Sacramento RO/Sacramento/CA	23	2	8
	San Jose RO/San Jose/CA	13		12
SEATTLE	Seattle FD/Seattle/WA	41	8	15
	Anchorage RO/Anchorage/AK	4		6
	Boise RO/Boise/ID	5		
	Billings RO/Billings/MT	4		
	Eugene RO/Eugene/OR	7		
	Medford POD/Medford/OR	2		
	Portland RO/Portland/OR	12	4	7
	Blaine RO/Blaine/WA	4		
	Spokane RO/Spokane/WA	7		
	Yakima RO/Yakima/WA	4		13
ST. LOUIS	St. Louis FD/St. Louis/MO	32	8	22
	So. Illinois TF/Fairview Hts/IL	3		6
	Des Moines RO/Des Moines/IA	5	2	5
	Cedar Rapids POD/Cedar Rapids/IA	2		
	Kansas City RO/Overland Park/KS	11	7	9
	Wichita RO/Wichita/KS	4		10
	Cape Girardeau RO/Cape Girardeau/MO	3		
	Carbondale POD/Carbondale/MO	1		
	Springfield RO/Springfield/MO	4		
	Omaha RO/Omaha/NB	6	2	
	Sioux Falls RO/Sioux Falls/SD	3		
	Rapid City POD/Rapid City/SD	2		
	Sioux City POD/Sioux City/IA	2		

<u>DIVISION</u>	<u>OFFICE/CITY/STATE</u>	<u>DEA</u>		<u>S&L TF</u>
		<u>SA</u>	<u>DI</u>	
WASHINGTON	Washington FD/District of Columbia	69	8	60
	Norfolk RO/Norfolk/VA	7		14
	Richmond RO/Richmond/VA	6		9
	Roanoke RO/Roanoke/VA	4		
	Charleston RO/Charleston/WV	3		6
	Clarksburg POD/Clarksburg/WV	2		
	Baltimore DO/Baltimore/MD	37	5	18
	Hagerstown POD/Hagerstown/MD	2		
	Salisbury POD/Salisbury/MD	2		

(b) DEA currently has 341 Special Agents in our foreign offices working worldwide drug investigations. DEA also has a few DI's working in these offices, principally in those areas where precursor chemical control has posed the greatest challenge. The chart following this response lists where DEA's foreign offices are located in different regions throughout the world, the name of the office, the city and country in which the office is located, followed by a designator (CO, Country Office; or RO, Resident Office) to identify the type of office. The last columns on the chart identify the number of DEA SA's and DI's who staff each office.

2b. FOREIGN:

OFFICE/CITY/COUNTRY

<u>DEA</u>	
<u>SAs</u>	<u>DI's</u>

Caribbean Offices:

Bridgetown, Barbados Country Office	2
Kingston, Jamaica Country Office	3
Nassau, Bahamas Country Office(CO)	20
Freeport, Bahamas RO	3
Port-au-Prince, Haiti CO	2
Santo Domingo, Dom. Rep. CO	3

Europe & Middle East Offices:

Ankara Country Office (CO)/Ankara/Turkey	3
Istanbul RO/Istanbul/Turkey	3
Athens CO/Athens/Greece	3
Bern CO/Bern/Switzerland	3
Bonn CO/Bonn/Germany	2
Frankfurt RO/Frankfurt/Germany	5
Brussels CO/Brussels/Belguim	2
Cairo CO/Cairo/Egypt	2
Copenhagen CO/Copenhagen/Denmark	2
Islamabad CO/Islamabad/Pakistan	4
Karachi RO/Karachi/Pakistan	4
Lahore RO/Lahore/Pakistan	4
Peshawar RO/Peshawar/Pakistan	3
Lagos CO/Lagos/Nigeria	3
London CO/London/England	3
Madrid CO/Madrid/Spain	4
New Delhi CO/New Delhi/India	3
Bombay RO/Bombay/India	2
Nicosia CO/Nicosia/Cyprus	4
Ottawa CO/Ottawa/Canada	2
Montreal RO/Montreal/Canada	2
Paris CO/Paris/France	4
Rome CO/Rome/Italy	4
Milan RO/Milan/Italy	3
The Hague CO/The Hague/Netherlands	4
Vienna CO/Vienna/Austria	4

OFFICE/CITY/COUNTRY

	<u>DEA</u>	
	<u>SAs</u>	<u>Dis</u>

Far East Offices:

Bangkok CO/Bangkok/Thailand	14	
Chiang Mai RO/Chiang Mai/Thailand	5	
Songkhla RO/Songkhla/Thailand	4	
Udorn RO/Udorn/Thailand	2	
Canberra CO/Canberra/Australia	2	
Hong Kong CO/Victoria/Hong Kong	5	
Kuala Lumpur CO/Kuala Lumpur/Malaysia	2	
Manila CO/Manila/Philippines	2	
Rangoon CO/Rangoon/Burma	2	
Seoul CO/Seoul/Korea	2	
Singapore CO/Singapore/Singapore	2	
Tokyo CO/Tokyo/Japan	2	

South America Offices:

Asuncion CO/Asuncion/Paraguay	2	
Bogota CO/Bogota/Colombia	24	1
Barranquilla RO/Barranquilla/Colombia	8	
Brasilia CO/Brasilia/Brazil	6	1
Buenos Aires CO/Buenos Aires/Argentina	4	1
Caracas CO/Caracas/Venezuela	7	1
La Paz CO/La Paz/Bolivia	21	
Cochabamba RO/Cochabamba/Bolivia	7	
Santa Cruz RO/Santa Cruz/Bolivia	10	
Lima CO/Lima/Peru	15	
Montevideo CO/Montevideo/Uruguay	2	1
Quito CO/Quito/Ecuador	3	1
Guayaquil RO/Guayaquil/Ecuador	4	
Santiago CO/Santiago/Chile	2	

Central America Offices:

Belize City CO/Belize City/Belize	2	
Curacao CO/Curacao/Netherland Antilles	2	
Guatemala City CO/Guatemala City/Guatemala	7	
Mexico City CO/Mexico City/Mexico	16	1
Guadalajara RO/Guadalajara/Mexico	5	
Hermosillo RO/Hermosillo/Mexico	5	
Mazatlan RO/Mazatlan/Mexico	5	
Merida RO/Merida/Mexico	3	
Monterrey RO/Monterrey/Mexico	5	
Panama City CO/Panama City/Panama	5	
San Jose CO/San Jose/Costa Rica	5	
San Salvador CO/San Salvador/El Salvador	2	
Tegucigalpa CO/Tegucigalpa/Honduras	3	

3. *Please provide the Subcommittee with a list of arrests, seizures and convictions by type or class of illicit narcotic (s), for each regional, district, field, or other adjunct office staffed by DEA.*

DEA arrest and conviction data is provided in the first chart that follows this response. This data is provided for Fiscal Year 1993 through the second quarter of Fiscal Year 1994. National figures are given for each specific drug type, followed by a breakdown of arrests and convictions for each Field Division and each office within the Division.

Information about DEA seizures is provided in the last two charts in this section. This includes statistics on DEA's asset seizures, laboratory seizures, and dangerous drug removals. This information is also provided for Fiscal Year 1993 through the second quarter of Fiscal Year 1994. Seizure information for each Field Division is provided, as well as for each office within the Division.

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DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
DEFENDANT STATISTICAL SYSTEM
SEPTEMBER 07, 1994

ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME

PERIOD DO NOT NECESSARILY REFER TO THE SAME PERSONS

	CASE DRUG				TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	
NATIONAL					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	2,153	11,196	5,119	2,967	21,435
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	952	5,371	2,571	1,465	10,359
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	2,209	9,922	3,788	2,454	18,373
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	857	4,244	1,772	1,029	7,902
ATLANTA FIELD DIVISION					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	114	1,350	402	154	2,020
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	32	674	123	69	898
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	62	786	212	94	1,154
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	43	402	113	44	602
ATLANTA GA					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	33	319	94	89	535
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	12	148	27	21	208
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	21	92	18	37	168
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	18	82	25	23	148
CHARLESTON SC					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	1	81	25	5	112
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	1	88	16	-	95
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	17	97	17	-	131
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	4	25	10	1	40
COLUMBIA SC					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	41	182	53	11	287
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	12	45	26	7	90
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	13	135	56	17	221
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	3	60	18	9	90
COLUMBUS GA					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	32	-	-	32
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	9	-	1	10

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
DEFENDANT STATISTICAL SYSTEM
SEPTEMBER 07, 1994

ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME

PERIOD DO NOT NECESSARILY REFER TO THE SAME PERSONS

	CASE DRUG				
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	TOTAL
COLUMBUS GA					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	24	1	-	25
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS .	-	4	-	-	4
GREENSBORO NC					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	4	120	-	4	128
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	47	6	2	55
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	5	95	5	5	110
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS .	1	35	-	2	38
KNOXVILLE TN					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	2	81	53	8	144
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	28	7	12	47
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	2	39	31	8	80
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS .	1	42	26	5	74
MEMPHIS TN					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	3	76	16	17	112
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	44	11	4	59
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	3	53	10	13	79
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS .	1	28	6	-	35
NASHVILLE TN					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	26	21	4	51
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	20	9	4	33
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	1	29	-	8	38
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS .	-	3	2	-	5
SAVANNAH GA					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	1	169	40	-	210
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	1	115	18	4	138

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DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
DEFENDANT STATISTICAL SYSTEM
SEPTEMBER 07, 1994

ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME

PERIOD DO NOT NECESSARILY REFER TO THE SAME PERSONS

	CASE DRUG				TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	
SAVANNAH GA					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	37	49	-	86
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . . .	-	32	12	-	44
WILMINGTON NC					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	23	5	-	28
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	14	-	1	15
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	53	13	-	66
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . . .	-	7	-	-	7
CHARLOTTE NC					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	7	47	74	11	139
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	4	24	1	7	36
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	43	8	3	54
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . . .	2	41	6	2	51
RALEIGH NC					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	21	78	14	3	116
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	2	58	2	5	67
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	67	4	1	72
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . . .	13	25	3	1	42
MACON GA					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	1	116	7	2	126
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	34	10	1	45
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	22	-	2	24
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . . .	-	18	5	1	24
BOSTON FIELD DIVISION					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	91	339	102	60	592
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	81	230	74	30	415

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
DEFENDANT STATISTICAL SYSTEM
SEPTEMBER 07, 1994

ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME

PERIOD DO NOT NECESSARILY REFER TO THE SAME PERSONS

	CASE DRUG				TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	
BOSTON FIELD DIVISION					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	48	329	104	56	537
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	24	195	22	22	263
BOSTON MA					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	45	149	33	39	266
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	51	60	15	26	152
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	13	106	38	24	181
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	7	66	4	13	90
BRIDGEPORT CT					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	1	28	-	-	29
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	1	7	-	2	10
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	3	36	3	-	42
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	21	-	-	21
BURLINGTON VT					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	8	19	5	-	32
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	1	5	10	-	16
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	3	32	10	-	45
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	18	-	-	18
CONCORD NH					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	20	20	2	42
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	16	9	-	25
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	11	5	19	35
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	8	4	2	14
HARTFORD CT					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	13	61	3	-	77
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	11	76	3	1	91

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	CASE DRUG				TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	
HARTFORD CT					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	27	11	3	41
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	5	29	5	-	39
PORTLAND ME					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	2	26	17	7	52
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	2	19	18	1	40
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	7	25	18	5	55
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	1	4	6	1	12
PROVIDENCE RI					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	17	19	10	12	58
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	2	31	13	-	46
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	15	44	13	2	74
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	4	9	1	6	20
SPRINGFIELD MA					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	5	17	14	-	36
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	13	16	6	-	35
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	7	48	6	3	64
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	7	40	2	-	49
CHICAGO FIELD DIVISION					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	73	554	214	84	925
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	41	301	106	41	489
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	83	577	124	82	866
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	49	217	73	54	393
CHICAGO IL					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	44	312	79	16	451
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	34	171	33	11	249

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	CASE DRUG				TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	
CHICAGO IL					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	70	341	36	40	487
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	35	123	27	25	210
FARGO ND					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	3	11	8	8	30
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	2	12	6	3	23
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	3	17	8	4	32
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	-	6	3	4	13
HAMMOND IN					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	4	22	24	11	61
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	8	1	-	9
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	5	44	5	6	60
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	3	16	6	2	27
INDIANAPOLIS IN					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	3	24	37	10	74
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	15	26	18	59
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	2	24	35	10	71
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	-	10	13	5	28
MILWAUKEE WI					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	2	58	7	16	83
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	30	3	1	34
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	44	4	6	54
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	-	21	4	6	31
MINNEAPOLIS MN					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	17	102	41	12	172
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	5	60	36	8	109

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	CASE DRUG				
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	TOTAL
MINNEAPOLIS MN					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	3	78	27	11	119
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	11	21	11	8	51
SPRINGFIELD IL					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	25	18	11	54
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	5	1	-	6
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	29	9	5	43
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	20	9	4	33
DALLAS FIELD DIVISION					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	40	369	129	123	661
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	7	156	67	69	299
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	59	282	86	140	567
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	14	121	32	44	211
DALLAS TX					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	25	117	52	32	226
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	4	48	24	26	102
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	37	75	29	42	183
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	8	32	8	14	62
FT WORTH TX					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	65	12	12	89
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	1	3	12	8	24
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	2	51	6	19	78
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	26	6	5	37
OKLAHOMA CITY OK					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	7	63	17	53	140
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	61	9	24	94

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	CASE DRUG				TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	
OKLAHOMA CITY OK					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	5	44	26	54	129
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	2	14	5	19	40
TULSA OK					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	15	8	6	26
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	9	6	6	23
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	37	5	17	59
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	12	1	-	13
LUBBOCK TX					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	3	66	19	9	97
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	1	15	15	1	32
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	14	30	11	3	58
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	1	27	7	2	37
MIDLAND TX					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	2	19	8	-	29
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	1	5	-	-	6
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	1	25	2	-	28
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	3	5	1	-	9
TYLER, TX					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	3	24	16	11	54
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	15	1	2	18
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	20	7	5	32
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	5	4	4	13
DENVER FIELD DIVISION					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	37	372	504	226	1,139
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	30	159	229	127	545

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ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME

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	CASE DRUG				TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	
DENVER FIELD DIVISION					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	15	368	254	149	786
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	7	147	196	73	423
DENVER CO					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	29	235	60	139	463
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	11	72	27	53	163
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	13	218	32	73	336
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	6	88	27	32	153
GLENWOOD SPRINGS CO					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	34	14	5	53
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	5	6	2	13
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	45	43	16	104
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	3	3	-	6
COLORADO SPRINGS CO					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	11	42	19	72
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	1	16	29	8	55
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	20	3	6	29
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	6	9	10	25
CHEYENNE WY					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	15	36	25	76
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	7	6	38	51
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	28	31	27	86
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	8	20	8	36
SALT LAKE CITY UT					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	1	40	14	28	84
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	11	25	-	16	52

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	CASE DRUG				TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	
SALT LAKE CITY UT					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	13	1	6	20
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	1	23	5	19	48
ALBUQUERQUE NM					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	6	28	44	6	84
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	5	24	25	7	61
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	2	39	35	18	94
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	-	15	11	3	29
LAS CRUCES NM					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	1	9	294	3	307
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	2	10	136	2	150
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	5	109	3	117
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	-	4	121	1	126
DETROIT FIELD DIVISION					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	67	491	184	107	849
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	84	234	160	58	536
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	60	515	184	70	829
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	32	226	82	60	400
DETROIT MI					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	53	185	24	30	292
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	72	104	40	15	231
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	48	228	42	24	342
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	24	65	7	22	118
SAGINAW MI					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	1	28	36	5	70
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	15	8	-	23

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ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME

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	CASE DRUG				TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DAINGEROUS DRUGS	
SAGINAW MI					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	1	18	22	8	49
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . . .	-	3	18	1	22
CINCINNATI OH					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	59	19	6	84
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	4	20	27	1	52
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	6	85	36	7	134
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . . .	2	67	10	5	84
CLEVELAND OH					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	4	53	14	18	89
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	7	15	13	10	45
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	1	79	18	6	104
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . . .	2	15	10	3	30
COLUMBUS OH					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	28	5	10	44
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	4	2	3	9
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	1	47	11	14	73
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . . .	-	9	2	2	13
GRAND RAPIDS MI					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	2	42	44	27	115
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	1	31	21	16	69
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	1	11	13	-	25
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . . .	1	19	16	13	49
LOUISVILLE KY					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	4	43	24	11	82
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	12	15	10	37

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	CASE DRUG				TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	
LOUISVILLE KY					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	2	35	15	10	62
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	2	25	14	14	55
LEXINGTON KY					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	3	20	11	-	34
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	24	26	3	53
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	5	23	1	29
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	12	5	-	17
TOLEDO OH					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	32	7	-	39
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	9	8	-	17
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	7	4	-	11
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	1	11	-	-	12
HOUSTON FIELD DIVISION					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	190	603	1,050	90	1,933
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	58	316	574	45	993
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	112	560	776	120	1,568
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	67	208	330	32	637
HOUSTON TX					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	41	192	56	31	320
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	9	71	29	3	112
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	24	187	45	23	279
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	21	46	17	10	94
CORPUS CHRISTI TX					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	1	25	256	9	291
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	5	106	2	113

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	CASE DRUG				
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	TOTAL
CORPUS CHRISTI TX					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	1	22	147	-	170
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	11	62	2	75
GALVESTON TX					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	2	36	2	2	42
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	10	10	-	20
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	6	27	4	20	57
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	3	26	3	1	33
MCALLEN TX					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	36	44	109	7	196
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	4	26	104	7	141
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	22	44	117	-	183
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	11	12	26	-	49
BROWNSVILLE TX					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	4	33	101	-	138
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	15	40	-	55
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	5	52	39	1	127
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	13	34	-	47
LAREDO TX					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	27	38	159	2	226
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	16	11	104	2	133
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	8	16	131	3	158
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	15	9	44	1	69
SAN ANTONIO TX					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	43	54	81	13	191
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	19	82	43	5	149

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	ASE DRUG				TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	
SAN ANTONIO TX					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	37	100	66	16	219
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	7	39	16	9	71
AUSTIN TX					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	18	62	44	20	144
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	1	31	18	23	73
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	1	57	56	56	170
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	2	21	19	9	51
DEL RIO TX (CLOSED)					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	-	-	-	-
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	-	-	-	-
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	-	-	-	-
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	-	-	-	-
EAGLE PASS TX					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	5	4	68	-	77
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	5	7	53	-	65
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	10	74	-	84
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	4	1	25	-	30
EL PASO TX					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	12	78	100	2	192
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	4	38	32	1	75
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	8	41	32	1	82
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	4	16	41	-	61
ALPINE TX					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	1	1	60	-	62
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	-	31	-	31

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	CASE DRUG				TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	
ALPINE TX					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	4	35	-	39
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . . .	-	-	34	-	34
BEAUMONT TX					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	36	14	4	54
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	20	4	2	26
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	-	-	-	-
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . . .	-	14	9	-	23
LOS ANGELES FIELD DIVISION					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	77	509	97	367	1,050
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	49	228	78	215	570
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	88	358	67	174	687
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . . .	25	192	17	99	333
LOS ANGELES CA					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	28	134	33	38	233
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	21	45	37	11	114
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	32	121	7	27	187
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . . .	10	74	7	16	107
HONOLULU HI (INC. GUAM)					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	11	56	25	68	160
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	14	24	17	48	103
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	7	42	27	46	122
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . . .	3	13	4	41	61
LAS VEGAS NV					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	3	114	8	65	190
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	48	10	29	87

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	CASE DRUG					TOTAL
	DPTATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS		
LAS VEGAS NV						
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	12	82	1	17	112	
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	30	2	5	37	
RENO NV						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	1	33	28	101	163	
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	21	7	47	75	
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	5	33	20	36	94	
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	1	20	4	19	44	
RIVERSIDE CA						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	21	38	-	67	126	
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	2	34	3	45	84	
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	22	35	-	33	90	
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	6	7	-	9	22	
SANTA ANA CA						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	10	78	3	22	113	
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	9	49	-	32	90	
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	6	20	2	14	42	
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	3	39	-	7	49	
SANTA BARBARA CA						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	3	56	-	6	65	
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	3	7	4	3	17	
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	4	25	10	1	40	
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	2	9	-	2	13	
MIAMI FIELD DIVISION						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	262	1,990	526	232	3,010	
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	73	1,037	225	99	1,434	

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	CASE DRUG				
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	TOTAL
MIAMI FIELD DIVISION					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	194	1,558	419	165	2,336
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	72	523	150	56	801
MIAMI FL					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	117	466	54	27	664
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	22	312	21	19	374
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	127	537	58	29	751
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	26	161	25	7	219
FT MYERS FL					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	5	137	31	6	179
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	40	41	5	86
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	71	100	8	179
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	1	32	17	4	54
FT LAUDERDALE FL					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	4	235	70	52	361
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	3	143	20	17	183
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	2	137	47	24	210
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	2	45	13	14	74
JACKSONVILLE FL					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	3	65	43	9	120
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	1	37	37	-	75
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	2	84	42	14	142
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	19	10	5	34
MARATHON FL					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	5	37	1	-	43
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	4	2	-	6

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	CASE DRUG				TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	
MARATHON FL FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	- 1	37 6	24 2	- -	61 9
ORLANDO FL FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	12 -	60 17 46 13 28 24	71 19 13 13 24 14	31 5 13 13 14 14	174 41 75 75 71 71
PANAMA CITY FL FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	8 2 1 1	83 82 85 35 35 11	30 24 35 11	4 2 11 11	125 110 132 132 46 46
TAMPA FL FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	18 4 5 5 3 3	237 95 164 45 45 45	52 21 58 16	76 42 40 5	383 162 267 69
W PALM BEACH FL FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	6 4 23 73 2 27	112 45 73 17 27 10	38 22 17 4 10 3	7 3 4 4 3 3	163 74 117 42
GAINESVILLE FL FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	2 -	68 37	21 4	13 1	104 42

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	CASE DRUG				TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	
GAINESVILLE FL					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	60	13	17	90
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	27	8	4	39
SAN JUAN PR					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	68	241	44	2	355
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	35	106	7	2	150
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	31	193	-	-	224
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	32	62	4	-	98
KINGSTON JA					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	7	15	40	-	62
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	2	24	4	-	30
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	-	-	-	-
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	-	-	-	-
NASSAU BA					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	53	5	3	61
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	13	1	3	17
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	-	-	-	-
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	-	-	-	-
SANTO DOMINGO					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	53	-	-	53
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	25	-	-	25
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	-	-	-	-
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	-	-	-	-
KEY WEST FL JTG					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	-	-	-	-
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	-	-	-	-

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
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ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME

PERIOD DO NOT NECESSARILY REFER TO THE SAME PERSONS

	CASE DRUG				TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	
KEY WEST FL JTG FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	- -	- -	5 -	- -	5 -
PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	2 - - -	1 5 - -	- - - -	- - - -	3 5 - -
TALLAHASSEE, FL FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	- - - -	54 27 68 33	12 - 4 9	2 - 5 -	68 27 77 42
BRIOGETOWN, BARBADOS FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	3 - - -	22 15 - -	3 1 - -	- - - -	28 16 - -
FREEPORT, BAHAMAS FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	- - - -	16 - - -	- - - -	- - - -	16 - - -
ST. THOMAS, VI FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	- -	35 10	11 1	- -	48 11

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DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
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ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME

PERIOD DO NOT NECESSARILY REFER TO THE SAME PERSONS

	CASE DRUG				
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	TOTAL
ST. THOMAS, VI					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	3	3	-	6
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . . .	-	3	1	-	4
NEWARK FIELD DIVISION					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	151	367	57	67	642
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	101	122	12	17	252
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	108	381	18	49	556
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . . .	57	157	15	30	259
NEWARK NJ					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	125	190	44	13	372
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	30	81	4	9	124
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	93	243	11	14	361
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . . .	50	64	11	17	142
ATLANTIC CITY NJ					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	22	81	12	45	160
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	71	8	3	5	87
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	15	129	7	29	180
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . . .	5	58	4	10	77
CAMDEN NJ					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	4	96	1	9	110
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	33	5	3	41
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	9	-	6	15
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . . .	2	35	-	3	40
NEW ORLEANS FIELD DIVISION					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	40	877	217	275	1,409
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	14	384	98	121	617

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ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME
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	CASE DRUG				TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	
NEW ORLEANS FIELD DIVISION					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	19	746	172	204	1,141
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	17	527	146	138	828
NEW ORLEANS LA					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	15	275	37	29	356
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	7	123	10	14	154
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	7	296	59	54	416
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	11	176	29	37	253
BATON ROUGE LA					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	1	53	14	19	87
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	2	14	9	6	31
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	40	27	12	79
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	1	28	17	4	50
SHREVEPORT LA					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	2	42	5	17	66
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	1	12	-	-	13
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	1	13	5	17	36
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	1	20	6	5	32
BIRMINGHAM AL					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	142	26	26	194
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	84	6	8	98
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	95	17	22	134
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	62	17	12	91
LITTLE ROCK AR					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	2	108	40	142	292
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	3	46	11	81	141

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ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME

PERIOD DO NOT NECESSARILY REFER TO THE SAME PERSONS

	CASE DRUG				TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	
LITTLE ROCK AR					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	111	30	73	214
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	3	49	19	57	128
JACKSON MS					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	128	39	18	185
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	41	23	12	76
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	1	68	17	8	94
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	-	45	21	4	70
MOBILE AL					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	20	120	54	20	214
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	1	61	33	-	95
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	10	123	17	17	167
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	1	147	37	18	203
GULFPORT MS					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	9	2	4	15
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	3	6	-	9
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	-	-	1	1
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	-	-	-	1	1
NEW YORK FIELD DIVISION					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	541	1,051	128	51	1,771
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	168	538	91	17	814
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	828	1,125	104	43	2,100
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	267	502	48	19	836
NEW YORK NY (INCL JFK)					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	407	442	35	10	894
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	94	137	20	9	260

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
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ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME
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	CASE DRUG					TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS		
NEW YORK NY (INCL JFK)						
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	695	589	20	13	1,317	
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	180	182	14	7	383	
ALBANY NY						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	6	78	13	1	98	
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	1	84	7	2	94	
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	1	118	21	4	144	
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	1	25	2	2	30	
BUFFALO NY						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	9	143	36	17	205	
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	19	84	33	4	140	
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	6	111	19	14	150	
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	4	41	15	3	63	
LONG ISLAND NY						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	3	98	10	8	119	
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	9	83	8	1	101	
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	11	67	-	7	85	
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	5	105	2	4	116	
ROCHESTER NY						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	6	32	20	4	62	
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	26	13	-	39	
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	34	23	3	60	
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	2	38	7	3	50	
NY TASK FORCE						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	102	223	2	5	332	
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	40	119	-	-	159	

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
OFFENDANT STATISTICAL SYSTEM
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ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME
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	CASE DRUG				DANGEROUS DRUGS	TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS			
NY TASK FORCE						
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	114	203	7		2	326
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	73	93	5		-	171
SYRACUSE NY						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	8	35	12		6	61
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	5	5	10		1	21
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	1	3	14		-	18
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	2	18	3		-	23
PHILADELPHIA FIELD DIVISION						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	70	455	83		119	727
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	22	139	61		32	264
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	71	286	52		119	528
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	35	153	20		31	239
PHILADELPHIA PA						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	45	308	57		85	495
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	17	80	37		27	161
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	60	158	10		94	322
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	25	78	16		14	133
PITTSBURGH PA						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	8	36	2		13	59
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	1	40	-		3	44
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	8	32	1		9	50
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	4	42	1		9	56
HARRISBURG PA						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	2	72	18		12	104
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	16	17		-	33

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
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ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME

PERIOD DO NOT NECESSARILY REFER TO THE SAME PERSONS

	CASE DRUG				TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	
HARRISBURG PA					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	1	47	38	10	96
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	3	22	2	1	28
WILMINGTON DE					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	6	28	-	1	35
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	1	11	-	1	13
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	29	3	1	33
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	1	10	1	1	13
ALLENTOWN PA					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	9	11	6	8	34
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	3	2	7	1	13
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	2	20	-	5	27
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	2	1	-	6	9
PHOENIX FIELD DIVISION					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	34	138	482	90	744
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	6	63	246	59	374
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	52	171	392	54	669
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	15	79	179	25	298
PHOENIX AZ					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	34	62	79	70	245
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	1	34	45	46	126
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	26	70	40	54	180
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	12	28	21	22	83
YUMA AZ					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	21	15	9	45
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	3	7	6	16

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
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ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME

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	CASE DRUG					TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS		
YUMA AZ						
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	5	20	35	10	70	
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	11	11	2	24	
TUCSON AZ						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	38	210	9	257	
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	1	25	103	7	136	
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	14	65	154	1	234	
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	3	34	82	1	120	
DOUGLAS AZ (CLOSED)						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	-	-	-	-	-
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	-	-	-	-	-
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	-	-	-	-	-
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	-	-	-	-	-
NOGALES AZ						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	6	131	2	139	
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	4	1	72	-	77	
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	7	3	101	2	113	
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	4	49	-	53	
SIERRA VISTA, AZ						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	11	47	-	58	
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	-	19	-	19	
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	13	58	1	72	
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	2	16	-	18	
SAN DIEGO FIELDO DIVISION						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	56	197	373	273	899	
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	32	69	156	163	420	

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ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME

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	CASE DRUG				TOTAL
	OPATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	
SAN DIEGO FIELD DIVISION					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	91	163	328	377	959
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	23	80	128	114	345
SAN DIEGO CA					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	40	93	113	224	470
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	21	40	77	133	271
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	49	123	114	342	628
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	16	58	57	92	223
CALEXICO CA					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	8	48	82	6	144
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	2	18	32	2	54
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	24	25	84	2	135
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	5	10	21	3	39
TECATE CA (CLOSED)					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	-	-	-	-
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	-	-	-	-
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	-	-	-	-
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	-	-	-	-
SAN YSIDRO CA					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	8	37	142	3	190
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	7	8	31	4	50
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	18	12	99	9	138
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	5	40	1	46
CARLSBAD CA					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	19	36	40	95
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	2	3	16	24	45

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
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ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME

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	CASE DRUG					TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS		
CARLSBAD CA FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	- 2	3 7	31 10	24 18	58 37	
SAN FRANCISCO FIELD DIVISION FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	64 54 56 13	217 89 164 66	112 45 88 27	287 136 212 67	680 324 520 173	
SAN FRANCISCO CA FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	48 33 21 11	100 44 109 18	92 40 47 14	111 58 55 42	351 175 232 85	
FRESNO CA FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	5 7 7 1	8 15 1	6 - 1	54 22 49 7	73 29 73 9	
SACRAMENTO CA FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	1 14 6	33 9 7 4	12 5 32 12	52 43 62 10	98 71 107 26	
SAN JOSE CA FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	8 7	43 16	2 -	70 11	123 34	

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ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME

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	CASE DRUG				
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	TOTAL
SAN JOSE CA FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	19	28	7	46	100
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	1	28	-	8	37
MONTEREY CA FY 1993 ARRESTS	2	33	-	-	35
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	13	-	2	15
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	3	5	-	-	8
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	1	15	-	-	16
SEATTLE FIELD DIVISION FY 1993 ARRESTS	25	229	196	129	579
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	17	73	53	79	222
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	29	215	149	103	496
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	12	78	75	48	213
SEATTLE WA FY 1993 ARRESTS	8	75	48	24	155
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	6	38	13	19	76
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	10	74	49	9	142
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	3	25	27	13	68
ANCHORAGE AK FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	11	18	-	29
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	5	-	-	5
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	2	15	14	-	31
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	1	-	-	1
BLAINE WA FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	29	34	25	96
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	8	13	24	45

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ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME
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	CASE DRUG				
	DPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	TOTAL
BLAINE WA					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	2	22	16	12	52
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	5	6	12	9	32
BOISE ID					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	9	2	13	24
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	4	2	6	12
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	27	4	15	46
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	3	-	8	11
EUGENE OR					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	24	23	19	66
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	4	1	7	1	13
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	4	2	12	33	51
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	10	7	1	18
GREAT FALLS MT					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	2	5	14	21
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	3	-	-	13	16
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	19	5	9	33
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	14	3	8	25
PORTLAND OR					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	2	21	28	24	75
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	3	2	8	9	22
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	11	34	10	17	72
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	4	5	6	6	21
SPOKANE WA					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	38	34	3	75
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	4	5	5	14

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ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME
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	CASE DRUG					TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS		
SPOKANE WA FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	- -	9 14	28 15	2 1	39 30	
YAKIMA WA FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	7 1 - -	20 11 13 -	4 5 11 5	7 2 6 2	38 19 30 7	
ST LOUIS FIELD DIVISION FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	50 13 17 25	381 192 347 157	153 91 138 55	140 51 85 46	724 347 587 283	
ST LOUIS MO FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	45 10 11 23	177 19 151 75	31 12 51 15	9 8 9 5	262 79 222 118	
DES MOINES IA FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	2 - - 1	18 20 22 6	9 7 12 6	31 8 21 5	60 34 55 18	
KANSAS CITY KS FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	- -	60 20	12 19	11 7	85 46	

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
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ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME
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	CASE DRUG				TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	
KANSAS CITY KS					
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	1	28	13	18	60
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	14	-	5	19
OMAHA NB					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	25	11	11	47
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	17	2	-	19
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	1	15	3	5	24
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	8	7	4	19
SIoux FALLS SD					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	20	22	22	64
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	24	18	10	52
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	2	21	8	10	41
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	21	16	12	49
WICHITA KS					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	1	26	14	18	59
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	3	20	9	4	36
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	2	48	18	10	78
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	1	10	6	6	23
CAPE GIRARDEAU MO					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	31	23	3	57
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	32	5	2	39
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	37	14	6	57
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	-	17	3	1	21
SPRINGFIELD MO					
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	24	31	35	90
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	10	19	12	41

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ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME

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	CASE DRUG				
	OPATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	TOTAL
SPRINGFIELD MO FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS		25 6	19 2	6 8	50 16
WASHINGTON DC FIELD DIVISION FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	171 70 217 60	707 357 391 214	110 82 121 64	93 37 158 27	1,081 546 1,487 365
WASHINGTON DC FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	69 41 101 22	314 186 513 67	50 52 44 33	43 17 118 11	476 296 776 133
CHARLESTON WV FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	7 3 7	43 7 68 21	24 10 26 16	14 8 10 7	88 26 107 51
NORFOLK VA FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS FY 1993 CONVICTIONS FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS	6 2 1	86 52 71 24	11 4 24 7	- - - -	103 58 95 32
RICHMOND VA FY 1993 ARRESTS FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	19	46 23	4 10	11 5	80 38

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ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS FOR THE SAME TIME

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	CASE DRUG					TOTAL
	OPIATES	COCAINE	CANNABIS	DANGEROUS DRUGS		
RICHMOND VA						
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	11	178	3	19	211	
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	3	41	3	4	51	
ROANOKE VA						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	-	59	-	-	59	
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	-	25	-	-	25	
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	-	10	3	-	13	
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	-	5	-	-	5	
BALTIMORE MD						
FY 1993 ARRESTS	70	159	21	25	275	
FY94-MARCH ARRESTS	27	64	6	7	104	
FY 1993 CONVICTIONS	102	151	21	11	285	
FY94-MARCH CONVICTIONS . .	27	56	5	5	93	

ATLANTA STATISTICAL SUMMARY
FY 1993

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ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
OFFICE	\$20,630	2.3	115.0	471.2	578,695	3
ATLANTA	\$1,233	0.0	45.4	59.6	23	0
CHARLESTON	\$1,940	0.0	4.0	72.6	376	0
COLUMBIA	\$311	0.0	0.4	0.0	15	0
COLUMBUS	\$965	0.0	10.5	0.0	0	0
GREENSBORO	\$1,198	0.0	175.4	30.7	14	0
NASHVILLE	\$1,189	0.0	0.1	0.0	302	0
WILMINGTON	\$4,186	0.1	89.2	28.4	116,501	0
MEMPHIS	\$1,792	0.0	3.5	128.5	2	0
SAVANNAH	\$3,575	0.0	0.8	172.8	6,209	1
CHARLOTTE	\$1,829	0.0	84.0	0.4	3,657	0
KNOXVILLE	\$2,532	0.0	0.6	0.0	0	0
RALEIGH	\$708	0.0	5.5	28.3	5,836	0
MACON						

BOSTON STATISTICAL SUMMARY
FY 1993

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (P/L)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
BOSTON	\$10,521	17.1	34.5	2.3	117,407	1
BRIDGEPORT	\$3,553	0.0	0.2	1.0	0	0
BURLINGTON	\$937	0.0	1.5	0.6	232	0
CONCORD	\$719	0.0	4.1	0.0	0	0
HARTFORD	\$1,081	0.5	6.3	11.0	0	0
PORTLAND	\$1,451	0.0	0.2	0.0	129	0
PROVIDENCE	\$1,898	1.7	1.0	4.2	0	1
SPRINGFIELD	\$577	0.0	0.0	4.6	0	0

CHICAGO STATISTICAL SUMMARY
FY 1993

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
CHICAGO	\$16,536	13.6	216.9	204.7	1,555	2
INDIANAPOLIS	\$2,663	0.0	1.8	12.6	97,951	1
MILWAUKEE	\$4,217	0.4	52.8	45.7	0	7
SPRINGFIELD	\$631	0.0	2.6	0.0	33,110	0
HAMMOND	\$5,674	0.0	9.2	42.9	56,341	0
MINNEAPOLIS	\$4,254	0.0	1.5	51.0	1,421	0
FARGO	\$111	0.0	1.0	0.5	22,628	0

DALLAS STATISTICAL SUMMARY
FY 1993

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DAI JG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
OFFICE						
DALLAS	\$5,035	6.9	71.7	311.9	661,913	7
FORT WORTH	\$7,146	0.5	109.5	75.3	215,298	2
OKLAHOMA CITY	\$986	0.0	1.4	5.9	640,936	8
TULSA	\$441	0.0	78.4	8.8	6,457	0
LUBBOCK	\$1,416	0.0	12.4	33.5	3,852	2
TYLER	\$409	0.0	6.6	5.0	68,374	1
MIDLAND	\$0	0.5	0.4	0.0	0	0

DENVER STATISTICAL SUMMARY
FY 1993

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
DENVER	\$2,964	1.2	6.2	7.9	61,492	4
SALT LAKE CITY	\$209	0.0	430.8	1.4	129,866	6
CHEYENNE	\$355	0.0	0.1	42.4	399,863	1
ALBUQUERQUE	\$2,978	0.9	70.0	555.4	1,194,680	3
LAS CRUCES	\$10,316	0.1	180.7	8,423.4	19,481,541	0
GLENWOOD SPRINGS	\$638	0.0	0.4	1.3	6,815	0
COLORADO SPRINGS	\$226	0.0	0.4	2.5	1,692	0

DETROIT STATISTICAL SUMMARY
FY 1993

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DAUG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
DETROIT	\$21,503	4.1	81.4	1,795.4	13,030	2
COLUMBUS	\$746	0.0	150.5	0.4	887	0
CLEVELAND	\$3,803	0.0	43.4	8.4	395,708	1
CINCINNATI	\$1,808	4.7	205.2	468.8	16,121	1
LOUISVILLE	\$955	0.0	4.4	22.9	1,410	0
GRAND RAPIDS	\$1,029	0.0	1.5	726.5	0	9
SAGINAW	\$424	0.0	0.7	136.2	4,832	0
LEXINGTON	\$1,093	0.0	2.1	0.6	0	0
TOLEDO	\$1,360	0.0	2.6	0	1	0

HOUSTON STATISTICAL SUMMARY
FY 1993

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
HOUSTON	\$27,697	4.3	3,752.6	1,021.0	46,933	1
GALVESTON	\$395	0.0	0.0	5.9	0	1
CORPUS CHRISTI	\$964	0.0	68.7	11,356.6	5,252,083	0
SAN ANTONIO	\$1,918	5.1	39.4	1,582.7	434,218	3
EAGLE PASS	\$172	0.2	0.4	3,556.5	0	0
LAREDO	\$2,160	2.3	154.0	17,923.2	46,096	0
AUSTIN	\$3,428	0.0	1.1	0.3	3	5
MCALLEN	\$14,396	2.5	1,009.6	23,437.6	66,017	0
BROWNSVILLE	\$3,986	0.1	875.8	9,178.3	0	0
EL PASO	\$6,183	0.8	2,761.6	9,068.9	8,692,975	0
ALPINE	\$982	0.6	0.9	1,599.3	67	0
BEAUMONT	\$1,844	0.0	0.4	0.0	0	0

LOS ANGELES STATISTICAL SUMMARY
FY 1993

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
LOS ANGELES	\$27,592	44.8	677.1	95.9	5,214,322	5
HONOLULU	\$55,518	1.0	52.8	15.5	1,545,583	0
LAS VEGAS	\$2,191	0.0	187.5	3.7	531,509	5
RENO	\$3,384	0.0	0.3	47.8	1,087,787	4
RIVERSIDE	\$7,031	16.5	2,087.4	171.8	4,627,526	28
SANTA ANA	\$3,768	0.3	595.8	19.0	320,612	6
SANTA BARBARA	\$745	1.6	10.0	4.1	257,279	0

MIAMI DIVISION SUMMARY
FY 1993

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
MIAMI	\$27,397	113.5	18,853.2	3,935.0	20,532	0
KINGSTON	\$100	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0
NASSAU	\$250	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0
FREPORT	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0
SANTO DOMINGO	\$610	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0
PORT-AU-PRINCE	\$0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0
FT. LAUDERDALE	\$16,084	0.0	2,215.6	2,396.8	11,952	1
FT. MYERS	\$2,803	1.0	332.2	80.6	2,412	0
BRIDGETOWN CO	\$438	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0
JACKSONVILLE	\$11,446	0.0	364.9	0.0	12	0
KEY LARGO	\$3,623	1.5	1,106.8	1,572.1	0	0
ORLANDO	\$5,787	0.0	310.4	1,018.9	49,276	1
PANAMA CITY	\$3,724	0.1	10.6	10.6	52,653	1
TAMPA	\$5,317	1.0	272.1	769.6	27,322	5
WEST PALM BEACH	\$2,064	0.1	608.2	54.9	606	0
GAINESVILLE	\$5,439	0.3	92.3 ⁴	28.8	4,014	0
TALLAHASSEE	\$0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0	0
SAN JUAN	\$35,548	37.1	1,805.6	161.1	3,065	0
ST. THOMAS VI	\$0	0.0	56.3	133.1	0	0

NEWARK STATISTICAL SUMMARY
FY 1993

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
NEWARK	\$10,406	51.9	1,583.4	0.0	4,775	1
ATLANTIC CITY	\$594	0.0	0.8	0.0	40,329	0
CAMDEN	\$2,152	0.1	1.0	0.0	0	2

NEW ORLEANS STATISTICAL SUMMARY
FY 1993

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
NEW ORLEANS	\$3,671	157.8	83.5	692.4	159,486	0
BATON ROUGE	\$344	0.0	13.2	0.2	10,009	1
SHREVEPORT	\$154	0.0	0.1	0.0	4,871	0
BIRMINGHAM	\$2,289	0.0	102.0	92.0	42,735	1
LITTLE ROCK	\$3,479	0.0	2.3	0.6	50,934	7
JACKSON	\$2,240	0.0	102.7	0.7	41,943	0
MOBILE	\$4,241	0.0	33.6	2,408.0	9	1
GULFPORT	\$331	0.0	0.0	0.0	433	0

NEW YORK STATISTICAL SUMMARY
FY 1993

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES* (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
NEW YORK*	NOT	147.0	2,474.9	35.2	49,622	0
ALBANY	AVAILABLE	0.0	2.6	9.0	0	0
BUFFALO		5.3	198.4	38.2	944	1
ROCHESTER		0.0	0.8	43.7	0	0
NYJTF		12.1	1,181.9	2.2	874	0
LONG ISLAND		0.1	34.8	6.9	52,648	0
SYRACUSE		0.0	6.3	10.7	6,501	0

*Includes JFK Airport

* Office level asset seizure data not available to due to computer coding problem.
Data will be forwarded as soon as it is available.

PHILADELPHIA STATISTICAL SUMMARY
FY 1993

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
PHILADELPHIA	\$15,697	10.0	92.5	112.7	111,810	4
PITTSBURGH	\$971	0.0	0.5	0.5	3,483	0
WILMINGTON	\$175	0.1	9.2	0.0	0	0
HARRISBURG	\$733	0.0	143.5	9.8	0	0
ALLENTOWN	\$224	0.0	2.3	0.0	12,191	0

PHOENIX STATISTICAL SUMMARY
FY 1993

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
OFFICE						
PHOENIX	\$35,006	3.6	168.2	1,358.3	542,788	10
YUMA	\$573	0.0	23.0	167.1	286,712	0
TUCSON	\$3,995	0.0	190.2	5,499.7	42,140	1
NOGALES	\$190	0.0	225.7	5,305.2	0	0
SIERRA VISTA	\$51	0.0	261.1	2,524.5	0	0

SAN DIEGO STATISTICAL SUMMARY
FY 1993

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
SAN DIEGO	\$21,928	6.2	84.8	6,043.7	14,997,307	44
SAN YSIDRO	\$8,269	1.2	542.9	10,766.0	194,953	0
CALEXICO	\$371	0.2	4,704.6	1,577.4	3,727,768	0
CARLSBAD	\$4,630	0.0	3,909.9	831.5	2,136,770	4

SAN FRANCISCO STATISTICAL SUMMARY
FY 1993

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
SAN FRANCISCO	\$9,685	7.4	22.4	23.6	2,233,252	6
SACRAMENTO	\$9,167	1.3	2.2	22.1	1,001,221	11
FRESNO	\$5,160	0.0	12.9	0.0	531,451	12
SAN JOSE	\$2,981	0.4	28.8	9.1	369,014	9
MONTEREY	\$606	0.0	8.6	4.5	0	0

SEATTLE STATISTICAL SUMMARY
FY 1993

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
SEATTLE	\$7,997	4.3	35.7	17.5	303,408	1
ANCHORAGE	\$2,260	0.0	6.9	11.2	47	0
BLAINE	\$3,392	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0
BOISE	\$639	0.0	0.0	0.0	1,035,827	0
EUGENE	\$1,024	0.0	337.3	1.5	924,036	6
GREAT FALLS	\$634	0.0	2.1	11.7	14,204	1
PORTLAND	\$2,202	0.1	7.1	14.0	45,358	1
SPOKANE	\$2,462	0.0	0.6	1.5	0	0
YAKIMA	\$1,352	0.0	22.5	2.1	523	1

ST. LOUIS STATISTICAL SUMMARY
FY 1993

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
ST. LOUIS	\$4,699	1.0	48.1	155.9	56,535	0
DES MOINES	\$2,620	0.0	60.1	1.3	1,821	3
KANSAS CITY	\$1,768	0.0	38.7	2.2	258,849	1
OMAHA	\$667	0.0	471.7	60.3	854	0
SIOUX FALLS	\$681	0.0	4.2	0.0	0	0
WICHITA	\$1,945	0.0	6.4	190.8	165,204	2
CAPE GIRARDEU	\$1,164	0.0	12.1	592.9	43,237	0
SPRINGFIELD	\$1,968	0.0	5.2	16.8	132,568	6

WASHINGTON DC STATISTICAL SUMMARY
FY 1993

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
WASHINGTON DC						
RICHMOND	\$3,384	11.7	247.0	31.9	223,218	0
NORFOLK	\$1,199	0.7	11.1	6.9	2,649	1
CHARLESTON/WV	\$2,600	0.2	2.4	4.9	0	0
BALTIMORE	\$1,345	0.0	0.4	0.3	2,502	1
ROANOKE	\$4,811	2.2	14.0	57.4	32,167	0
	\$819	0.0	0.3	0.0	30	0

ATLANTA STATISTICAL SUMMARY
THROUGH 2ND QUARTER FY 1994

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
ATLANTA	\$5,240	1.7	184.5	52.9	47,659	2
CHARLESTON	\$413	0.0	8.2	0.1	199	0
COLUMBIA	\$726	0.0	2.2	0.0	0	0
COLUMBUS	\$176	0.0	8.0	0.0	0	0
GREENSBORO	\$753	0.0	1.1	0.0	0	0
NASHVILLE	\$620	0.0	0.8	1,555.1	1	0
WILMINGTON	\$244	0.0	15.6	0.0	0	0
MEMPHIS	\$1,253	0.0	48.2	3.4	7,075	0
SAVANNAH	\$966	0.0	39.9	0.0	80	0
CHARLOTTE	\$546	0.0	0.2	0.0	9,574	1
KNOXVILLE	\$440	0.0	0.5	1.2	70,270	0
RALEIGH	\$2,160	0.0	1.1	0.0	0	0
MACON	\$355	0.0	7.6	0.0	0	0

BOSTON STATISTICAL SUMMARY
THROUGH 2ND QUARTER FY 1994

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
OFFICE	\$1,094	1.1	23.7	14.7	0	0
BOSTON	\$911	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	1
BRIDGEPORT	\$39	0.0	0.5	1.3	0	0
BURLINGTON	\$123	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0
CONCORD	\$461	0.2	22.1	0.1	0	0
HARTFORD	\$224	0.0	0.3	0.9	93	0
PORTLAND	\$232	0.2	1.1	0.0	0	0
PROVIDENCE	\$642	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0
SPRINGFIELD						

CHICAGO STATISTICAL SUMMARY
THROUGH 2ND QUARTER FY 1994

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
CHICAGO	\$6,581	1.9	431.1	472.0	25,290	0
INDIANAPOLIS	\$1,523	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	3
MILWAUKEE	\$1,767	0.0	4.8	14.7	130	0
SPRINGFIELD	\$353	0.0	0.5	8.5	37,401	0
HAMMOND	\$1,237	0.0	17.9	15.4	943	2
MINNEAPOLIS	\$3,371	0.0	12.1	0.2	5,030	0
FARGO	\$205	0.0	0.0	0.0	4,559	0

DALLAS STATISTICAL SUMMARY:
THROUGH 2ND QUARTER FY 1994

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
DALLAS	\$1,578	1.0	1,711.6	2,297.5	270,033	3
FORT WORTH	\$3,226	0.2	4.0	22.8	176,259	3
OKLAHOMA CITY	\$296	0.0	1.2	0.1	67,795	2
TULSA	\$995	0.0	2.9	7.2	66,997	1
LUBBOCK	\$548	0.1	3.0	26.4	13	1
TYLER	\$192	0.0	0.4	0.0	15,218	1
MIDLAND	\$0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0	0

DENVER STATISTICAL SUMMARY
THROUGH 2ND QUARTER FY 1994

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
DENVER	\$736	0.8	8.0	15.7	72,088	4
SALT LAKE CITY	\$95	0.7	28.9	0.8	161,642	4
CHEYENNE	\$95	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0
ALBUQUERQUE	\$208	0.0	78.4	404.1	2,604	0
LAS CRUCES	\$498	0.3	24.4	3,041.6	5,303,698	0
GLENWOOD SPRINGS	\$317	0.0	45.0	1.2	332	1
COLORADO SPRINGS	\$21	0.0	0.0	2.8	4,979	2

DETROIT STATISTICAL SUMMARY
THROUGH 2ND QUARTER FY 1994

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ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
DETROIT	\$13,540	2.8	51.9	413.2	2,962	0
COLUMBUS	\$523	0.0	2.9	0.5	0	0
CLEVELAND	\$5,366	0.2	7.8	1.6	20	2
CINCINNATI	\$783	0.0	32.7	0.0	11	0
LOUISVILLE	\$920	0.0	0.1	0.1	30,516	0
GRAND RAPIDS	\$901	0.0	0.0	26.3	0	0
SAGINAW	\$293	0.0	1.6	39.7	0	0
LEXINGTON	\$298	0.0	0.0	2.8	504	0
TOLEDO	\$1,045	0.0	2.6	0	17,440	0

HOUSTON STATISTICAL SUMMARY
THROUGH 2ND QUARTER FY 1994

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ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
HOUSTON	\$14,427	0.3	1,384.0	123.8	11	0
GALVESTON	\$383	0.0	0.2	0.0	0	0
CORPUS CHRISTI	\$452	0.0	54.7	6,104.7	3	0
SAN ANTONIO	\$922	1.2	51.6	761.8	36,248	0
EAGLE PASS	\$68	0.0	0.8	3,100.9	2,297	0
LAREDO	\$857	0.0	2.3	13,118.9	13,492	0
AUSTIN	\$772	0.0	2.6	0.0	0	1
MCALLEN	\$2,781	0.0	22.9	7,043.6	1,024,767	0
BROWNSVILLE	\$193	0.0	75.6	5,075.4	0	0
EL PASO	\$886	0.0	44.7	5,022.4	58,166	0
ALPINE	\$12	0.0	0.0	1,185.5	344	0
BEAUMONT	\$1,475	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0

LOS ANGELES STATISTICAL SUMMARY
THROUGH 2ND QUARTER FY 1994

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
LOS ANGELES	\$11,204	13.8	1,257.0	56.8	468,894	1
HONOLULU	\$3,762	3.1	4.4	0.1	1,231,923	0
LAS VEGAS	\$3,174	0.0	3.8	8.8	586,963	6
RENO	\$557	0.0	1.4	2.1	157,545	0
RIVERSIDE	\$2,680	0.6	50.9	30.6	10,835,766	3
SANTA ANA	\$3,801	0.0	0.0	0.0	429,825	2
SANTA BARBARA	\$54	0.1	3.9	0.5	414,528	0

MIAMI DIVISION SUMMARY
THROUGH 2ND QUARTER FY 1994

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
MIAMI	\$7,273	52.8	10,390.0	232.6	33,237	0
KINGSTON	\$317	0.0	0.0	797.2	0	0
NASSAU	\$2,220	0.0	0.0	0.0	234,496	0
FREEMPORT	\$0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0
SANTO DOMINGO	\$1,142	0.0	746.0	0.0	0	0
PORT-AU-PRINCE	\$0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0
FT. LAUDERDALE	\$57,178	0.0	106.5	183.1	44	1
FT MYERS	\$1,674	0.0	641.8	5,139.5	1	0
BRIDGETOWN CO	\$255	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0
JACKSONVILLE	\$744	0.0	0.0	608.5	0	0
KEY LARGO	\$3	0.0	3.2	10,896.0	0	0
ORLANDO	\$9,659	0.0	21.4	35.5	5,496	0
PANAMA CITY	\$9,578	0.0	16.5	5.5	1,246	0
TAMPA	\$2,623	0.4	175.6	1,056.8	6,040	0
WEST PALM BEACH	\$272	0.0	11.6	466.2	0	0
GAINESVILLE	\$11,156	0.0	0.8	0.2	1,323	0
TALLAHASSEE	\$0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0	0
SAN JUAN	\$9,299	1.4	468.1	13.2	118,456	0
ST. THOMAS VI	\$0	1.2	5.0	0.0	5	0

NEWARK STATISTICAL SUMMARY
THROUGH 2ND QUARTER FY 1994

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
OFFICE						
NEWARK	\$1,474	0.1	289.1	0.0	508	0
ATLANTIC CITY	\$104	0.0	0.0	0.0	6,249	0
CAMDEN	\$141	0.0	126.7	0.9	3,040	0

NEW ORLEANS STATISTICAL SUMMARY
THROUGH 2ND QUARTER FY 1994

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
OFFICE						
NEW ORLEANS	\$11,552	0.0	58.8	0.0	5,891	0
BATON ROUGE	\$65	0.0	0.0	0.0	5	0
SHREVEPORT	\$33	0.0	0.0	0.0	127	0
BIRMINGHAM	\$166	0.0	2.6	173.1	0	1
LITTLE ROCK	\$824	0.0	0.5	0.0	815	5
JACKSON	\$1,250	0.0	7.6	0.0	38	0
MOBILE	\$2,527	0.0	22.3	0.4	0	0
GULFPORT	\$58	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0

NEW YORK STATISTICAL SUMMARY
THROUGH 2ND QUARTER FY 1994

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

	ASSET SEIZURES* (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
OFFICE						
NEW YORK*	NOT	7.3	821.9	15.9	1,425	0
ALBANY	AVAILABLE	0.0	3.4	0.0	0	0
BUFFALO		0.0	9.1	13.7	23,885	0
ROCHESTER		0.0	2.6	0.0	0	0
NYJF		11.8	923.8	1.2	0	0
LONG ISLAND		3.8	12.7	0.0	20	0
SYRACUSE		0.9	0.4	0.1	0	0

*Includes JFK Airport

* Office level asset seizure data not available to due to computer coding problem.
Data will be forwarded as soon as it is available.

PHILADELPHIA STATISTICAL SUMMARY
THROUGH 2ND QUARTER FY 1994

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
PHILADELPHIA	\$4,110	4.1	4.6	140.8	88,285	3
PITTSBURGH	\$526	0.0	3.0	0.0	2,396	0
WILMINGTON	\$345	0.0	0.3	0.0	0	0
HARRISBURG	\$55	0.0	0.5	0.0	0	0
ALLENTOWN	\$83	0.0	0.5	2.0	1,287	0

PHOENIX STATISTICAL SUMMARY
THROUGH 2ND QUARTER FY 1994

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
OFFICE						
PHOENIX	\$3,671	0.0	2.1	454.3	1,099,962	11
YUMA	\$590	0.0	1.0	59.1	75,937	0
TUCSON	\$2,959	0.0	5.2	6,662.3	83,341	0
NOGALES	\$113	0.3	25.1	2,547.1	0	0
SIERRA VISTA	\$87	0.0	0.0	610.9	0	0

SAN DIEGO STATISTICAL SUMMARY
THROUGH 2ND QUARTER FY 1994

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
SAN DIEGO	\$3,763	2.4	136.4	2,737.6	27,550,238	12
SAN YSIDRO	\$5,562	0.0	25.1	4,312.7	1,506,339	0
IMPERIAL COUNTY	\$721	2.6	1,698.4	499.4	9,899	1
CARLSBAD	\$233	0.1	49.0	437.7	413,966	2

SAN FRANCISCO STATISTICAL SUMMARY
THROUGH 2ND QUARTER FY 1994

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
SAN FRANCISCO	\$7,060	1.9	14.7	80.9	1,026,185	9
SACRAMENTO	\$865	0.7	101.5	0.1	2,476,127	5
FRESNO	\$1,370	0.0	0.0	0.4	530,171	7
SAN JOSE	\$573	1.0	51.5	0.1	734,376	2
MONTEREY	\$26	0.0	1.0	0.0	27,375	0

SEATTLE STATISTICAL SUMMARY
THROUGH 2ND QUARTER FY 1994

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
OFFICE						
SEATTLE	\$3,697	0.0	26.4	0.7	713,697	1
ANCHORAGE	\$140	0.0	4.3	0.0	0	0
BLAINE	\$538	0.0	0.0	0.0	499	0
BOISE	\$32	0.0	0.0	0.0	652,720	0
EUGENE	\$1,197	6.9	0.0	0.0	212,293	0
GREAT FALLS	\$267	0.0	0.4	0.0	7,531	0
PORTLAND	\$2,229	0.2	0.1	0.6	64,076	0
SPOKANE	\$110	0.0	0.2	0.1	25,837	0
YAKIMA	\$16	0.3	0.8	36.9	1,060	0

ST. LOUIS STATISTICAL SUMMARY
THROUGH 2ND QUARTER FY 1994

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
OFFICE						
ST. LOUIS	\$2,554	0.1	3.6	3.3	63,119	1
DES MOINES	\$541	0.0	0.0	0.0	650	0
KANSAS CITY	\$2,741	0.0	15.5	0.0	6,640	4
OMAHA	\$466	0.0	251.7	4.4	0	0
SIOUX FALLS	\$48	0.0	0.0	0.0	15,373	0
WICHITA	\$363	0.0	3.1	5.6	0	0
CAPE GIRARDEAU	\$1,119	0.0	9.2	4.6	84,217	0
SPRINGFIELD	\$261	0.0	7.2	294.9	57,801	2

WASHINGTON DC STATISTICAL SUMMARY
THROUGH 2ND QUARTER FY 1994

ANALYZED DRUG REMOVALS

OFFICE	ASSET SEIZURES (000)	HEROIN (KG)	COCAINE (KG)	CANNABIS (KG)	DANG. DRUGS (DU)	LABORATORY SEIZURES
WASHINGTON DC	\$3,315	1.8	25.1	14.8	395,631	1
RICHMOND	\$637	0.0	15.6	0.0	0	1
NORFOLK	\$851	0.0	16.1	0.1	0	0
CHARLESTON WV	\$38	0.0	0.1	1.0	1,831	0
BALTIMORE	\$2,832	0.2	7.2	1.4	4,586	0
ROANOKE	\$432	0.0	0.4	0.0	0	0

4. *Does the DEA have any input or influence with U.S. Attorney's Offices in bringing drug cases to court? In other words, do U.S. Attorneys' Offices consult with the DEA, either formally or informally, before bringing drug-related cases to court? If so, please describe.*

DEA has a very close working relationship with the U.S. Attorney's Offices throughout the nation. Cases nominated for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) investigations, for example, are reviewed by the local OCDETF committee, chaired by the U.S. Attorney's Office and consisting of DEA and other federal law enforcement agencies. When the case is accepted for OCDETF investigation, an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) is assigned to work with DEA agents, as well as agents from other agencies. The AUSA's work hand in hand with these agents at every step of the investigation in order to ensure a coordinated enforcement and prosecutorial effort.

DEA's Domestic Enforcement Guidelines also help ensure that cases are properly coordinated with the local U.S. Attorney's Office by requiring that the appropriate U.S. Attorney be advised of all investigations as soon as it appears to the first-line supervisory DEA agent that there is probable cause to make an arrest, even though no arrest is in fact contemplated. In investigations where the subjects are believed to be part of a major drug trafficking organization, but probable cause to make an arrest has not yet been established, the notification of a pending investigation to the U.S. Attorney is made by DEA at such time as it is determined that the subjects are part of a major drug trafficking organization. The U.S. Attorney's office is then kept abreast of the progress of the investigation at regular intervals to assure appropriate participation by prosecuting officials. The U.S. Attorney, however, in each Federal judicial district, consistent with Department of Justice guidance, determines policy regarding declinations and also referrals of prosecution to state and local authorities.

5. *Please provide the Subcommittee with a description of the number of DEA agents with foreign language training or expertise. Specifically, how many DEA agents are fluent in Chinese? Spanish? Russian?*

The international nature of drug law enforcement requires DEA to provide language training to its employees and to actively recruit bi-lingual special agents and support staff. Employees with bi-lingual skills are essential if DEA is to fulfill its mission overseas and combat drug trafficking by ethnic groups within the United States.

Public Law 100-690, Section 6401 and Public Law 101-509, section gave DEA the authority to establish a **Foreign Language Bonus Program**. The objectives of this program are:

- To provide DEA with a computerized method of determining its foreign language assets, i.e. who is foreign language proficient, in which foreign languages, at what level is the proficiency, and where those employees are located.
- To allow DEA managers to better utilize their foreign language assets to further DEA's basic enforcement mission and other operational initiatives.
- To provide a system of bonuses and awards which will provide a monetary reward to employees who have attained a tested minimum proficiency or higher in a foreign language and who utilize these skills for mission related purposes. It is additionally designed to provide an incentive for employees with no DEA designated critical foreign language skills to obtain such skills and for those employees with current critical foreign language skills to improve them.

Unfortunately, due to budgetary constraints, the **Foreign Language Bonus Program** was not funded in Fiscal Years 1993 and 1994. However, initial implementation of the program allowed DEA to determine which employees had language skills and their proficiency in those skills. I have attached a list which shows the diverse language skills possessed by DEA employees and their fluency. (See chart accompanying this response.) Scores of "2" and above are considered fluent. Currently, DEA has 1,058 employees who possess some proficiency in Spanish, of whom, 866 are considered to be fluent; 41 employees are proficient in Chinese, 28 are fluent; and 6 employees are proficient in Russian, and 3 are fluent.

DEA currently provides language training for special agents selected for an overseas deployment which requires a foreign language skill. Additional language training is also available at overseas Embassies after the employee has arrived at their post.

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LANGUAGE SKILLS SYSTEM
FOREIGN LANGUAGE TEST TOTAL AND SCORE GRID

LANGUAGE	TOTAL TESTED	S	C	O	R	E						
		0	0+	1	1+	2	2+	3	3+	4	4+	5
ARABIC (EGYPT)	3	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
AZERBAIJANI	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
CAMBODIAN	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
CHINESE (CANT)	18	1	0	2	0	1	1	4	1	3	2	3
CHINESE (MAND)	22	0	3	3	3	1	3	2	2	0	1	4
CHINESE (WU)	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DANISH	5	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
DUTCH	9	1	1	0	3	2	2	0	0	0	0	0
FRENCH	63	1	3	4	6	7	15	10	6	8	3	0
GERMAN	54	0	2	6	12	13	11	4	1	5	0	0
GREEK	13	1	0	1	0	0	2	5	1	3	0	0
HAITIAN CREOLE	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
HEBREW	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HINDI	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0
INDONESIAN	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
ITALIAN	37	0	0	1	3	10	4	10	5	3	1	0
JAPANESE	6	0	0	3	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
KOREAN	6	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	2	0	0	0
LAO	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
NORWEGIAN	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0

PATUA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PERSIAN - FARSI	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1
POLISH	6	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	1	1	0	0
PORTUGUESE	26	0	1	0	1	5	7	5	4	3	0	0
RUSSIAN	6	0	1	0	2	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
SERBO-CROATIAN	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
SPANISH	1058	6	19	68	99	157	194	239	120	110	29	17
SWEDISH	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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08/16/94

LANGUAGE SKILLS SYSTEM
FOREIGN LANGUAGE TEST TOTAL AND SCORE GRID

LANGUAGE	TOTAL TESTED	S	C	O	R	E							
		0	0+	1	1+	2	2+	3	3+	4	4+	5	
TAGALOG	7	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	1	0	0	0	
THAI	53	1	2	5	7	15	10	4	1	1	0	7	
TURKISH	14	0	2	3	0	8	1	0	0	0	0	0	
UKRANIAN	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	
URDU	4	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	
VIETNAMESE	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	
*** Total ***	1438	11	34	102	145	226	257	294	149	144	42	34	

6. *Could you please provide the Subcommittee with a description of the status of legislation which addresses illicit prescription drug diversion.*

DEA has drafted legislation which will enhance the controls on prescription drugs for controlled substances. This legislation, known as the *Controlled Substances Monitoring Act*, will amend the *Controlled Substances Act* (CSA) and the *Controlled Substances Import and Export Act*. A major goal of this legislation is to allow DEA to take advantage of existing computer and electronic data transfer technology to increase the ability to monitor and target diversion of controlled substances. Other changes focus on enhancements of the order form, prescription, record keeping, reporting, and security requirements of the CSA. This legislation would:

- Expand the reporting requirement for manufacturers and distributors for sales of controlled substances to include sales of all controlled substances. Currently, the requirement is limited to substances in Schedules I and II of the CSA and narcotic substances in Schedule III. The bill mandates the development of additional state assistance programs to include data sharing in order to use to the fullest advantage the new information collected as a result of the expanded industry reporting.
- Establish a Federal duplicate prescription program in order to significantly strengthen diversion controls over controlled substances at the dispensing level, and as an adjunct to the manufacturer/distributor reporting of sales of all controlled substances. Dispensing pursuant to prescriptions for Schedule II and III drugs (as well as dispensing of same by physicians) would be reported via electronic means to either a state agency or to DEA. States which already have a multiple copy prescription program in place or who wish to establish one could do so as long as it is compatible with the Federal system. The states and DEA would share the data collected through this program.
- Establish a system whereby manufacturers and distributors report transactions to DEA electronically on a specified basis, for example weekly. Now such reports are submitted monthly on magnetic tape or on special forms completed by hand. Additionally, the proposal allows manufacturers and distributors to sell Schedule I and II controlled substances pursuant to an electronic order system such as is currently used for all other pharmaceutical products. At present such orders must be made on a special order form supplied to the purchaser by DEA.
- Increase criminal penalties for diverting Schedule III, IV and V controlled substances. Diversion of the lower Schedule drugs occurs with great frequency today, in part, due to the success of stronger control measures imposed on Schedule II drugs.

The proposal also strengthens controls on Schedule III substances. These increased controls include limiting prescription refills to two and eliminating authorization for oral prescriptions in Schedule III drugs, except in emergency situations.

- Strengthen controls over narcotic treatment programs (NTP) in order to minimize diversion from these programs. These controls include adding a specific public interest standard to be considered when an NTP has applied for DEA registration. A key factor to be considered in determining whether an NTP's registration is in the public interest would be the manner in which it administers its program of take-home doses of medication. A requirement for a central registry of narcotic treatment program clients would be established to eliminate simultaneous enrollment of a patient in more than one program.

At present the CSA does not specifically address security requirements regarding controlled substances outside of establishing the standards for registration. This legislation would remedy that weakness by establishing a new section in the CSA dealing with security requirements and by authorizing civil penalties for violations of these requirements. The legislation would also establish a system which registrants may use to verify the registration status of firms and individuals with whom they conduct business. Although manufacturers and distributors are required by regulation to determine if a purchaser is a DEA registrant, there is no system to assist such an effort.

There are a number of disparate areas where the current law fails to address specific problems or situations that have arisen. One of these is when controlled substances violations involve Medicare/Medicaid fraud. This proposal would increase the penalty for fraud in such situations. It would also expand the scope of the Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 1990 to include other anabolic agents which are abused in a manner similar to anabolic steroids. Under this legislation, a new registration category would be established for firms such as waste disposal companies, which handle controlled substances and do not conform to the established registration categories.

A self-funding mechanism is established in this legislation so that all costs of the these programs will be paid for through DEA's registration fee increases and user fees. This legislation is currently being reviewed by the Department of Justice.

Responses to additional questions that were asked by other Members of the Subcommittee at the hearing include the following:

7. *Can you describe in greater detail problems associated with the illegal diversion of legal prescription drugs?*

Diversion of Controlled Pharmaceuticals

A great variety of narcotics, depressants and stimulants are manufactured for legitimate medical needs both in the United States and overseas. These are also drugs which are subject to abuse when available, and are therefore subject to diversion into the illicit traffic. The drugs which have been brought under legal control for this reason are listed individually in international treaties, the Controlled Substances Act and implementing regulations, and are referred to as "controlled substances."

Pharmaceutical drugs of abuse comprise a unique aspect of the drug abuse problem. The goal of controls is not to eliminate their supply altogether, as with illicit drugs of abuse, but instead to both ensure their widespread availability for medical purposes and to prevent their distribution for illicit sale and abuse. Unfortunately, these drugs frequently reach the abuser through illegal manipulation of health care providers or by illegal activities by the providers themselves, and fraudulent health care claims often finance this abuse. Since these drugs are for the most part produced, distributed, and dispensed in the United States, and the principal "sources of supply" have a Federal and state license, this is one aspect of the drug abuse problem that is within our authority to control.

About 14 percent of all prescriptions written are for controlled substances and about 230 million prescriptions are written for them each year. Although the quantity which is diverted into the illicit traffic is unknown, these drugs account for over 30 percent of all the reported deaths and injuries associated with drug abuse. Legitimate drugs commonly found in the illicit traffic are narcotics such as hydromorphone (Dilaudid), oxycodone (Percodan), codeine, methadone, and hydrocodone (Vicodin); stimulants such as amphetamine; and depressants such as alprazolam (Xanax) and diazepam (Valium).

Methadone, although one of the most regulated drugs in the United States, is number 20 in Drug Abuse Warning Network mentions for controlled drugs. Patients of methadone clinics sell their take-home dosages for \$1.00 per milligram (mg). This problem has always existed but due to changes in treatment philosophy and clinic operation, the abuse of methadone is increasing.

These legitimate drugs have effects more or less identical to illicit drugs, and like them, cost only pennies to produce but can be sold at a mark-up of several thousand percent. The initial act of diversion from an authorized source is accomplished in a number of ways, which requires some understanding of the system of legal controls.

DEA's Diversion Control Program

Under federal law, all businesses which manufacture or distribute controlled drugs, all health professionals entitled to dispense, administer or prescribe them, and all pharmacies entitled to fill prescriptions must register with the DEA. A registration can be denied, suspended or revoked on the basis of several criteria, including professional license sanctions, previous convictions, or incompatibility with public interest. A registrant must also maintain compliance with a series of regulatory requirements relating to drug security, records accountability, and adherence to standards. Consequently, drugs are diverted into the illicit traffic either by 1) criminal violations of these requirements, 2) negligent failure to meet requirements, 3) fraudulent manipulation of a health care provider, or 4) the use of force by an intruder. Once the drugs are diverted, they are sold in the illicit street traffic just like any other drug.

DEA is obligated under international treaties to monitor the movement of licit controlled substances across U.S. borders, and to issue import and export permits for that movement. Also, intelligence information and investigative reports are reviewed to determine weaknesses in foreign legitimate drug distribution systems, and to devise initiatives to deal with problems of international drug diversion.

There exists generally a strong commonality of direction and purpose in Federal, state and local efforts to deal with controlled substances diversion. However, authority for diversion control in the states is divided among medical licensing and/or pharmacy boards, state police, and/or specialized multiple agency Diversion Investigation Units. For this reason, DEA's diversion control program is the central source for national policy guidance, support and intelligence information.

Typical diversion cases involve physicians who sell prescriptions to drug dealers or abusers, pharmacists who falsify records and subsequently sell the drugs, employees who steal from inventory, executives who falsify orders to cover illicit sales, prescription forgers, and individuals who commit armed robbery of pharmacies and drug distributors. All of these are significant sources of diverted drugs; however, at the present time, it appears that the largest component of the problem results from the criminal activity of physicians and pharmacy personnel. The following are a few sample cases from DEA's Diversion investigations:

- In November 1993 in the Northern District of Illinois, two individuals were convicted on 38 counts of conspiracy to distribute and distribution of Dilaudid. They were sentenced to life in prison without parole. A medical doctor involved in the case was

sentenced to 235 months in prison. These three individuals were the ringleaders of a 19 person group that had diverted over 60,000 Dilaudid tablets. The group diverted Dilaudid by using "professional patients" who visited doctors on a daily basis. One of the ringleaders collected the Dilaudid and subsequently sold it to individuals who took the drug out of Illinois for resale.

- A joint three-year investigation of a physician culminated in a guilty plea of illegal distribution of Dexedrine (a Schedule II stimulant). It was revealed that he diverted in excess of 11,000 dosage units of Dexedrine monthly in one county. He had been prescribing to drug abusers in a tri-state area. This physician also pled guilty to counts of Federal mail fraud, income tax evasion, and Medicare fraud.
- A DEA pharmacy audit revealed that a pharmacist had, during a five month period, distributed in excess of 100,000 Schedule III acetaminophen with codeine tablets; over 2,500 ounces of codeine-containing cough syrup; and in excess of 26,000 Schedule II glutethimide (a depressant) tablets. This investigation was expanded when it was determined that this pharmacist purchased controlled substances and filled prescriptions without a DEA registration during a previous two-year period when he owned another pharmacy.
- A physician known as "Dr. Xanax" was arrested as the result of a joint investigation which determined that he diverted on a monthly basis more than 20,000 dosage units of various controlled substances including Percodan, Vicodin, Darvocet, Xanax, and Valium. He had been arrested six months earlier on state charges of prescribing and dispensing controlled substances to drug abusers and dealers. The doctor forfeited \$200,000 in cash and his automobile valued at \$26,000. He was sentenced in May 1993 to 9-18 months prison and fined \$10,000.
- In the spring of 1992, three defendants were convicted in federal court in Arizona for illegally distributing Dilaudid. The three were involved with a multi-state drug trafficking organization which recruited and trained senior citizens, disabled persons, and addicts to "doctor shop" for sympathetic and/or willing physicians to write controlled substances prescriptions, primarily Dilaudid. The physicians were located in Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, Texas, New Mexico, Nebraska, and Wyoming. The tablets, with a street value of up to \$90 per tablet, were sold to traffickers in Ohio, Wisconsin, Missouri, and Tennessee.
- In an out-of-court civil settlement reached in December 1992, a major pharmaceutical firm in New Jersey agreed, among other terms of settlement, to pay to the United States the largest civil penalty ever paid under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA)--\$700,000. A DEA investigation of the firm revealed over 600 violations of the CSA.

The company denied any wrongdoing with respect to the government's allegations and the settlement agreement provides that the settlement is not to be construed as an admission of liability.

A summary of statistics related to DEA's Diversion Control Program are as follows:

Fiscal Year 1993 Through First Half 1994

	<u>FY-93</u>	<u>1st Half FY-94</u>
Cases	2,829	1,133
Arrests	428	169
Convictions	256	140
Criminal Fines	\$1,211,476	\$2,798,725
Civil Fines	\$2,891,016	\$1,913,355
Assets Seized	\$7,216,247	\$10,430,389
Cyclic Investigations	816	334
Civil Cases	72	40
Administrative Hearings	39	25
Letters of Admonishment	341	162
Show Cause	165	76

Diversion of Anabolic Steroids

The newest area of responsibility for DEA's Diversion Control Program is the control of steroids. *The Anabolic Steroid Control Act* was passed by the Congress in the fall of 1990 and became effective on February 21, 1991. It classified 27 named steroids as Schedule III substances under the Controlled Substances Act which DEA administers. This legislation represented an initiative by the Congress following hearings which determined a national health problem of steroid abuse affecting perhaps six million people. No additional

resources were provided to the DEA for the purpose of enforcing the Act. Nevertheless, Congress had identified a problem which involved illegal distribution and smuggling similar to the traffic in other drugs. As a consequence, DEA expanded existing regulatory and enforcement programs to include the control of these substances. A Special Enforcement Program devoted exclusively to steroids was developed and implemented. These efforts have been successful domestically. In the short period during which this program has been in effect, most of the diversion from legitimate domestic sources has ceased. Supplies are now usually smuggled into the United States from Mexico, South America or Western Europe and subsequently distributed much like any other illicit drug.

The following cases give an idea of the type of activity and individuals involved with diverting Anabolic Steroids:

- In February 1992 a German citizen and resident was arrested following delivery of 12 kilograms of pharmaceutical grade anabolic steroid bulk powder. The 12 kilograms would have yielded approximately 2.4 million tablets with an estimated street value of \$1.9 million. This individual claimed that his illicit operation supplied individuals in Europe, the United States and Australia with steroids manufactured in Hungary, Poland, and the former Soviet Union. His physical fitness distributorship business provided a legitimate facade for frequent travel to body-building expositions. After his arrest, he identified his German source of supply, who, according to Australian Customs authorities, was previously arrested for smuggling steroids into Australia and is considered a major supplier of steroids to that country.
- In April 1992 an investigation of international steroid smuggling was culminated with successful controlled deliveries of 9 packages from Germany containing over 200,000 dosage units of steroids with an estimated street value of \$1.2 million. The organization involved distributed steroids throughout the United States which had been smuggled into the country from Europe. Customers of the organization placed orders either by telephone or telefax and were instructed to send blank money orders to a commercial postal center. Orders were filled and sent through the U.S. mail or by express mail to customers. Cooperation provided by members of the organization identified a British citizen as their source of supply. This individual was subsequently indicted and arrested.
- A joint investigation of a nationwide steroid distribution organization was completed in the summer of 1992, resulting in the indictment of over 40 individuals. This organization worked from nationally franchised gymnasiums, supplying steroids from sources located in the Detroit area, Mexico and Canada. During the course of the investigation, which was begun in mid-1990, over 2 million dosage units of controlled substances including Percodan and Valium, but primarily steroids, were confiscated. Also seized were small amounts of cocaine and marijuana, and 21 handguns and rifles.

Recently, DEA's Office of Diversion Control launched an effort to focus international attention on the anabolic steroids problem by hosting an International Conference on the Abuse and Trafficking of Anabolic Steroids in Prague, Czech Republic in December 1993. The conference brought together government officials representing law enforcement, regulatory and health agencies, and nongovernmental scientific and medical experts from around the world to examine the health consequences, regulatory and enforcement implications, steroid abuse by athletes and others, and mechanisms to prevent steroid abuse.

Although DEA's investigative programs directed against high-level practitioner and pharmacy violators have been highly successful in limiting the problem, efforts to make further progress to halt the diversion of legitimately manufactured controlled substances in a comprehensive manner are constrained by existing law. The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) places controlled substances in one of five schedules. While Schedule II controlled substances also remain a significant problem, substances appearing in Schedules III, IV, and V cumulatively comprise approximately 60 percent of the reported instances of drug abuse of legitimately manufactured controlled substances in the United States. Without additional effective controls such as prescription accountability systems and electronic monitoring provisions, for the lower scheduled drugs diversion of controlled substances will remain a serious problem in the United States. Also, lack of effective controls in foreign drug producing countries creates an opportunities for the diversion pharmaceutical products, into international commerce. In addition, the economic downturn and general "downsizing" of government has impacted negatively on states' abilities to dedicate adequate resources to impact on illegal activity involving legitimately manufactured controlled substances. The Controlled Substances Monitoring Act which is discussed in response to the question concerning legislative needs is specifically designed to respond to this problem.

To further reduce the availability of diverted controlled substances, DEA must embark on an evolving strategy designed to meet the challenges that are immediately presented, and to establish a mechanism for instituting and monitoring a comprehensive system of controls designed to alleviate the problem of diverted controlled substances.

Health Care

In 1992, according to the GAO, over 700 billion dollars was spent on health care in the United States, which is approximately 12 percent of the gross national product. The amount of fraud and abuse was estimated at 10 percent or 70 billion dollars a year. Both the President and Congress are examining many avenues of health care reform. No matter what type of reform is instituted, the potential for health care fraud continues. Although DEA does not investigate health care fraud as a primary duty, fraud is often encountered during investigations of diversion of controlled substances. As part of DEA's overall strategy, DEA will continue to join forces with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Health and Human Services when health care fraud is encountered. DEA will assist the other agencies with its knowledge of the pharmaceutical industry and its expertise in asset seizures.

The concept of prevention is essential to any successful diversion control strategy. The emphasis on programs that prevent diversion of legitimately manufactured controlled substances is a natural progression from the present diversion control efforts which rely on investigations as the primary weapon against diversion. Now, technology makes it possible to have tight and more effective controls to prevent the diversion of controlled substances. Computer technology that is now available or will be in the near future such as electronic transfers of controlled substances orders, on-line verifications and confirmations, and prescription accountability systems can stem the tide of diversion and abuse of licit controlled substances. Each of these issues is addressed in the Controlled Substances Monitoring Act which is discussed under Question 6.

8. *What are DEA's legislative needs?*

Some of the legislative needs of the Drug Enforcement Administration were met through our Fiscal Year 1995 Appropriation, the Crime Bill and the *Domestic Chemical Diversion Control Act of 1993*, which was passed and signed into law during this session of Congress. There are still some important areas where legislation is needed including:

Technology: The FBI has worked closely with Senator Patrick Leahy and Representative Don Edwards on legislation which will help law enforcement keep pace with developing technologies. Known as the "Digital Telephony Bill," *H.R. 4922 and S. 2375* will address the potentially devastating impact emerging technologies in the telecommunications industry may have on law enforcement's ability to lawfully intercept telecommunications. During the next session, we will also explore legislation to help DEA meet the challenges posed by other technology such as beepers.

Diversion of Licit Drugs: As mentioned in our response to Question 6, DEA is seeking legislative help in controlling the diversion of prescription drugs.

Community Protection Initiative: *H.R. 1277* was introduced to exempt qualified current and former law enforcement officers from State laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed handguns. This bill was introduced by Congressman Cunningham (R-CA) in March of last year. To date, no further action has been taken on this legislation. DEA supports this legislation because it would allow retired DEA agents to carry concealed weapons.

Funeral Attendance: DEA is proposing legislation to amend Title 5 U.S.C. to permit a Federal agency to authorize the travel of an appropriate number of fellow law enforcement officers to attend a funeral or memorial service of an agent killed in the line of duty.

Availability Pay: The *Law Enforcement Availability Pay Act* is included in the Senate version of the Treasury/Postal Service Appropriations Bill. The Availability Pay legislation was included in the Treasury-Postal Service bill by Senator DeConcini, who has had a long history of support for Federal law enforcement. The purpose of this act is to provide premium pay to law enforcement officers to ensure their availability for unscheduled duty. The bill would mandate that availability pay (25 percent of base salary) be given to criminal investigators who are available an annual average of two unscheduled hours or more a day in excess of the regular 8-hour work day. Availability pay would replace AUO, but would be treated the same as AUO in computing retirement benefits.



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9. *How many illegal aliens are involved in drug trafficking? Please provide arrest and conviction data.*

While DEA does collect citizenship data on the individuals that we arrest, we do not make determinations as to whether they are illegal aliens or legal residents of the United States. In Fiscal Year 1993, 26 percent of all of DEA's arrest were of foreign nationals. The two largest groups of foreign nationals consisted of Mexicans and Colombians; DEA arrested 2,662 Mexicans (48 percent of all foreign arrests), and 1,033 Colombians (18 percent of all foreign arrests). Fiscal Year 1993 convictions for Mexicans totaled 1,847, and 853 for Colombians. Please note that the arrest and conviction data do not necessarily refer to the same individuals because of the time between an arrest and subsequent disposition.

I hope that this information will be helpful to you. If you need any additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Thomas A. Constantine
Administrator



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